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Chapter 1
General Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Background
1.1.1 Overview
How markets impound information into asset prices is one of the major concerns of nan-
cial economics. Standard asset pricing models are typically built on the premise that new
information is reected immediately in equilibrium prices, which consequently provide
the best possible estimate of fundamental asset values. Investors are eectively assumed
to have innite time and processing resources, which enable them to gather and process
all value-relevant signals instantaneously and appropriately. These assumptions, however,
stand in stark contrast to a large body of psychological research which has documented
that humans nd it hard to respond to multiple information signals or to perform sev-
eral tasks simultaneously. Directing attention towards one stimulus necessarily goes along
with a reduction of attention towards other tasks. In short, human attention is limited
and must be selective.
Motivated by this long-standing and intuitively appealing evidence, a rapidly growing
stream of theoretical and empirical research highlights the importance of attention con-
straints in nance. This work suggests that market participants' limited attention may
be important not only for individual behavior, but also for equilibrium market outcomes.
Yet despite the well-known relevance of attention constraints for human decision making,
nancial research has only recently addressed their potentially powerful role in a compre-
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hensive and rigorous way. As a consequence, the impact of investor attention constraints
on nancial markets is still far from being well understood.1
Against this background, the major goal of this thesis is to broaden and deepen the
understanding on how limited investor attention aects economic aggregates in nancial
markets. In doing so, this thesis aims to contribute to a fundamental debate in behavioral
economics: Do phenomena in individual behavior matter in that they extend to the market
level?
More specically, this thesis consists of four distinct research projects. Each of the rst
three derives implications of limited investor attention for equilibrium outcomes at the
stock-level, and then subsequently investigates their empirical validity in depth. In this
way, the thesis uncovers and explains several novel patterns in turnover and return data.
A fourth empirical study explores the relative performance of simple portfolio diversi-
cation strategies, whose design might be considered as meeting the needs of cognitively
overloaded private investors.
1.1.2 Attention Constraints and Individual Decision Making in Financial
Markets
Laboratory studies in psychology have accumulated comprehensive evidence that atten-
tion is a limited resource (Kahneman (1973)). Subjects can focus their attention on a
particular stimulus only at the expense of other stimuli in the environment.2 As for in-
stance a literature survey by Pashler (1998) reveals, it has been known for a long time
that performance typically suers if individuals aim at carrying out several mental tasks
at the same time.
1This view is also expressed in a number of recent quotes. For example Camerer (2006) notes: \Attention is perhaps the
ultimate scarce cognitive resource. A few studies have started to explore its implications for economics." (p.202). Cohen
and Frazzini (2008) state that \there is a large body of literature in psychology regarding individuals' ability to allocate
attention between tasks". (...) \An empirical literature is also beginning to build regarding investor limited attention."
(p.1981). Corwin and Coughenour (2008) point out that \despite the documented importance of limited attention in other
settings, its impact on nancial markets has only recently attracted attention." (p. 3064).
2An often cited example in this context are dichotic listening tasks (Broadbent (1953)). In its simplest form, subjects
are exposed to two dierent auditory stimuli simultaneously, one played to each ear. They are instructed to extract the
information contained in one of the stimuli. When afterwards asked about the second stimulus, subjects can typically
remember very little.
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Yet despite the intuitive appeal of these ndings, the question to what extent they mat-
ter for the quality of decision making in nancial markets has only recently become the
subject of intensive investigations. This may seem surprising as asset markets provide
a natural setting for exploring consequences of decision markers' time and processing
constraints. Market participants are constantly faced with an abundance of information
signals, which moreover widely vary in strength and precision. However, time and atten-
tion are costly. Consequently, market participants have to be very careful and selective
in distilling and processing this vast amount of information in a short period of time.
Optimally allocating nite resources in this context is a complex and demanding task. It
therefore seems reasonable to hypothesize that attention constraints may potentially have
far-reaching implications for many aspects of nancial markets.
However, a key obstacle to work aiming at empirically investigating this conjecture is that
investor attention allocation is typically not observable. As Barber and Odean (2008) put
it: \A direct measure would be to go back in time and, each day, question (...) investors
(...) as to which stocks they thought about that day." (p.787). In contrast to laboratory
experiments in psychological research, attention in real nancial markets can hardly be
measured directly. A challenge for empirical work is therefore to design promising indirect
measures for attention allocation. An emerging stream of literature addresses this issue by
developing and testing conceptually quite diverse proxies for limited investor attention,
both in the time-series and in the cross-section.3 Chapter 3 and chapter 4 of this thesis
aim at progressing on this front.
Which market participants are likely to be aected by attention constraints? It is nat-
ural to assume that information processing constraints should be particularly binding
for retail investors. And indeed, the empirical literature on the trading behavior of in-
dividual investors supports this conjecture. Findings thereby also typically suggest that
the attention-driven nature of retail investors' behavior negatively aects their perfor-
mance.4 For example, the common theme underlying the studies of Barber and Odean
3The time-series perspective is taken by e.g. Bagnoli et al. (2006), DellaVigna and Pollet (2009), Hirshleifer et al. (2009),
Hou et al. (2009), Peng et al. (2007), and Peress (2008). The cross-sectional view is considered in e.g. Barber and Odean
(2008), Da et al. (2011), Grullon et al. (2004), Engelberg (2008), Hou et al. (2009), Lou (2010), and Loh (2010).
4Work in other areas of economics strengthens the conjecture that limited attention might adversely eect individuals'
welfare. For instance, see Hossain and Morgan (2006) for inattention towards shipping costs in eBay auctions or Chetty
et al. (2009) for inattention to intransparent taxes. See DellaVigna (2009) for a recent overview.
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(2008), Engelberg et al. (2011), Lou (2010), and Seasholes and Wu (2007) is to reveal
that retail investors are net buyers of attention-grabbing stocks, which subsequently un-
derperform. This nding is in line with an extant literature which documents that retail
investors are particularly susceptible to a number of costly decision-making mistakes.5 In
fact, \these discrepancies, or investment mistakes, are central to the eld of household
nance." (Campbell (2006), p. 1554.) Against this background, chapter 5 of this thesis
is devoted to evaluate easy to implement asset allocation strategies as a possible remedy
against this widespread behavior of cognitively overloaded private investors.6
However, the impact of limited attention does not seem to be restricted to this specic
subgroup of market participants. For instance, Kacperczyk et al. (2011) provide evidence
suggestive of mutual fund managers exhibiting limited attention. References in Hirshleifer
and Teoh (2003) suggest that analysts fail to take value-relevant nancial statement in-
formation into account. Corwin and Coughenour (2008) show that time and processing
constraints negatively aect the liquidity provision of market makers, in particular in busy
moments. Limited attention is rooted in human cognitive resource constraints. In varying
degrees, it therefore matters for all market participants, including sophisticated nancial
professionals (e.g. Libby et al. (2002), Hirshleifer et al. (2004), Hirshleifer et al. (2009),
Huang and Liu (2007)).
1.1.3 Attention Constraints and Stock Market Outcomes
Limited attention might matter at the individual level, but does it also matter for eco-
nomic aggregates? There is clearly a strong demand to evaluate whether limited attention
is merely an interesting aspect of market participants' behavior, or whether it has im-
portant implications for equilibrium outcomes. But in which ways might attention-driven
5See e.g. Barber and Odean (2011) for a recent review. Among the best documented investment mistakes are the following:
Retail investors show a disposition to sell winning stocks too early and hold on to losing stocks too long (e.g. Odean (1998),
Shefrin and Statman (1985), and Weber and Camerer (1998)). They often trade excessively (e.g. Barber and Odean (2000),
and Odean (1999)). They tend to forgo the benets of diversication (e.g. Benartzi (2001), French and Poterba (1991),
Goetzmann and Kumar (2008), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), Kilka and Weber (2000)).
6It should be noted that limited attention per se is not a behavioral bias, as it merely reects constraints in human
information processing (e.g Hou et al. (2009)). However, it is likely to be related to or to interact with well-known biases.
For example, Yuan (2009) nds that attention-constrained retail investors suer from more pronounced disposition eects.
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) conjectures that narrow framing (Kahneman (2003)), i.e. the tendency to buy and sell assets
without considering total portfolio eects, is rooted in information processing constraints.
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individual decisions aect market behavior? The literature so far has proposed a number
of answers, which also depend on which specic variables and settings one is interested in.
The empirical studies in this thesis shed further light on the role of limited attention for
stock-level turnover (chapter 2) as well as for the price discovery of economically linked
stocks (chapter 3 and 4).
The impact limited investor attention can have on aggregate stock-level trading volume is,
to some extent, obvious: In their investment decision, investors can only consider stocks
whose existence they are aware of (e.g. Merton (1987)). Consequently, attention towards
a certain rm is simply a necessary condition for trading its stock (e.g. Hou et al. (2009)).
Apart from this very basic relationship, several theories and empirical ndings suggest
more specic mechanisms for how the link between attention and trading volume might
work. For instance, if (at least some) attention-constraint investors form their expectations
on the basis of only a subset of publicly available information (e.g. Hong and Stein (1999)),
dierences of opinion might become more pronounced. To the extent that investors do
not suciently adjust for the fact that they are not basing their valuations on all relevant
information, trading volume might increase (e.g. Hong and Stein (2007)). This eect
might be even more pronounced if attention constraints and behavioral biases such as
overcondence or self-attribution bias are present simultaneously (e.g. Hou et al. (2009),
Daniel et al. (1998)). Investors then might pay selective attention towards news that
conrms their private information, whose precision might consequently be overestimated.
A dierent line of arguments suggests that cognitively overloaded investors might have
preferred habitats, i.e. choose to trade only a specic subset of available securities, to
reduce the complexity of investment decisions (e.g. Barberis and Shleifer (2003), Barberis
et al. (2005)). If a stock belongs to the habitat of particularly many investors, it is more
likely to be traded than the stocks of otherwise comparable rms (e.g. Loughran and
Schultz (2005)). In a similar vein, attention-grabbing stocks might ceteris paribus be
more likely to be heavily traded, as these stocks solve the search problem of which stock
to invest in. When there are many alternatives such as the thousands of stocks available in
nancial markets, options that particular catch attention are natural candidates. In line
with this reasoning, Barber and Odean (2008), Engelberg et al. (2011), among others,
show that retail investors excessively invest in attention-grabbing stocks. Moreover, there
is convincing evidence that stale news, which however is broadcasted in an attention-
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grabbing matter, leads to increased trading (e.g. Huberman (2001), Gilbert et al. (2011),
Tetlock (2011)). Finally, Grullon et al. (2004) and Chemmanur and Yan (2009) show that
the stocks of rms with high advertising expenditures are, ceteris paribus, more heavily
traded.
Approaches proposing that investor attention constraints also matter for price discovery in
nancial markets arguably often face higher hurdles. A key obstacle to any attention-based
theory of mispricings is that it rst has to convincingly argue why arbitrageurs should
fail to keep asset prices close to the fundamental values implied by standard models. In
ecient markets in the sense of Fama (1970), arbitrage is the crucial force which ensures
that actual stock prices equal the fundamental value of the rm. In this classical view, as
soon as the actions of less than fully rational investors cause stock prices to deviate from
their true value, rational arbitrageurs will step in. They will aggressively bet against the
mispricings, thereby bringing prices back in line with their fundamentally justied level.
According to this textbook view, arbitrageurs will implement zero-cost trading strategies
to gain close to riskless prots at the expense of less rational traders.
This traditional view, however, has been challenged by a strand of research, which is
commonly referred to as the \limits to arbitrage" literature. In essence, this work argues
that strategies designed to correct deviations from fundamental values can, in reality,
be both risky and costly. Moreover, arbitrageur capital might be subject to nancial
constraints, induced by e.g. agency conicts. As a consequence, arbitrageurs might have
less incentives or less possibilities to quickly eliminate even apparent mispricings, which
therefore might persist at potentially substantial levels and for potentially long periods of
time. By now, both the theoretical and empirical literature on impediments to arbitrage
is comprehensive7, and a broad consensus with regard to the key frictions and major
forces has emerged. Barberis and Shleifer (2003) refer to the insights obtained from this
work as \one of the biggest successes of behavioral nance" (p. 1053). Investor psychology
and limits to arbitrage are often considered the two building blocks of behavioral nance
needed to explain return anomalies, which are dicult to reconcile with standard asset
pricing models (e.g. Shleifer and Summers (1990), Gromb and Vayanos (2010)).
7A small selection includes Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002), Jong et al. (2009), Long et al. (1990), Hong et al. (2011),
Ponti (2006), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), and Shleifer (2000). See Gromb and Vayanos (2010) for a recent review of the
literature.
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In the light of such limits to arbitrage, attention-driven investment behavior is likely to
leave discernible traces in stock return data. Recent studies provide theoretical frameworks
in which investor attention constraints can aect asset pricing statics and dynamics. More-
over, a growing empirical work tests implications derived from these models. For instance,
informationally overloaded investors may be slow in incorporating publicly available in-
formation immediately into prices.8 This gradual information ow will lead to stock price
underreaction, giving rise to return predictability.9 Information will not be completely
incorporated into asset prices until investors fully pay attention to it.
The prominence with which (actual or stale) news is revealed appears crucial in this con-
text (e.g. Hong and Stein (2007)). A substream of the literature proposes that attention-
driven noise traders may excessively focus on attention-grabbing stocks, thereby inducing
price pressure and stock price overreaction.10 In this sense, investor attention constraints
appear to play a dual role (e.g. Hou et al. (2009)).
Finally, limited investor attention may also cause more subtle patterns in price discovery.
For example, cognitively overloaded investors might have a tendency to categorize stocks
into broad classes, such as local or value stocks, instead of focussing on individual rms.
Processing information and making investment decisions primarily at the aggregate cate-
gory level might subsequently induce excessive comovements of stock returns, as rms in
the respective class are treated (too) equally.11
8A vivid and clean example is given in Huberman and Regev (2001). The authors run a case study on the price discovery
of a single biotech company named EntreMed. Huberman and Regev (2001) document that its stock price more than tripled
in May 1998 as a consequence of seemingly breaking news made public on a front-page article in the New York Times.
Remarkably, however, this article was in fact based on stale news. The substance of the story had already been released
months earlier - in a less attention-grabbing manner in the less widely read scientic magazine \Nature".
9Papers representing this line of reasoning include Cohen and Frazzini (2008), DellaVigna and Pollet (2007), DellaVigna
and Pollet (2009), Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), Hirshleifer et al. (2009), Hong and Stein (1999), Hong et al. (2007), Hou
and Moskowitz (2005), Menzly and Ozbas (2010), and Peress (2008).
10Papers representing this line of reasoning include e.g. Barber and Odean (2008),Engelberg et al. (2011), and Seasholes
and Wu (2007).
11Theoretical work includes e.g. Barberis and Shleifer (2003), Peng (2005), or Peng and Xiong (2006). Empirical work
has addressed a number of dierent settings. For instance, see Cooper et al. (2001) and Cooper et al. (2005) on the eect
of name changes, Barberis et al. (2005), Greenwood (2008), or Boyer (2011) on index eects, Green and Hwang (2009) on
price eects, or Pirinsky and Wang (2006) on location eects.
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1.2 Outline of the Thesis and Main Results
This thesis is a collection of four empirical research projects which are devoted to several
of the above raised issues. The remainder of the this section will shortly summarize the
chapters and their main results in turn.
In chapter 2 (joint with Martin Weber), we exploit exogenous variation in limited investor
attention along a geographical line in order to analyze whether localized trading is an
important driver of rm-level turnover.
Specically, based on the well-documented fact that investors have a strong preference
for trading stocks of locally headquartered rms, we investigate the following research
questions: Is individual local bias strong and pervasive enough to materially aect the
cross-section of stock turnover at the rm level? If so, which rms and which investor
groups tend to be most aected? Are there cross-sectional regularities in stock-level trad-
ing volume related to rm location, rm visibility, and investor clienteles?
We shed light on these issues by running a series of natural experiments in the German
stock market. Germany has several holidays which are legally observed only in some of
its 16 states. These holidays are characterized by a limit or ban on work and ocial
business (but not exchanges). Previous research and casual evidence suggest that both
private and professional investors in holiday regions tend to be temporarily distracted
and thus to often refrain from actively participating in the stock market on such days.
A large and geographically concentrated subset of holiday-distracted investors would not
have implications for the cross-section of stock turnover, if these investors traded the
market portfolio. However, the combination of limited attention and local bias gives rise
to a hypothesis untested so far: Stocks of rms located in holiday regions should ceteris
paribus exhibit a more pronounced drop in turnover than stocks of rms located in un-
aected regions. An advantage of the German setting is that both samples are similar
and thus satisfy the requirements of a natural experiment: They are broadly homogenous
with respect to e.g. the number of rms, industry composition, typical rm size, average
stock risk-return proles or (unconditional) turnover properties. Similar ndings apply to
important characteristics of individual investors.
We nd strong support for our conjecture in the data. Stocks of rms located in holiday
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regions are (only) temporarily strikingly less traded, both in statistical and economic
terms, than otherwise similar stocks of rms in non-holiday regions. The pure regional
holiday-induced abnormal drop in turnover roughly ranges from 10% to 20%, and survives
a number of sensitivity checks. We devote considerable eort to the question whether our
ndings are driven by a temporary change in the cross-section of information release.
From a rm perspective, we analyze shocks in the release of corporate news. From a
market perspective, we study shocks in the idiosyncratic component of stock returns.
From an investors viewpoint, we explore shocks in the search frequency for rm names
in Google. From an analyst perspective, we study shocks in the cross-section of stock
recommendations. From a media point of view, we analyze shocks in press coverage.
These tests only sporadically point to dierences in information intensity.
We thus argue that our ndings, in their entirety and robustness, are most plausibly
explained with locally biased investors staying out of the market due to regional holidays.
Consistent with this interpretation, the volume shock is particularly pronounced in stocks,
which are small, hard to value or neglected by the press, and thus less visible to non-
local investors. Trading records of about 3,000 German online broker investors provide
additional supportive evidence. Private investors appear to drive the negative volume
shock in small rms, in which their localized trading is concentrated.
While chapter 2 has focused on stock-level trading volume, chapter 3 (joint with Martin
Weber) concentrates on stock-level price discovery. It does so by testing asset pricing
implications of the investor attention shift hypothesis proposed in recent theoretical work
(e.g. Peng and Xiong (2006)). Our objective here is to directly assess how the dynamics
of investor inattention aect the relative pricing eciency of linked assets. We thereby
study a promising and so far widely neglected setting, which diers conceptually from
the ones the literature on limited attention has addressed so far: Stock pairs trading
(Gatev et al. (2006)), a popular proprietary relative arbitrage approach, which bets on
the future performance of stocks with very similar past performance. More specically,
the major research questions dealt with are the following: How to proxy for unobservable
investor attention allocation? Is the price formation of linked stocks aected by time-
varying investor attention? More specically, do shocks in limited attention towards rm-
level information hinder market participants from keeping relative prices of stock pairs in
line, thereby giving rise to cross-return predictability?
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To answer these questions, we design a novel proxy for limited investor attention in the
time series, which relies on the intuition behind recent models on the dynamics of attention
allocation. It aims at identifying days on which market participants are likely to be forced
to spend more (or less) resources than usual on understanding \the big picture". The
goal is to separate \high distraction days", during which turbulent market conditions are
assumed to demand investors full attention, from \low distraction days", during which
we expect sucient resources to process complex interactions at the rm-level. We then
test whether the proxy is able to to explain variations in the magnitude of prots to pairs
trading, building on the idea that investors might \lose sight of the trees (stock-level
information) for the forest (more aggregate information)".
The nature of pairs trading is very simple. It consists of a formation period followed
immediately by a trading period. In the rst step, one identies those stock pairs whose
historical prices have moved together the most. In our analysis, we consider in total close
to half a billion of eligible stock pairs. In the immediately following second step, one shorts
the relatively overpriced winner and buys the relatively underpriced loser, whenever the
cumulative returns have suciently diverged. If the future resembles the past, prices
are likely to nally convergence again, thereby generating positive returns on zero-cost
portfolios. Our baseline analysis here relies on ndings from more than 300,000 round-trip
trades. We are particularly interested in whether it makes any dierence whether stocks
diverge on high or low distraction days.
And indeed, we nd broad, robust, and economically meaningful evidence for investor
distraction eects. For instance, the average one-month return on those long-short US
stock pairs in 1962 to 2008 which happen to open on high distraction days is about
twice as high as the return on pairs which open on low distraction days. In line with the
implications of limited investor attention, pairs diverging on high distraction days are far
more likely to converge again within in the next few days. This nding is not limited to
the US market. The return dierence between high and low distraction days is a persistent
phenomenon which, with varying degree, is observable in each of the eight major non-US
stock markets we additionally study.
Alternative proxies for limited attention, which we derive from the previous literature,
often have an incremental eect. US pairs opening immediately before holidays, when
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investor distraction is likely to be particularly high, tend to be more protable and to
converge more often than pairs on average. In line with our hypotheses, the impact of
investor distraction appears lower for pairs consisting of rms from the same industry
or for pairs consisting of whole value-weighted industries. Finally, pairs particularly ne-
glected (covered) by the media appear more (less) protable, and exhibit a higher (lower)
sensitivity to changes in the level of investor distraction. Collectively, our results lend
support to the notion that the relative eciency of linked assets might not be stable over
time, but be aected by short-term investor attention shifts.
Chapter 4 provides a natural extension of the line of arguments developed in the previous
chapter. Again, it is concerned with the question whether attention shifts matter for price
discovery of linked stocks. However, we now concentrate on twin stocks, i.e. on rms
with a fundamental, contractual, and sometimes long-standing economic relationship.
These rms have contractually agreed on pooling all their current and future operations
and cash-ows, but remain separate entities with their own stock exchange listings in
their own countries. Their typically large and liquid stocks can be considered close to
perfect substitutes. No model of intrinsic value is required, which overcomes the bad
model problem inherent in many asset pricing tests. These stocks should move in lockstep
in frictionless, ecient markets.
However, their returns and prices often exhibit large deviations from theoretical parity.
This puzzling nding has motivated substantial research and is by now widely consid-
ered a textbook example of apparent mispricings in nancial markets (e.g. Barberis and
Shleifer (2003)). Previous work has convincingly shown that arbitrage is limited, which
can explains why mispricings might persist - but not why they arise in the rst place.
Why do investors at least temporarily fail to take the blatant fundamental relationship
between twin stocks into account? What exactly causes returns of twin stocks to diverge?
Very little is known about the underlying mechanisms. We address this gap in the liter-
ature by exploring the role of time-varying investor attention as one potential source of
temporary return deviations. The design of the baseline distraction proxy thereby closely
follows the approach developed in chapter 3, so that the results might be considered as
reconrming its explanatory power.
Our main contribution is to show that changes in the level of daily and weekly return
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discrepancies of internationally listed twin stocks are indeed positively correlated with
a number of conceptually quite diverse proxies deemed to measure changes in investor
attention. These ndings largely carry over to the price perspective. Price deviations from
theoretical parity tend to be somewhat higher (lower) than usual in moments of high (low)
investor distraction. In a related out of sample setting, we nally nd supportive evidence
from US dual-class shares.
Chapter 5 (joint with Sebastian Muller and Martin Weber) diers from the other research
projects in that it does not focus on market-level implications of investor attention con-
straints. Instead, it is devoted to the evaluation of easily implementable asset allocation
guidelines for individual investors. Such an analysis is important as the empirical litera-
ture has uncovered many costly investment mistakes of retail investors, out of which at
least some appear to be linked to cognitive resource constraints. As a consequence, deriv-
ing feasible buy-and-hold diversication strategies might be considered a possible remedy
against such investment biases.
Specically, the project addresses the following research questions: From the perspective
of retail investors in real-life situations, what is the most promising way to diversify? Do
simple rules of thumb add value? To what extent do such heuristics underperform when
benchmarked against sophisticated optimization models?
Our approach allows us to provide suggestions for the construction of a \world market
portfolio" that is as ex-ante ecient as possible. Our contribution to literature is twofold.
First, we compare a broad spectrum of heuristic portfolio policies with eleven promising
model extensions of the Markowitz (1952) mean-variance framework. Second, we explicitly
dierentiate between two ways of diversication that are usually analyzed separately:
International diversication in the stock market and diversication across dierent asset
classes. Given our focus, we pay particular attention to the practicability of our results.
We nd that none of the Markowitz-based portfolio models is able to signicantly outper-
form simple heuristics out-of-sample. Our results reveal that in fact a very broad range
of xed-weight allocation policies oers similar diversication gains as even sophisticated
and recently developed portfolio optimization approaches. This holds true for both inter-
national diversication in the stock market and diversication over dierent asset classes.
We thus suggest a simple and cost-ecient allocation approach for private investors.
Chapter 2
The Trading Volume Impact of Local
Bias: Evidence from a Natural
Experiment*
2.1 Introduction
By now there is ample evidence that both private and professional investors have a strong
preference for trading stocks of locally-headquartered rms. But is this so-called local bias
strong and pervasive enough to matter for the cross-section of stock turnover at the rm
level? To answer this question, we run a natural experiment in the German stock market.
Germany has several holidays which are observed only in some of its 16 states. While
these holidays have a religious origin, they materially inuence public life as a whole.
Authorized by law, they are characterized by a limit or ban on work and ocial business
(but not exchanges). Previous research (e.g. DellaVigna and Pollet (2009), Hong and Yu
(2009), and Frieder and Subrahmanyam (2004)) and casual evidence suggest that both
private and professional investors in holiday regions tend to be temporarily distracted and
thus to often refrain from actively participating in the stock market on such days.
This exogenous variation in investor attention along a geographical line would not have
implications for the cross-section of abnormal rm-level trading activity if investors traded
This chapter is forthcoming in the Review of Finance.
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the market portfolio. Only the aggregate level of trading volume might then be aected
(e.g. Lo and Wang (2000)). However, the introduction of local bias gives rise to a cross-
sectional hypothesis untested so far: Stocks of rms located in holiday regions (in the
following referred to as holiday rms) should, all else equal, exhibit a more pronounced
negative shock in trading activity than stocks of rms located in unaected regions (in the
following referred to as non-holiday rms). An advantage of the German setting is that
both samples are similar and thus satisfy the requirements of a natural experiment: They
are broadly homogenous with respect to e.g. the number of rms, industry composition,
typical rm size, average stock risk-return proles or (unconditional) turnover properties.
Similar ndings apply to important characteristics of individual investors.
Consistent with our line of reasoning, we indeed nd that holiday rms are (only) tem-
porarily strikingly less traded, both in statistical and economic terms. The negative shock
in turnover relative to non-holiday rms ranges roughly from 10% to 20%. It is not aected
by the inclusion of various control variables or several changes in methodology.
To the extent that news arrival triggers abnormal trading, one might be concerned that
our ndings could be driven by a temporary change in the cross-section of information
release. Note, however, that the vast amount of rm-relevant news on a market, industry,
style or other aggregated levels should not be aected by regional holidays. It is arguably
only the structure of idiosyncratic rm-specic news, generated in or near a rm's head-
quarter, which might potentially be aected. Digging deeper, we explore this news-based
explanation of our ndings from ve perspectives. From a rm perspective, we analyze
shocks in the release of corporate news. From a market perspective, we study shocks in
the idiosyncratic component of stock returns. From an investor's viewpoint, we explore
shocks in the search frequency for rm names in Google. From an analyst perspective,
we study shocks in the cross-section of stock recommendations. From a media point of
view, we analyze shocks in press coverage. Overall, these tests (only) sporadically point
to signicant dierences in information release. Thus, we cannot rule out the possibility
of lower information intensity for holiday rms contributing to our results. However, we
believe it is justied to argue that information eects are unlikely to fully explain the
magnitude and robustness of the ndings we document.
In line with a local bias explanation and the investor recognition hypothesis of Merton
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(1987), the regional holiday eect is particularly pronounced for rms less visible to non-
local investors. Market capitalization, idiosyncratic risk and residual media coverage are
used as proxies for visibility. Finally, we study daily trading patterns of about 3,000
private investors from a German online broker. Consistent with implications of previous
research, individual investors seem to disproportionately cause the negative turnover shock
in smaller rms, in which their localized trading is concentrated.
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, while prior research shows
that investors are biased towards the stocks of nearby rms, we identify scenarios in which
these individual preferences are strong and pervasive enough to materially aect the cross-
section of stock turnover. To our knowledge, our novel approach thereby provides the rst
non-US evidence of local bias aecting market outcomes.
Second, our ndings help to better understand determinants of stock-level trading volume,
which plays an essential role in much research on liquidity, return predictability, behavioral
nance or information asymmetries. For example, Hong and Stein (2007) note that \many
of most interesting patterns in prices and returns are tightly linked to movements in
volume" (p. 111). At the same time, empirical evidence on the drivers of its substantial
variation both in the cross-section and time-series is scarce (see e.g. the discussions in Gao
and Lin (2010), Statman et al. (2006) or Chordia et al. (2007)). We add to this literature by
uncovering cross-sectional regularities related to rm location, rm visibility, and investor
clienteles.
Third, a growing body of research builds on the idea of limited attention, whereby in-
vestors process only a subset of publicly available information due to attention capacity
constraints. A challenge for empirical work is the identication of a suitable proxy for
investor distraction. For example, Hou et al. (2009) rely on down market periods, while
Hirshleifer et al. (2009) employ the number of competing earnings announcements. In a
scenario related to ours, DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) analyze the market response to
earnings announcements on Fridays, when, as they argue, investor inattention is more
likely. Our ndings highlight the role of regional holidays as a promising proxy for limited
attention. We identify scenarios which seem to cause distraction of an important sub-
set of investors, leading to market frictions in trading activity along a geographical line.
Moreover, we explore which rms and investor groups tend to be most aected.
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses related research
and develops our hypotheses. Section 2.3 describes sample characteristics. Section 2.4
contains the event study and explores alternative interpretations of our ndings. Section
2.5 analyzes determinants of the regional holiday eect. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature and Hypotheses
By now, there is extensive and robust evidence for local bias on an individual level.1
However, research exploring its implications for return and volume patterns is still at the
beginning and moreover limited to the US market. Pirinsky and Wang (2006) document
an excessive comovement of local stock returns, which they attribute to correlated trad-
ing of local residents. Building on investors' consumption smoothing motives, Korniotis
and Kumar (2010) argue that stock returns contain a predictable local component. The
ndings of Hong et al. (2008) suggest that, in the presence of only few local rms compet-
ing for investors' money, share prices of spatially close rms are driven up by the excess
demand of proximate residents. In a current study based on intra-day data, Shive (2011)
exploits large power outages to study the eect of local investor clienteles on pricing e-
ciency. Her study provides evidence that informed local investors play an important role
in information processing and price discovery.
To the best of our knowledge, only two papers focus on the impact of local bias on rm-
level turnover. Loughran and Schultz (2004) show, among other pieces of evidence, that the
time zone in which a rm is headquartered triggers intraday trading patterns in its stock.
Loughran and Schultz (2005) demonstrate that rural stocks are less liquid than urban
stocks, which they attribute to the latter being local and thus visible to more potential
1Heterogeneous ndings suggest that both informational and behavioral factors are likely to drive local bias. Studies
attributing this behavior to a preference for investing into the familiar, to the pronounced visibility of local stocks or to
incorrectly perceived information advantages include e.g. Bailey et al. (2008), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), Huberman
(2001), Seasholes and Zhu (2010), and Zhu (2003). Papers arguing in favor of superior locally generated information include
e.g. Baik et al. (2010), Bodnaruk (2009), Coval and Moskowitz (1999), Coval and Moskowitz (2001), Feng and Seasholes
(2004), Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005), and Massa and Simonov (2006). Moreover, recent studies of Brown et al. (2008),
Hong et al. (2004), Hong et al. (2005), Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2007), and Shive (2010) show that local social interaction
and neighborhood word-of-mouth eects strongly aect investment decisions. Local bias has been shown to be robust
across countries, investor subgroups and sample periods. For the German market, combined ndings from e.g. Dorn and
Huberman (2005), Dorn et al. (2008), Hau (2001), and this study suggest that, in the overall picture, German investors
pose no exception.
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investors. They conclude that \much remains to be done on geography and asset pricing"
(p. 363). We aim at taking a step in this direction by exploiting holidays which are observed
only in some areas of Germany. In our baseline analysis, we focus on All Saints' Day as well
as on Epiphany. All Saints' Day, celebrated on November 1, is legally recognized only in
the states of Baden-Wurttemberg, Bavaria, Northrhine-Westphalia, Rhineland Palatinate,
and Saarland. Epiphany, celebrated on January 6, is a legally recognized holiday only in
the states of Baden-Wurttemberg, Bavaria, and Saxony-Anhalt. There are more regional
celebrations in Germany (see the appendix). We partly rely on these holidays in later tests.
However, focusing on Epiphany and All Saints' Day yields the most attractive event study
properties: It is a yearly event which splits the market in two large disjunct groups with
similar characteristics (see section 2.3 for details).
How holidays in general aect (in particular private) investors' trading behavior is an
empirical question. On the one hand, one might expect increased trading activity, as in-
vestors may have more time to engage in the stock market. On the other hand, one might
expect decreased trading activity, as investors could indulge in vacation activities and
thus refrain from participation in the market. Indeed, previous work supports this second
line of reasoning. Frieder and Subrahmanyam (2004) show that turnover drops during
nationwide holidays. Hong and Yu (2009) provide evidence of aggregate trading activity
in international stock markets (including Germany) being lower during summer holiday
periods, which they dub a \gone shin' eect". This seasonality in turnover seems to
be caused by both private and professional investors. DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) re-
port that trading activity immediately after earnings announcements made on Fridays is
comparatively low, as investors tend to be absent-minded due to the upcoming weekend.
With regard to the German setting, the idea of investors being temporarily distracted is
backed up by anecdotal evidence from leading papers and news services.2 Combined with
local bias, this type of limited investor attention makes novel predictions. Specically,
2For instance, Die Welt (May 27, 2005), Financial T imes Deutschland (June 12, 2009), Tagesspiegel (June 12, 2009),
Stuttgarter Zeitung (May 8, 2007; May 24, 2008), DPA (May 25, 2001), and Dow Jones (June 1, 2007) all report that
many investors, both private and professional, stay out of the market on regional holidays and corresponding bridge days.
Other articles indirectly point to (primarily retail) investor distraction. For example, Frankfurter Rundschau (October 30,
2004) and Die Welt (November 2, 2004) report that non-holiday states prot from increased holiday tourism. AHGZ (May
12, 2007), a magazine for the hotel and catering sector, states that retail sales volume is higher around regional holidays.
Spiegel Online (June 14, 2006) and ddp (June 8, 2009) point to the danger of trac jams due to the large number of people
on a short holiday. Sueddeutsche Zeitung (October 31, 2000) writes about massive obstructions of trac near graveyards
on All Saints' Day, on which it is custom to honor the deceased.
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if investors tend to heavily overweight local stocks in their investment decisions, then a
large, geographically concentrated subset of holiday-distracted investors might temporar-
ily change the cross-section of stock turnover:
Hypothesis 1: Due to local bias, trading activity during regional holidays will be signicantly
lower for rms in holiday regions.
This hypothesis is consistent with the trading volume implications of the habitat-based
model of comovement in Barberis et al. (2005). Similarly, in the model of Merton (1987),
investors are aware only of a subset of the stock universe. Consequently, the demand for
each stock depends on its shadow cost of information. In equilibrium, rms recognized by
less investors, will, all else equal, have fewer shareholders taking relatively large positions.
It seems plausible to assume that investor recognition of a rm is negatively correlated
with geographical distance. We thus expect the impact of local investors to be particularly
strong for rms which are hardly visible to remote investors:
Hypothesis 2: The negative turnover shock will be more pronounced for those local rms
which are less recognized by non-local investors.
We also explore whether there are dierences across investor types, which empirical nd-
ings assess to be likely. The aforementioned evidence of limited stock market participation
during holidays appears to hold particularly true for private investors. At the same time,
retail stock ownership tends to be more exposed to local bias than institutional stock hold-
ings (e.g. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001)). Small rms have been shown to be investment
habitats of retail investors (e.g. Dorn et al. (2008), Kumar and Lee (2006)), whose local
bias is particularly concentrated in these stocks (e.g. Zhu (2003)). Thus, traces of retail
investor behavior in rm-level turnover should be most easily detected in small stocks.
Combined with the observation of Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) that those investors
who trade excessively are particularly locally biased, the rich set of ndings suggests:
Hypothesis 3: The negative turnover shock in smaller rms will be disproportionately
caused by individual investors.
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2.3 Sample Characteristics
We follow the consensus in the literature on local bias and use a rm's headquarter as
a proxy for its location. Our initial sample consists of the common stocks of all rms
headquartered in Germany which have been listed on a German stock exchange at some
point between June 13, 1988 and January 15, 2009.3 The lower bound is determined
by the availability of the daily number of shares traded. The upper bound is meant to
maximize the sample size by the inclusion of Epiphany (January 6) in 2009. The data is
then subjected to a three-stage screening process.4 This leaves a nal sample of 792 stocks,
for which the appendix provides descriptive statistics at a weekly frequency. The mean
(median) rm is in our sample for 556 (515) weeks, has an average market capitalization
of 1,148 (123) million Euro, and has a weekly turnover of 1.42% (0.93%). There is large
cross-sectional and considerable time-series variation in turnover, which again motivates
the exploration of local bias as a potential driver of rm-level trading activity.
Figure 2.1 shows the geographic distribution of sample rms. Table 2.1 provides summary
statistics for event study samples.
3See the appendix for an overview of all data sets used in this study. For the holidays analyzed here, the Frankfurt stock
exchange has been open over the whole sample period, while stock trading at the regional exchanges in Germany started in
2000. This is unlikely to inuence our results for three reasons. First, for all sample stocks, the primary exchange from which
Datastream obtains its default prices turns out to be the Frankfurt stock exchange. Second, inferences remain unchanged
if we restrict our analysis to those stocks which are exclusively traded on the Frankfurt stock exchange. Third, results are
robust across time. In particular, they also hold for the subperiod 2000-2009 (see sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3 for details).
4First, adjusted and unadjusted daily closing prices, market capitalization, book values, the number of daily shares
traded, the number of total shares outstanding, adjustment factors as well as industry membership have to be available
via Datastream. Second, we conduct the tests suggested by Ince and Porter (2006). Third, to assure that our analysis is
not contaminated by very small and illiquid stocks, we exclude securities if their mean market capitalization is less than 10
million Euro or if the 5th percentile of their unadjusted prices is less than 1 Euro. The main results do not change if we use
the sample after step two, which contains 1,071 stocks.
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Figure 2.1: Geographic Distribution of Firm Headquarters and of Regional Holidays across Germany
This gure shows the location of rm headquarters across Germany. Headquarters are represented by black
dots; additional clusters of headquarters (with more than 20 rms) in a given city are represented by larger
dots and the corresponding number of rms. These clusters belong, from west to east, to the cities of Dusseldorf
(28 rms), Cologne (36 rms), Frankfurt (40 rms), Stuttgart (21 rms), Hamburg (57 rms), Munich (70
rms) and Berlin (48 rms). Moreover, the gure exemplarily illustrates the geographic distribution of regional
holidays across Germany. Shown is the example of Epiphany, which is legally recognized only in the grey-shaded
states of Baden-Wurttemberg (118 rms), Bavaria (180 rms), and Saxony-Anhalt (3 rms).
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Several ndings highlight advantages of the German setting. First, both the treatment
(holiday) and the control (non-holiday) groups form large portfolios. Second, their com-
position does not seem to dier much. For example, median rms have about the same
market capitalization and comparable average stock returns. Industry concentration, as
computed from Herndahl indices based on Datastream Level 2 industry classication, is
very similar. The appendix shows that also industry composition appears broadly com-
parable. Similar ndings apply to the fraction of large rm observations. Third, the time-
series properties of local turnover indices show a remarkably similar behavior, even in the
tails of the distribution. Fourth, an eyeball analysis of gure 1 reveals that rm location
in Germany tends to be less concentrated than in the predominantly used US samples
(e.g. Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005)). Fifth, not only rm-level variables, but also indi-
vidual investors' characteristics seem comparable. This is suggested by calculations based
on data of the German SAVE study (e.g. Boersch-Supan et al. (2009)), a comprehensive
panel survey designed to provide representative information on the nancial situation and
relevant socio-psychological traits of German households. As can be seen from the follow-
ing table, households' propensity to participate in the stock market, investors' risk taking
behavior and economic expectations, their nancial literacy and use of nancial advice,
or the inuence of social contacts on nancial decision-making is similar in control and
treatment groups.
With regard to typical US samples of previous local bias studies, Seasholes and Zhu (2010)
highlight a cross-sectional geographic sampling error, which they argue to potentially lead
to incorrect conclusions. Taken together, the German setting seems to suer less from
this selection bias. Instead, portfolios are broadly diversied, homogeneous in several
dimensions and thus seem particularly suitable for the following natural experiment.
2.4 Event Study
2.4.1 Methods and Baseline Results
In order to quantify the impact of localized trading, one needs to dene a measure of
trading activity. We focus on rm turnover as \turnover yields the sharpest empirical
implications and is the most natural measure" (Lo and Wang (2000), p. 12).
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As turnover is naturally skewed, we use its natural logarithm in the following calculations.
In the regression setting targeted at testing hypothesis 1, the dependent variable TOi;t is
the daily turnover of rm i on a regional holiday at time t. We consider each year from
1988 to 2009 in which the holiday falls on a trading day. For All Saints' Day (Epiphany),
this results in 16 (14) years with a total of 6,485 (5,657) observations.
During regional holidays, market turnover in general tends to be lower. The average daily
turnover of a value-weighted (equal-weighted) turnover index during the whole sample
period is 0.42% (0.20%). On Epiphany, these numbers decrease to 0.36% (0.14%), on All
Saints' Day to 0.29% (0.13%). However, we are not interested in changes in trading activity
per se, but in potential cross-sectional dierences between holiday and non-holiday rms.
Thus, the independent variable of interest is the holiday region dummy Holi;t that equals
one if a rm's headquarter is located in a holiday region and zero otherwise. The null
hypothesis is that the dummy should not have any signicance.
To isolate the holiday eect, it is essential to control for the expected level E[TOi;t]
of turnover. To assure robustness, we rely on two models widely employed in previous
research. Model 1 accounts for rm-specic average turnover in the pre-event period (e.g.
Chae (2005)). In the baseline analysis, the expected rm turnover is calculated as the
natural logarithm of the average turnover over t-20 to t-2. Model 2 controls for both
market-related and rm-specic volume by adopting a \turnover market model"(e.g. Tkac
(1999)). To this end, for t-60 to t-2, turnover for each rm is regressed on a market-
wide, value-weighted turnover index TOm;t. Using the coecients from the time-series
regression, expected turnover is then given by
E[TOi;t] = bi + biTOm;t: (2.1)
As current rm-level turnover might be related to current stock return (e.g. Chordia
et al. (2007)), we include two control variables. Ret+;i;t represents the event day stock
return if positive and zero otherwise.5 Ret ;i;t is dened analogously. This distinction
is motivated by possible asymmetric eects caused by short-selling constraints or the
disposition eect, which have been shown to aect localized trading (e.g. Grinblatt and
Keloharju (2001)). It has also been documented that turnover is inuenced by lagged
5However, our results do not change if we only include the lagged return or if we do not add return-related control
variables at all. Moreover, as shown in section 2.4.2, inferences are the same when including interaction terms to allow for
a dierent impact of returns on holiday rm turnover.
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stock returns (e.g. Statman et al. (2006), Glaser and Weber (2009)). This eect should
be captured at least partly by our measures of expected turnover. To more fully control
for recent past returns, we include two analogous variables (Ret+;i;t 1 and Ret ;i;t 1) for
the pre-event day return. The return controls might also be regarded as crude proxies for
news or rumors, which could aect turnover. In section 2.4.3, we comprehensively test for
dierences in information release between holiday and non-holiday rms.
In our basic regression setting, we employ a Fama-MacBeth approach, combined with the
method of West and Newey (1987). We implement the following cross-sectional model in
each year and use the resulting time-series of coecients to assess their signicance:
TOi;t = 0;t + 1;tE[TOi;t] +
5X
k=2
k;tReturnControlk;i;t + 6;tHoli;t + i;t (2.2)
Table 2.3 shows the ndings for the Epiphany sample and the All Saints' Day sample,
respectively. Displayed are results from three regression specications, which dier in the
dependent variable. The baseline regression uses rm-specic turnover at the day of the
holiday (TOi;t), the others use the day preceding and following the holiday, respectively.
The holiday region dummy attains a highly negative coecient in all specications. For
both the Epiphany and the All Saints' Day sample, and for both models of expected
turnover, the coecient is strongly signicant at the one percent level. The upper bounds
of the 95% condence intervals are all well below zero. Moreover, from an economic
perspective, the eect is quite large: The pure holiday-induced abnormal drop in volume
ranges from roughly 10% to slightly over 20%. Additionally, results are robust across
time: In the Epiphany sample, the holiday region dummy is negative in each year; in the
All Saints' Day sample, it attains a negative coecient in about 80% of the observations.
Finally, the holiday eect can, for the most part, only be identied at the day of the holiday
itself. On the day before the holiday, there is no negative shock in trading activity; on the
day after, there is some evidence, which, however, is much weaker than on the date of the
holiday itself.6 In sum, the ndings so far support hypothesis 1.
6As unreported ndings suggest, the eect on the day after the holiday might at least partly be attributable to the
impact of bridge days as well as the end of Christmas holidays, which varies both across time and states, respectively. This
seems also consistent with the anecdotal evidence given in footnote 2.
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2.4.2 Robustness Checks
The main results from a variety of sensitivity tests are summarized in table 2.4.
Our test specication might be misspecied in the sense that it may lead to a spurious
positive factor loading on the holiday region dummy on average, irrespective of an actual
holiday event. We therefore implement a \placebo treatment": For each model specica-
tion and each holiday sample, we randomly select 500 days (excluding the period from
t-1 to t+1, where t denotes the holiday) and, for each of these pseudo events, run the re-
gression as given in Equation (2). Mean and median factor loadings on the holiday region
dummy are given in panel A. In all specications, they are virtually zero.
There is arguably some element of arbitrariness in the length of the pre-event period in
both models of expected turnover. Therefore, we experimented with intervals from 10 to
100 trading days. Panel B veries that inferences remain the same.
It might be possible that the importance of the return controls varies between holiday
and non-holiday rms. We thus interact all return variables from the baseline regression
with the regional holiday dummy. It turns out that none of them is signicant. Panel C
shows that the importance of the holiday region dummy remains unaected.
One might be concerned that the results could partially be driven by a disproportionate
number of holiday rms whose stocks are not traded at the event day. Our ndings might
then not reect a broader phenomenon, but rather be attributable to outliers. We thus
repeat the analysis discarding all stocks with zero trading volume. However, as shown in
panel D, this exercise rather strengthens our results.
Panel E shows results when using raw (instead of logarithmized) turnover. In all speci-
cations, the holiday eect is signicant at the 1% level. Moreover, it keeps its economic
signicance. For the mean (median) rm the results indicate a pure regional holiday-
induced drop in daily trading volume of roughly 200,000 (more than 20,000) Euro.
Residuals of a given rm might be correlated across years, potentially leading to biased
standard errors. We thus follow a suggestion of Petersen (2009) by pooling all rms with
non-zero turnover, adding year dummies and clustering standard errors by rm. As shown
in panel F, ndings are robust to this alternative econometric specication.
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Table 2.4: Robustness Checks
This table displays the coecient in front of the holiday dummy obtained from various regressions to test for
the robustness of our baseline results. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical signicance at the
ten, ve and one-percent level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Epiphany All Saints' Day
Panel A: Mean and Median Factor Loadings on the Regional Holiday Dummy from Placebo Treatments
Firm specic expected turnover Mean: -0.001, Median: -0.004 Mean: 0.005, Median: 0.001
Market model expected turnover Mean:0.007, Median: 0.009 Mean: 0.005, Median: 0.006
Panel B: Alternative Pre-event Periods
Firm specic expected turnover in t-10 to t-2 -0.24*** (-5.54) -0.13*** (-3.45)
Firm specic expected turnover in t-40 to t-2 -0.21*** (-5.02) -0.14*** (-3.78)
Firm specic expected turnover in t-40 to t-11 -0.20*** (-5.28) -0.15*** (-4.14)
Market model expected turnover in t-100 to t-2 -0.17*** (-7.20) -0.17*** (-3.70)
Market model expected turnover in t-40 to t-2 -0.19*** (-9.04) -0.16*** (-5.41)
Market model expected turnover in t-60 to t-11 -0.17*** (-9.12) -0.16*** (-4.62)
Panel C: Interacting Return Variables with Holiday Dummies
Firm specic expected turnover -0.29*** (-4.29) -0.17*** (-2.82)
Market model expected turnover -0.22*** (-5.69) -0.21*** (-3.54)
Panel D: Omitting Stocks With Zero Trading Volume on Event Day
Firm specic expected turnover -0.24*** (-11.48) -0.15*** (-4.84)
Market model expected turnover -0.20*** (-15.10) -0.19*** (-6.23)
Panel E: Using Ordinary Turnover
Firm specic expected turnover -0.02%*** (-3.80) -0.02%*** (-3.10)
Market model expected turnover -0.02%*** (-3.31) -0.02%*** (-3.82)
Panel F: Pooled Regression With Year Dummies and Standard Errors Clustered by Firm
Firm specic expected turnover -0.23*** (-4.73) -0.13** (-2.51)
Market model expected turnover -0.19*** (-4.13) -0.16*** (-2.86)
Panel G: Analysis Based on Metropolitan Areas
Firm specic expected turnover -0.22*** (-9.46) -0.13*** (-4.13)
Market model expected turnover -0.18*** (-5.90) -0.17*** (-4.77)
Panel H: Regional Holiday Eects on Corpus Christi (Since 2000, Econometric Approach as in Panel F)
Firm specic expected turnover Market model expected turnover
-0.20*** (-2.67) -0.20*** (-3.61)
Panel I: Carnival Monday
Firm specic expected turnover Market model expected turnover
-0.05** (-2.38) -0.06** (-2.74)
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Legally recognized regional holidays are observed on a state level. Thus, our interpretation
rests on the idea of states being an appropriate classication of the preferred investment
habitats of local investors. While similar concepts have been proven fruitful in US studies
(e.g. Hong et al. (2008), Korniotis and Kumar (2010)), it is clearly only a noisy proxy.
Note, though, that this works against detecting a regional holiday eect: If local investors
tilted their trading towards stocks of local rms irrespective of state borders, then it
would be hard to identify dierences in trading activity between two neighboring states.
In an attempt to use a classication scheme with a more pronounced socio-economic
background, we repeat our analysis building on metropolitan areas as dened by the
Conference of Ministers for Spatial Planning.7 Some areas span more than one state,
whereas some states contain more than one metropolitan region. Panel G veries that the
coecient is sporadically estimated even marginally more precisely, possibly pointing to
the true impact of localized trading being stronger than reported.
We also study turnover shocks on Corpus Christi as the third legally recognized regional
holiday. It is celebrated in the states of Baden-Wurttemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, North Rhine-
Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland, at the Thursday 60 days after Easter
Sunday. Stock market trading on this day started not before 2000, which results in a total
of 5,078 rm-level observations distributed over nine yearly observations. Panel H veries
that our ndings hold also in this case. The shock in turnover is highly signicant, and
estimated to be close to 20%. The setting for Corpus Christi is, apart from the shorter
sample period and the xed day of the week, not conceptually dierent from Epiphany
and All Saints' Day. Including all holidays in the remaining tests increases the sample size
and ensures that we consider each regional holiday in Germany for which requirements
on a meaningful event study are met.
However, if our results were representative of a widespread localized trading phenomenon,
then we might also detect similar patterns in related scenarios such as Carnival. While
there is no ocial holiday, representative surveys reveal that Carnival is prominent in some
(mostly southern and western) regions, but rather unpopular in other (mostly northern
7This classication identies eleven metropolitan regions in which roughly 70% of the German population and 84%
of sample rms are located. http://www.eurometrex.org denes these areas as \larger centres of economic and social life"
containing \core business, cultural and governmental functions". We only consider areas clearly belonging either to a holiday
or a non-holiday region. This leaves a total of 5,416 (4,350) observations for the All Saints' Day (Epiphany) sample.
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and eastern) areas of Germany.8 Despite the lack of clear-cut separation between aected
and non-aected regions, we run an analogous analysis for Carnival Monday, on which
most parades are held. Panel I provides evidence supportive of our line of reasoning.
2.4.3 Dierences in Information Intensity?
A key concern to a local bias story is that holiday rms might simply release less in-
formation than otherwise comparable non-holiday rms. To the extent that this triggers
rebalancing trades or increased dierences of opinion, it might partly explain our ndings.
As an intuitive and rather informal rst approach to explore the possibility of such an
information eect, we compare the fraction of corporate news released around the holiday.
To this end, we rely on rm-specic news stories published by DGAP, a German news
agency, from January 2000 to January 2009. These news include time-stamped ad hoc
disclosures, by which German rms are forced to publish new value-relevant information
immediately. We manually collect these disclosures for each sample rm. The database
additionally covers a broad range of other news, such as directors' dealings or business
reports. Since data retrieval is labor intensive, we gather these corporate news for half of
sample rms, which we randomly select. The following test is based on this subsample.
We create a dummy variable that states for each rm and each day whether corporate
news or ad hoc disclosures have been released. Then, for each holiday, and separately for
the holiday and the non-holiday sample, we compute the fraction of all news attributable
to a short window around the holiday (t-1 to t+1). After that, we compute an odds ratio
by dividing the percentage obtained for the holiday sample by the percentage obtained for
the non-holiday sample. If holiday rms released temporarily less news, we would expect
values persistently well below one. However, the odds ratios are 1.05 for Epiphany, 1.02 for
All Saint's Day and 0.84 for Corpus Christi, pointing against a widespread drop in news
release. As later sections of this study reveal that rm size is an important determinant of
8We here rely on survey results published in the magazine \Daheim in Deutschland" (by Reader's Digest), February
2010. Our classication is based on the fraction of individuals stating to actively participate in carnival celebrations. The
areas of Hesse, Rhineland Palatinate, Saarland (roughly 30%), Bavaria (27%), Baden Wurttemberg (25%) and North Rhine-
Westphalia (24%) serve as a treatment group. The remaining regions have participation rates between 10% and 19% and
thus serve as a control group. A related classication scheme based on the relative popularity of carnival clubs leads to
similar results. Data for this analysis is provided by \Bund Deutscher Karneval", the umbrella organization of several
thousand German carnival clubs.
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the drop in trading activity, we determine whether this might be due to dierences in news
release. Specically, we repeat the analysis separately for large and small stocks, split by
the median of market capitalization at the beginning of the year. Around Epiphany, there
are no marked dierences. Around All Saint's Day, small holiday rms appear to release
relatively more news than large holiday rms. Around Corpus Christi, this picture partly
reverses. In sum, there is no clear pattern.
For deeper insights, we test more rigorously for dierences in news arrival from four
further perspectives. Specically, we study cross-sectional shocks with regard to abnormal
price movements, with regard to the degree of analyst coverage, with regard to investors'
internet search behavior as well as with regard to rms' media exposure. In the following,
these tests, whose main results are presented in tables 2.5 and 2.6, are described in detail.
Firm-specic news are likely to aect the magnitude of abnormal returns. Firm-specic
information should manifest itself in an increased importance of the idiosyncratic com-
ponent of the rm's daily stock return. On the other hand, if there is hardly any new
information, then the return should primarily be driven by the stock's exposure to perva-
sive well-known risk factors. Thus, if there was indeed temporarily less news for the typical
holiday rm, we would expect its absolute abnormal return to be considerably lower than
during some control period on average. For the typical non-holiday rm, however, there
should be no or at least not as much of a dierence. A benet of this approach is that
shock variables can be computed continuously, providing data for each rm on each day.
This overcomes the problem that ocial news coverage of a given rm may be sporadic,
even though there might be rumors, speculation or private information investors react
on. To formalize the cross-sectional prediction as sketched above, we employ the following
procedure. First, for each rm and each day, we compute the abnormal stock return. By
employing both a market model and a Carhart (1997) four factor model, we follow stan-
dard event study methodology; due to very similar ndings, only the ndings from the
latter model are reported. The four factor model is based on German data and includes
the market, size and value factors in the spirit of Fama and French (1993) and the mo-
mentum factor as constructed in Carhart (1997). The appendix provides more detailed
information about the construction of the factors. Second, for each rm, we compute the
dierence between the absolute abnormal return on the day of the holiday (=t) and the
average absolute abnormal return in some control period. We here rely on the period from
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Table 2.5: Tests for Cross-Sectional Dierences in News Arrival
This table summarizes results from various tests aimed at detecting potential cross-sectional dierences in news
arrival between holiday and non-holiday rms at the day of the holiday (=t). Large firms (Small firms) refer
to stocks with a market value larger (smaller) than the median stock, measured at the beginning of the year.
Statistical signicance at the ten, ve and one percent level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. Panel
A reports dierences in shocks in absolute abnormal returns. To this end, daily absolute abnormal returns for
each rm during t-5 to t+5, as obtained from a German version of the Carhart (1997) four factor model, are
computed. Factor loadings are estimated from time-series regressions from t-66 to t-6. For both the holiday
and the non-holiday sample, rm-specic shocks are computed as the absolute abnormal return at t minus
the average absolute abnormal return in t-5 to t+5 (excluding t). The table reports the dierence between the
median shock value for the holiday sample and the median shock value for the non-holiday sample, averaged
across years. Statistical signicance is assessed by bootstrapping as described in footnote 11. Panel B reports
the coecient in front of the regional holiday dummy as obtained from pooled regressions of daily rm-specic
abnormal search volume in Google on dummies for regional holidays, years and industry groups. Abnormal
search volume is computed as the dierence between the search volume at t and the average search volume
in t-10 to t-2, divided by the standard deviation of search volume in this pre-event period. T-statistics are
reported in parentheses. The last column reports p-values as obtained from an F-test of joint signicance of
all three holiday dummies. Panel C shows the average fraction of total analyst recommendations and reviews
attributable to holiday rms at t. Only recommendations and reviews issued (not outstanding) on a given day
are considered. In a similar way, the fraction holiday rms account for is also computed for every other day in
t-5 to t+5. These values are pooled to construct an empirical benchmark distribution of analyst coverage in
a nearby period. Values in parentheses represent the percentiles of this distribution as achieved at t. A higher
percentile indicates that holiday rm recommendations account for a larger fraction of the total number of
recommendations. In the value-weighted (equal-weighted) analysis, multiple recommendations of the same
rm are considered as multiple observations (single observation).
Panel A: Dierences in Shocks in Absolute Abnormal Returns
Dependent Variable Epiphany All Saints' Day Corpus Christi Pooled
Dierence in shock variable: All rms -0.05%* -0.02% -0.02% -0.03%
Dierence in shock variable: Large rms -0.07%* -0.01% 0.01% -0.03%
Dierence in shock variable: Small rms -0.02% -0.05% -0.03% -0.03%
Panel B: Abnormal Search Frequencies for Firm Names in Google
Dependent Variable Epiphany All Saints' Day Corpus Christi P-value joint sign.
Shocks in online search queries: All rms -0.13 (-0.61) -0.15 (-1.40) -0.19 (-1.42) 0.17
Shocks in online search queries: Large rms -0.26 (-0.52) -0.33 (-1.02) -0.20 (-0.40) 0.19
Shocks in online search queries: Small rms -0.12 (-0.58) -0.16 (-1.55) -0.08 (-1.14) 0.16
Panel C: Fraction of Holiday Firm Analysts Recommendations
Dependent Variable Epiphany All Saints' Day Corpus Christi
Value-weighted fraction of recommendations 40.34% (64) 68.57% (59) 81.51% (40)
Equally-weighted fraction of recommendations 40.37% (58) 69.90% (62) 82.57% (43)
Value-weighted fraction of reviews 41.67% (66) 63.64% (40) 87.87% (54)
Equally-weighted fraction of reviews 43.08% (72) 63.84% (44) 89.23% (54)
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t-5 to t+5 (excluding t), but results are not sensitive to this choice. The resulting variable
has the interpretation of an unexpected change in the relative importance of idiosyncratic
stock return factors. Third, for both the holiday and the non-holiday sample, we rank rms
based on this shock variable. We take the cross-sectional median for both samples to get
an estimate of the shock for the typical rm.9 Fourth, we compute the cross-sectional
dierence between the median shock for the holiday sample and the median shock for
the non-holiday sample. A news-based explanation of our ndings would predict values
signicantly below zero, as the shock in the relative importance of rm-specic return
factors for the typical holiday (non-holiday) rm should be more (less) negative. We re-
peat the procedure in each year. Finally, a bootstrap approach10 is used to test whether
the average of the resulting time series of dierences is statistically distinguishable from
zero. However, panel A of table 2.5, which reports results for the Epiphany, All Saints'
Day as well as Corpus Christi sample, shows that this not the case. The only slightly
signicant event is on the day of Epiphany, where, from an economic perspective, the
resulting return dierence appears small. For all other holidays, dierences are very close
to zero and insignicant, implying that in most cases shocks in abnormal returns do not
dier much between holiday and non-holiday rms. Pooling observations does not lead
to dierent conclusions. Moreover, there are no persistent dierences for large and small
stocks, again split by the median of market value.
Our second test is inspired by Da et al. (2011) and based on cross-sectional shocks in search
frequencies for rm names in Google. The application \Google Insights for Search" allows
to construct standardized time-series of terms entered in the internet search engine. Data
is available on a daily basis from January 2004 on. Computing shocks in search volume
might be regarded as a possibility to quantify unexpected changes in revealed (and thus
direct) focus to individual rms, induced by some external stimulus. In this sense, changes
9The appendix provides more details about the distribution of shock variables. It veries that ndings are qualitatively
similar when relying on the mean (instead of the median) of the winsorized cross-section. It also shows that extreme return
events are only slightly more frequent for non-holiday rms.
10The comparison of shock variables results in a holiday-specic time series of dierences between holiday and non-
holiday rms. We use this data to simulate 10,000 pseudo time-series of the same length as the original sample by randomly
drawing values with replacement. Averaging values separately for each pseudo time-series yields 10,000 pseudo estimates of
the dierence in median shock variables. Finally, we assess whether the value obtained from the averaged original time-series
is reliably negative by computing the fraction of simulated estimates that take on values below zero. For a discussion of
simulations in event studies, see e.g. Lyon et al. (1999).
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in the query frequency of a rm name11 appear a promising way of capturing shocks in
the arrival of rm-specic news or rumors. For example, Da et al. (2011) report a positive
correlation between search volume shocks and traditional proxies for information release,
such as extreme returns and news stories. The authors show that internet search volume
even often leads alternative measures of news arrival. We thus construct a measure of
unexpected search behavior for each rm based on daily data. It is dened as the dierence
between the search frequency during the holiday (=t) minus the average frequency over
t-10 to t-2, divided by the standard deviation in this pre-event period. We then pool
observations and regress the shock variables on a holiday region dummy in addition to
controls for years and industries. We do so for the sample of all rms, of large rms, and
of small rms. Panel B of table 2.5 shows that all holiday region dummy coecients are
insignicant, both separately and jointly, pointing against a news-based story.
Our third analysis focuses on the large eort of analysts in collecting, processing and dis-
seminating information (e.g. Womack (1996)). We are interested in whether aggregated
analyst coverage during regional holidays diers from coverage in a nearby benchmark pe-
riod. Specically, we concentrate on the number of daily analyst recommendations issued,
and determine whether the fraction holiday rms account for is exceptionally low during
the holiday. This is what a news-based explanation of our ndings would arguably predict.
To test this hypothesis, we match our sample with the I/B/E/S analyst buy/hold/sell-
recommendations database. This results in a total of 51,497 stock recommendations of
196 brokers, which cover more than 80% of the sample rms. For the eleven day pe-
riod centered around the holiday (t-5 to t+5), we then determine which fraction of all
recommendations issued on this day is attributable to holiday rms. The length of this
benchmark period is meant to account for the seasonality in earnings reports, but the
qualitative nature of our ndings is robust to alternative control windows. We average
values for t. Values for the benchmark period (excluding t) are pooled to give rise to an
11One might be concerned about the use of rm names. They might not be unambiguous and a few of them clearly have
multiple meanings. However, this seems unlikely to drive our main results. First, we study dierences between two large
samples with several hundred rm names. Thus, any potential inaccuracies and inconsistencies are likely to cancel out.
Second, we are interested in shocks of search frequencies, i.e. we control for the expected level of queries. Third,\Google
Insights for Search" additionally provides a top search list with the terms most closely related to the original search. In an
attempt to manually cleanse the data, we used that information to exclude those rms that seemed most likely to distort
the analysis. Inferences remained unchanged. The alternative of relying on security identication numbers instead of rm
names turned out to be unproductive as search frequencies tend to be much lower, resulting in many missing values.
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empirical benchmark distribution of relative analyst coverage for holiday rms. Relying
on the percentiles of this distribution, we are able to detect whether analyst informa-
tion transmission for holiday rms exhibits a negative shock. We distinguish between a
value-weighted analysis, in which multiple recommendations made for the same rm on
the same day are considered as multiple observations, and an equal-weighted analysis, in
which we regard such a scenario as a single observation. The latter tends to give more
weight to small rms, which less often receive several recommendations at the same day.
As a sensitivity check, we repeat the analysis now focusing on the review date, i.e. the most
recent date that an estimate is conrmed by an analyst to I/B/E/S as accurate. Panel
C of table 2.5 shows the fraction of total analyst coverage on the event day. Percentiles
are given in parentheses. A higher percentile indicates that holiday rm recommendations
account for a larger fraction of the total number of recommendations issued. In all speci-
cations, coverage does not seem to decrease for rms located in holiday regions. Judging
from the percentiles of the distribution, the holiday rather appears like an average day of
the benchmark period.12 Moreover, the value-weighted and the equal-weighted analysis
show a similar picture, suggesting there are no marked dierences between large and small
rms.
As a nal test, we study shocks in media coverage in three leading German daily business
newspapers, which are published nation-wide.13 The comprehensive database, for which
panel A of table 2.6 gives more details, is based on daily data from January 1, 2000
on and comprises Financial Times Deutschland, Handelsblatt and Sueddeutsche Zeitung.
Searching factiva and genios, articles about each rm for each day and in each paper are
manually collected.14 This results in a total of 126,125 news stories covering almost 94% of
our sample rms. Again, we distinguish between a value-weighted and an equal-weighted
12One might be concerned about noise in the data. Indeed, a similar bootstrapping approach as outlined in footnote 11
reveals that the dispersion of simulated outcomes is quite substantial. However, even the lower bound of the 99% condence
interval does not touch the 10th percentile of the benchmark distribution, which contradicts an information-based story.
13IVW, a German auditing institution that provides data on the distribution of media products, reports that Sueddeutsche
Zeitung had the second highest circulation among nationwide published daily papers over the period 2000 to 2008. It ranks
rst if one excludes the popular press. Among the daily newspapers with a strong focus on business and economics,
Handelsblatt and Financial Times Deutschland rank rst and second. In the fourth quarter of 2008, the three newspapers
had a combined circulation of more than 800,000 copies per day.
14Similarly as in Tetlock et al. (2008), we thereby require the article to mention at least twice the name or security
identication number of the rm. This procedure aims at reducing noise and identifying relevant rm-specic articles.
Coverage for Financial Times Deutschland starts on January 1, 2001.
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analysis. The latter relies on a dummy variable that simply states whether a rm has
received press coverage on a given day. The former individually counts each article. It
thus takes on values greater than one if there are several rm news stories in the same
paper, or if several papers cover the rm. In doing so, it tends to give more weight to
blue chips and big news. For further insights, we additionally split rms into large and
small stocks, as before. Across all specications, there is considerable variation in daily
media coverage. For instance, on a given day, the fraction of news stories attributable
to rms that didn't make the news the day before, is 63% (52%) for the equal-weighted
(value-weighted) analysis on average. Focussing on small rms yields even 91% (90%).
Panel B shows results from a test similar to the one used for analyst coverage. We analyze
whether aggregated media coverage for holiday rms is abnormally low around the holiday.
We consider both the event day and the following day, as information becoming public
at t can not be published by newspapers before t+1. To assess statistical signicance, we
calculate the percentage of total media coverage attributable to holiday rms for each day
of the year.15 We then analyze the fraction of press coverage around the holiday relative
to the whole empirical distribution, which does not exhibit strong seasonal patterns. The
analysis produces mixed results. Around All Saints' Day, media coverage for holiday rms
is indeed signicantly lower, which, in line with ndings from the test on corporate news
releases, appears to be driven by larger rms. However, there is no similar evidence for any
of the other holidays. In fact, press coverage is sometimes even higher than on average.
In the overall picture, results point against a strong general drop in media exposure for
both large and small holiday rms. To gain more insight, we implement a more formal
regression approach. We create the dummy Newsi;t which indicates for each rm i on
each day of the eleven trading days period centered around the regional holiday whether
a news article was published.16 We then pool the observations and run the following probit
15We thereby account for the fact that not all newspapers are published at each day of the year: At Corpus Christi,
Handelsblatt and Sueddeutsche Zeitung are not distributed. At Epiphany, Sueddeutsche Zeitung is not published. This is
unlikely to materially inuence our analysis. First, for the more important date t+1, all newspapers are available. Findings
are similar as on date t. Second, the results from the equally- and from the value-weighted analysis are similar in general.
This suggests that relevant information is, for the most part, picked up by each of these leading newspapers so that partly
relying on a subset of them does not change the qualitative nature of the results. This line of reasoning is also supported
by the highly signicant correlations in daily rm-level media coverage as shown in panel A of table 2.6.
16We choose this binary approach to reduce the overcounting of news about the same subject from multiple sources.
However, an analysis focussing on the actual number of news produces very similar results. The eleven day period is largely
representative for the media coverage in the whole year.
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regression separately for Epiphany, All Saints' Day and Corpus Christi:
NEWSi;t = 0 + 1EventDummy + 2HolidayRegionDummy + 3InteractionTerm+ Y earDummies+ i;t
(2.3)
The event dummy indicates the holiday within the event period. We also run analogous
regressions for the days preceding and following the holiday. Of interest is the interaction
eect between the event dummy and the holiday region dummy. If the volume shock was a
result of systematic cross-sectional dierences in press coverage, then it should consistently
attain a signicantly negative sign. Panel C of table 2.6 reports results from the nine probit
regressions. Magnitude and signicance of the interaction eect are assessed as suggested
by Ai and Norton (2003). Again, the only signicant results are found for the All Saints'
Day sample. Thus, the ndings at best sporadically point to dierences in information
release picked up by the press.
We nally incorporate additional control variables in our pooled regression approach as
outlined in section 2.4.2. For data availability reasons, we focus on the period from 2000
to 2009, and add a set of dummies to control for the eect of media coverage and ad
hoc disclosures on any day between t-5 and t+5. Panel D of table 2.6 reveals that the
regional holiday eect keeps its signicance, both from an statistical and an economic
point of view. Modifying the analysis by focussing only on those stocks for which we have
additional information about the release of other corporate news yields similar results.
Taken together, the combined ndings from all tests in this section provide the following
picture: First, we cannot dismiss the hypothesis of lower information intensity for holiday
rms as there is minor evidence of dierences in news release. Their lack of robustness
and small magnitude, however, suggest they are unlikely to fully explain the economically
substantial and pervasive drop in trading volume for holiday rms. The evidence points
against persistent disparities between small and large rms. Second, controlling for po-
tential dierences in news arrival to the extent possible, our results remain qualitatively
unchanged. Third, these ndings strongly conrm hypothesis 1.
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2.5 Determinants of the Regional Holiday Eect
Firm characteristics What factors drive the cross-sectional heterogeneity in negative
turnover shocks? To answer this question, we rst construct a rm-specic measure of ab-
normal turnover, dened as actual (logarithmized) turnover during the holiday minus the
average turnover during t-20 to t-2. For robustness reasons, we then run pooled regressions
separately for each of the three holiday samples as well as for two sample periods.
Hypothesis 2, inspired by the model of Merton (1987), posits that the turnover shock
should be particularly strong if a rm is visible primarily to local investors. Merton argues
that investor recognition is a function of the shadow cost of information, which, in his
model, depends on idiosyncratic risk, relative market size and the completeness of the
shareholder base. We thus use the logarithm of a rm's market capitalization, as measured
at the end of the preceding year, and a rm's idiosyncratic risk as independent variables.
Idiosyncratic risk is dened as the standard deviation of the residual obtained by tting
a Carhart (1997) four factor model (as described in section 2.4.3) to the daily return
time-series from t-180 to t-6.
Market capitalization is strongly negatively related to the total number of shareholders
(e.g. Grullon et al. (2004)) and positively related to the fraction of local investors (e.g. Zhu
(2003)). Consequently, we expect a smaller drop in volume for larger rms, which implies
a positive coecient for rm size. Idiosyncratic risk, on the other hand, increases the
shadow cost of information. Local investors are commonly thought to possess (actual or
perceived) informational advantages. Thus, local clienteles should account for a relatively
large proportion in the trading of stocks with high idiosyncratic risk, which should go along
with a more pronounced negative volume shock during regional holidays. Consequently,
a negative coecient is expected.
In addition, we employ with residual media coverage a third proxy, which is orthogonal
to size and available for the years 2001 to 2009. The residual is obtained from yearly
cross-sectional regressions of the number of rm-specic press articles in the previous
year on its lagged average market size, turnover and absolute return as well as on a set of
control variables for industry and DAX30 membership. Press articles are taken from the
comprehensive media coverage database described in section 2.4.3. Residual coverage is
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designed to proxy for the unexpected high or low weight the media attaches to a certain
rm. Given the importance of leading business newspapers in disseminating information
to a broad audience, residual media coverage is an intuitive measure of rm visibility.
Consequently, we expect a positive coecient.
Previous research and our baseline analysis highlighted the importance of current returns
for current turnover. We thus include the same two return-based variables in the regres-
sion. To control for additional eects induced by medium-term return continuation, we
consider the loading on the momentum factor (WML), obtained from a regression of
stock returns on the Carhart (1997) four factor model. The loadings on the market as
well as value factor (RMRF , HML) are considered as proxies for systematic risk (e.g.
Chordia et al. (2007)). The intercept from this regression (Alpha) is included as it has
been argued to contain a premium related to liquidity or heterogeneous information (e.g.
Lo and Wang (2000)). Moreover, we include a rural dummy for rms located outside a
metropolitan region. The \only game in town eect" (Hong et al. (2008)) suggests a neg-
ative coecient. Inspired by e.g. Seasholes and Wu (2007), a 52 week high dummy for
stocks whose price has exceeded this bound in the previous week is considered. Finally,
we include a set of industry dummies.
For each holiday, table 2.7 displays univariate and multivariate results for the whole
sample period. We report coecients for the subperiod 2001 to 2009 separately. These
coecients additionally include residual media coverage and controls for the availability
of press articles as well as ad hoc disclosures around the event date (see also section 2.4.3).
The ndings are broadly consistent with our expectations. Investor recognition seems an
important driver of the turnover shock. All proxies consistently attain the predicted sign
and, with the exception of idiosyncratic risk, are persistently statistically signicant. The
eect of market capitalization is clearly the strongest, but residual media coverage has
an incremental eect. The magnitude of the results is also of economic importance: As a
rough estimate, for example, a one standard deviation change in rm size has a similar
impact as a one standard deviation change in stock return. The current absolute return
is highly signicant. The dummies for rural rms and the 52 week high attain coecients
as predicted, but their importance is not robust. The other controls seem to play only a
minor role. In sum, hypothesis 2 can broadly be conrmed. The regional holiday eect is
considerably stronger for rms less visible to non-local investors.
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Investor characteristics In this section, we aim at gaining additional insights from the
daily tracking records of roughly 3,000 retail clients of a German online broker from Jan-
uary 1997 to April 2001. Comprehensive information about the sample, such as details
about the construction of portfolio holdings, is given in Glaser and Weber (2009) and
Glaser and Weber (2007). Sample investors account for a total of 316,134 stock transac-
tions, out of which 136,125 take place in 965 German rms. As the latter represent roughly
50% of all transactions traceable via Datastream, investors seem to exhibit a strong home
bias. Panels A to C of table 2.8 provide descriptive statistics, which show that sample
investors trade frequently. The mean (median) number of transactions in German rms
is 47 (22), leading to a total sample trading volume of more than 750 million Euro.
For the purpose of our analysis, the data set has two advantages. First, the broker does
not oer investment advice. Therefore, trading decisions are not aected by bank recom-
mendations. Second, online broker investor trading on regional holidays is not restricted
in any way. Results suggestive of localized trading might thus be considered conservative
in the sense that other investors might face higher obstacles, such as nding an open bank
oce.17 A disadvantage of the sample is that investor location is not provided. Given this
limitation, exploring to what extent investors exhibit local bias (in addition to home bias),
is not a straightforward exercise. We thus start our analysis with the reasonable assump-
tion that a disproportionate fraction of the broker's clients live in the region in which the
broker is headquartered. Locally biased investors should then have a strong preference for
rms also located in the aected metropolitan area.18 To test this, we compute a sample
investor preference measure as the dierence between a rm's brokerage weight and its
weight in the market portfolio of German stocks. The rm's brokerage weight is dened
as the total volume invested in the rm's stock by the broker's clients divided by the total
volume the clients invest in all German stocks at the time. We do so at the beginning of
each month and for each rm traded at least once on any day by any sample investor. We
average stock-specic time-series to obtain an average estimate, based on which we sort
rms in one of three portfolios of equal size: \Low preference", \medium preference" and
17Note again that this does not have cross-sectional implications for abnormal stock turnover unless local investors'
trading decisions systematically deviate from remote investors' buys and sells.
18To sharpen the analysis, we focus on the metropolitan area classication as outlined in section 2.4.2. Results are similar
when we make use of states instead. Moreover, to mitigate the eect of a few extremely large trades that could materially
aect the analysis, we winsorize investor transactions at the 99.9% level in all following tests.
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\high preference". Then, for each of these portfolios, we determine the fraction of rms
located in the same metropolitan area as the online broker itself. As the metropolitan area
turns out to be large, there is sucient level of diversication. Consequently, if sample
investors were not locally biased, we would expect the fraction of rms located near the
online broker to be similar across preference portfolios. However, panel D shows that this
is not what we nd. The fraction of the \medium preference" portfolio is standardized
to 1. Therefore, the value 1.29 for the \high preference" portfolio implies that there are
close to 30% more local rms than would be expected on average by chance.
Having veried the existence of at least some local bias, we turn to a test suggested by
hypothesis 1: Holiday trading activity should decrease in local bias. We label each rm
located in the broker's metropolitan area a \low preference", \medium preference" or
\high preference" rm. Then, we compute the daily fraction of aggregate sample investor
trading volume that is attributable to each of these portfolios, leading to an empirical
benchmark distribution for portfolio-specic relative trading activity. Similarly as in pre-
vious tests, we determine the percentile of the distribution that is observable during the
day of the regional holiday.19 Hypothesis 1 predicts that these percentiles should decrease
in local investors' preference - rms with a high degree of local bias should exhibit a more
pronounced shock in relative trading volume. Panel E shows that this is indeed what
we nd. The \high preference portfolio" temporarily exhibits the lowest trading activity,
no matter if one focuses on the total Euro volume traded, the number of transactions
conducted or the number of investors trading.
We now turn to hypothesis 3, which posits that the turnover drop in small stocks is dis-
proportionately caused by private investors. To this end, we aggregate data and conduct
tests based on shocks in a measure called Ratioi;t. For holiday i, it is computed as the
overall fraction of daily \holiday rm trading" by online broker investors divided by the
fraction of daily \holiday rm trading" by the whole market. The rationale is as follows:
As the daily trading volume of the investor sample is positively correlated (0.39) with the
daily market trading volume for these rms, it appears justied to use market volume
as a benchmark. By focussing on shocks of Ratioi;t, one mitigates the problem of lacking
information on investor location, as the expected level of trading in each group of stocks
19To sharpen the analysis, we focus on the holiday that most clearly separates the broker's metropolitan area as a holiday
region from as many other metropolitan areas as possible.
46 CHAPTER 2. THE TRADING VOLUME IMPACT OF LOCAL BIAS
is automatically accounted for. To identify shocks, we control for the autoregressive prop-
erties of Ratioi;t by employing AR(p)-processes similar to Connolly and Stivers (2003).
Shocks are dened as the residual i;t from the following regression:
Ratioi;t = i;0 +
pX
k=1
i;kRatioi;t k + i;t (2.4)
P denotes the maximum lag, up to which each estimated coecient on each lagged term
of Ratioi;t is individually signicant, and takes on values between two and ve for the
specications described below. i;t can thus be interpreted as unexpected daily changes in
holiday rm trading of retail investors as compared to the whole market.
To test hypothesis 3, we compute Ratioi;t separately for the whole sample as well as for
small and large stocks, split by the median of market capitalization at the beginning
of the year. We do this for each of the three holidays. We then determine the most
suitable AR(p)-process for each of the nine specications and run the regression as given
in Equation (4). This results in nine shock time series. Finally, we apply these to the seven
holiday observations that take place on a trading day during our retail investor sample
period: Epiphany is celebrated four times, All Saints' Day twice and Corpus Christi once.
Panel F of table 2.8 reports the percentiles of the shock variables for each stock sample
(all, large, small). The results for large stocks and for the whole sample appear like random
draws from the distribution. In other words, there are no systematic dierences between
individual investors and the overall market. However, focussing explicitly on smaller rms,
a clear pattern emerges: Online broker investors' trading activity consistently exhibits
negative shocks at the day of the holiday when benchmarked against the whole market.
The value of the shock variable is well below its median for every single observation.
Assuming independence, the likelihood of observing this result by chance is below 1%. In
other words, the ndings are consistent with hypothesis 3.
2.6 Conclusion
We run a series of natural experiments which collectively suggest that local bias leaves
discernible traces in the cross-section of rm-level trading activity. The German setting
allows us to compare abnormal turnover in several treatment groups, i.e. hundreds of
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rms in holiday regions, with turnover in control groups, i.e. in many ways very similar
rms in non-holiday regions. Ceteris paribus, rms in holiday regions are remarkably
less traded. This nding is mostly conned to the day of the holiday itself, statistically
signicant, economically meaningful, robust, and does not appear to be completely driven
by dierences in information release. Instead, consistent with a local bias explanation and
the model of Merton (1987), it is particularly strong for rms less recognized by non-local
investors. Moreover, in line with predictions of previous research, the turnover shock in
smaller stocks seems to be disproportionately caused by individual investors.
The basic message of this study is a simple one: Local investor clienteles are strong and
pervasive enough to generate frictions segmenting the stock market along a geographical
line. Our analysis also contributes to research on determinants of rm-level trading volume
by establishing cross-sectional regularities related to rm location, rm visibility, and
investor clienteles. Moreover, by uncovering a link between the potentially powerful role
of local investors, investor distraction, and the cross-section of rm turnover, we might
provide a new fruitful starting point for the emerging research on the joint dynamics of
investor attention, trading volume, and price discovery.
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Chapter 3
Losing Sight of the Trees for the
Forest? Pairs Trading and Attention
Shifts
3.1 Introduction
Relaxing the strict assumptions of traditional models, recent theoretical work argues that
investors have limited information processing capabilities. Consequently, they have to
optimally allocate their nite attention across several aggregation levels, which is done
depending on priority and urgency. As Peng and Xiong (2006) put it: \In severely con-
strained cases, the investor allocates all attention to market- and sector-level information
and ignores all the rm-specic data" (p. 565). In this chapter, we empirically explore
asset pricing implications of this attention shift hypothesis. Our objective is to directly
test how the dynamics of investor inattention aect the price formation of linked assets.
We create a novel proxy for time-varying investor distraction and explore its role in a
natural, promising, and so far widely neglected setting: Pairs trading (Gatev et al. (2006)),
a popular relative-value arbitrage approach, which bets on the future performance of two
assets with very similar past performance. Relying on close to 50 years of daily data for
the US stock market as well as on insights from eight major international markets, we
provide broad and robust evidence for distraction eects. For instance, pairs trading is
49
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much more protable than usual when stocks diverge on so called high distraction days,
during which turbulent market conditions are assumed to demand investors' full attention.
It is much less protable than usual when stocks diverge on low distraction days, during
which we expect sucient resources to process complex interactions at the rm-level.
Given the vast amount of news available in nancial markets, recent models propose and
empirical work veries that investors exhibit category learning behavior1: Most eort is
typically spent on processing news relevant primarily on some aggregated level, as this
information tends to be most important for the valuation of an investor's overall portfolio.
The remaining capacities are used to process more disaggregated (e.g. rm-level) news.
The dynamics of this setup lend support to the idea that the relative inattention to
disaggregated information should be particularly high in exceptional market conditions:
The need to focus on understanding shocks in the big picture should leave fewer resources
available to concentrate on details. Empirically investigating this prediction rst requires
answers to two questions: How to proxy for unobservable investor attention allocation?
And which return anomaly is likely to be particularly aected by attention shifts?
A few studies so far have dealt with these questions and thereby focussed on explaining
variations in the post-earnings announcement drift. We contribute to this literature in two
ways: We propose a novel proxy for investor distraction, and we apply it to pairs trading, a
conceptually dierent and untested setup. The proxy aims at quantifying the unexpected
daily information load market participants need to process in order to timely assess the
overall market situation. Building on the premise that information shocks partly manifest
themselves in abnormal returns, we do so by condensing the magnitude and dissemination
of unanticipated daily return shocks in a broad range of market segments into a single
ratio. We perform yearly decile sorts of the proxy in the baseline analysis, and particularly
concentrate on \high distraction days" (decile 10) as opposed to \low distraction days"
(decile 1). We then test whether the proxy has predictive power for the protability of
1Theoretical work includes e.g. Barberis and Shleifer (2003), Peng (2005), or Peng and Xiong (2006). On the empirical
side, a vivid example for category thinking is given in Cooper et al. (2001): During the internet bubble, rms that simply
changed their name to dot.com names, but not their business model, experienced positive abnormal post-announcement
returns. Similarly, mutual funds that change their names for cosmetic reasons to appear more like a current hot return
style, have been shown to attract positive abnormal inows without improving their performance (Cooper et al. (2005)). An
implication of category learning is excessive return comovement as recently identied in various settings. See e.g. Barberis
et al. (2005), Greenwood (2008), or Boyer (2011) on index eects, Green and Hwang (2009) on price eects, or Pirinsky
and Wang (2006) on location eects.
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short-term pairs trading, whose mechanisms are illustrated in section 3.2.2. In short, out of
the in total 200 million eligible sets of two stocks in our baseline US sample, we nd those
whose prices have moved together the most historically. Each month, we select the 100
pairs with minimum distance between normalized historical return paths, and then trade
them over the adjacent six months. Specically, whenever the dierence in cumulative
daily returns of any of these top pairs exceeds a certain threshold, we short the relatively
overpriced winner and buy the relatively underpriced loser. If the future resembles the
past, prices are likely to nally convergence again, thereby generating positive returns on
zero-cost portfolios. We are interested in whether it makes any dierence whether stocks
diverge on high or low distraction days. Do shocks in limited attention towards rm-level
information hinder market participants from keeping relative prices in line?
The essence of our ndings is captured in gure 3.1. It displays, in event-time, the av-
erage one-month return on long-short US stock pairs by distraction proxy decile ranks.
Findings are based on more than 100,000 round-trip trades between January 1962 and
December 2008. The lower (upper) line can be interpreted as lower (upper) bound for the
return achieved by the strategy (see section 3.2). There appears to be a close to mono-
tonic increase in the protability by distraction deciles. The return on pairs opening on
low (high) distraction days is far lower (higher) than returns on average. The dierence
between decile 1 and 10 is not only highly statistically, but also economically signicant:
The return on high distraction days is more than twice as high as the return on low dis-
traction days. This time-varying protability of pairs trading might also be interpreted in
the sense of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). The distraction proxy is likely to identify mo-
ments in which gathering and processing rm-specic information is particularly costly,
so that the market has to provide higher payos as compensation.
These return dierences appear robust. For instance, they are not sensitive to the specic
design of the distraction proxy. They are also quite persistent over time, including the re-
cent past, when unconditional pairs trading yields rather low returns. An approach which
aims at isolating the distraction eect in calendar time exhibits little exposure to well-
known risk premia. Firms tend to be large and liquid, and standard pair characteristics
are very similar across distraction deciles. To mitigate concerns that unobserved variables
might drive our results, we also examine, with similar results, returns to a subset of pairs
that happen to diverge on both high and low distraction days.
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Figure 3.1: One Month Return on Pairs by Distraction Proxy Decile Ranks in Event Time
This gure shows the average one month event-time return on US long-short stock pairs sorted by the dis-
traction proxy decile rank on the day of pair divergence. Findings are based on more than 100,000 round-trip
trades between January 1962 and December 2008 (see sections 3.2 and 3.3 for details). After divergence, pairs
are hold for up to one month. If they do not converge again before this cut-o date, positions are oset. If
pairs converge before this cut-o date, the proceeds are hold in cash until the full month has passed. As any
cash-ow before the cut-o date is positive by construction, this is a conservative approach. For the upper
bound of the return to the strategy, we compute returns on zero-cost portfolios between the day of divergence
(closing price) and the day of convergence (closing price). We refer to this scheme as \no waiting". For the
lower bound, we employ a more conservative return computation approach as discussed in Gatev et al. (2006).
Specically, we skip one day after the divergence and add one day following the crossing of the prices. We
refer to this scheme as \one day waiting".
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Moreover, ndings are not conned to the US market. The return dierence between
high and low distraction days is a persistent phenomenon which, with varying degree, is
observable in each of the eight major non-US stock markets we additionally study.
To gain deeper insights, we conduct a variety of additional tests whose results appear in
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line with the idea of the dynamics of investor distraction contributing to pairs trading
protability. Alternative proxies for limited attention, which we derive from the previous
literature, often have an incremental eect. Pairs opening immediately before holidays,
when investor distraction is likely to be particularly high, tend to be more protable and
to converge more often than pairs on average. The impact of investor distraction appears
lower for pairs consisting of rms from the same industry or for pairs consisting of whole
value-weighted industries. Finally, pairs particularly neglected (covered) by the media
appear more (less) protable, and exhibit a higher (lower) sensitivity to changes in the
level of investor distraction.
Our empirical approach provides a promising setup to gain insights about the impact of
time-varying investor inattention on asset pricing for several reasons.
1. Its quantitative nature allows us to identify sets of linked rms for which cross-
stock information transfer is likely to be inhibited in moments of high distraction.
The monthly top 100 pairs represent only an extremely small fraction of all eligible
pairs, and are identied by exhaustive matching in normalized daily price space.
In the baseline analysis, we concentrate on rms from dierent industries. In this
way, it provides an intuitive, elegant way of identifying rms, which, despite mainly
operating in dierent segments, are likely to be somehow economically related. Such
pairs are interesting candidates for our scenario as industrial boundaries have been
shown to along with informational boundaries induced by specialization of important
market participants such as analysts or fund managers (e.g. Hong et al. (2007),
Menzly and Ozbas (2010)). Moreover, there appears to be substantial information
content in residual pairwise stock return comovement, even when an exhaustive list
of explaining variables is relied on (e.g. Chen et al. (2010), Chordia et al. (2011)).
In sum, the link between two typical rms in our analysis might be thought of as
potentially being strong, but simultaneously often also less explicit, obvious, and
transparent, and thus prone to being neglected particularly easily.
2. The type of return predictability in pairs trading is dierent from the type of return
predictability that has been linked to limited attention in the literature so far. Pre-
vious studies assets have analyzed the lagged price response of stocks to their own
past returns (e.g. Hong et al. (2000)), lead-lag eects between portfolios of stocks
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(e.g. Hong et al. (2007), Hou (2007)) or return predictability along the supply chain
(Cohen and Frazzini (2008), Menzly and Ozbas (2010)). Pairs trading, however, is
about predicting the relative short-term performance of two individual, typically
rather large stocks with an often non-obvious relationship, out of which neither is
the systematic leader. Linking this type of cross-predictability of returns to variations
in investor distraction, is, to our knowledge, new.
3. The nature of pairs trading prots ts well with the idea of attention constraints
impeding timely information spill-over. It is a short-term strategy, whose protability
tends to almost monotonically decline in event-time (e.g. Engelberg et al. (2009) and
section 3.3). Importantly, the day of divergence appears to be a critical date. In fact,
a large fraction of the cumulative return dierence upon divergence is attributable to
the day of divergence itself. Thus, identifying circumstances in which this behavior
is ex ante more likely to be caused by temporary market frictions is a key to the
strategy's success.
4. In general, comprehensive empirical studies on pairs trading are still rare. This is sur-
prising given its large seemingly abnormal returns reported in Gatev et al. (2006) as
well as its apparent popularity among practitioners. Moreover, very little is known
about pairs trading in international markets, even though only very few trading
strategies have survived the test of time and independent scrutiny. As a consequence,
it is still an open question when, where, and why pairs trading is particularly prof-
itable. We address this gap in the literature with a data set comprising about 14,000
stocks with 25 million rm days from eight major non-US stock markets.
5. Our ndings might shed light on other pervasive empirical puzzles. A number of
scenarios are related to pairs trading in that there also appear primarily short-term
price discrepancies between similar assets, which are often dicult to reconcile with
standard theory.2 In a broader sense, our results might thus help to better understand
2For instance, Lee et al. (1991), Ponti (1995), Chay and Trzcinka (1999), and Cherkes et al. (2009) focus on the
relationship of the prices of closed-end fund shares and the per share market value of the assets hold by the funds. Lamont
and Thaler (2003a) and Mitchell et al. (2002) study situations where a rm's market value is less than the value of its
ownership stake in publicly traded subsidiary. Scruggs (2007), Rosenthal and Young (1990), Froot and Dabora (1999), and
Jong et al. (2009) study price parity deviations of dual-listed companies (\Siamese Twins"). Gagnon and Karolyi (2010)
study discrepancies between the prices of US and home-market shares of companies with cross-listed stocks. Smith and
Amoako-Adu (1995), Zingales (1995), and Schultz and Shive (2010) study dual class shares issued by the same company,
that dier in voting rights, but have equal cash ow rights.
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how limited attention aects the eciency of related assets in practice.
The remainder of this chaper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses related research
and explains our empirical design. Section 3.3 presents baseline ndings, both for the US
and international markets. Section 3.4 provides a number of robustness checks. Section 3.5
contains further tests that provide additional evidence of the link between time-varying
investor inattention and pairs trading prots. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature and Empirical Design
3.2.1 Limited Investor Attention
Extensive evidence from psychological research shows that attention is a scarce cognitive
resource. Focussing attention on one task necessarily goes along with a substitution of
cognitive resources from other tasks (Kahneman (1973)). Building on these insights, a
growing body of empirical and theoretical work highlights the importance of attention
constraints in nance. This research argues that market participants have to be selective
in information processing and thus potentially neglect value-relevant information. In the
presence of at least some limits to arbitrage, this can induce temporary mispricings.
As investor attention allocation is not observable, the identication of promising proxies
is a challenge for empirical work. A substream of this literature denes simple, intuitive
time-series proxies for limited investor attention and employs them to explain variations
in the magnitude of return anomalies. So far, these papers almost exclusively focus on
the post-earnings announcement drift. Hirshleifer et al. (2009) use the number of same
day earnings releases. They nd that, on days where many earnings announcements com-
pete for investors' attention, average immediate market reactions are weaker, but post-
announcement abnormal returns are higher. Qualitatively similar results are reported by
DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) and Peress (2008). DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) rely on Fri-
days, on which, as they argue, investors are distracted by the upcoming weekend. Peress
(2008) additionally employs the daily number of rms covered in the Wall Street Journal.
Hou et al. (2009) use down market periods, during which investors are assumed to often
\put their heads in the sand" (see also Karlsson et al. (2009)). They study, in addition to
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the post-earnings announcement drift, variations in momentum prots.
We contribute to this literature by providing consistent evidence based on a novel proxy,
which relies on the intuition behind models on the dynamics of attention allocation such
as Peng (2005) or Peng and Xiong (2006). It aims at identifying days on which market
participants are likely to be forced to spend more (or less) resources than usual on under-
standing \the big picture". Implementing this idea leaves many degrees of freedom. To
assure robustness, we rst construct a baseline proxy and then, in section 3.4.6, extensively
test the sensibility of our ndings with ten modied proxies.
For the construction of the baseline proxy, a four-step procedure is employed. First, for
January 1960 to December 2008, we compute daily value-weighted returns for the 49 Fama
and French (1997) industries3, thereby taking into account all common shares (CRSP
share code 10 or 11) traded on NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ. Second, we decompose indus-
try returns to construct daily industry-specic return shocks. Specically, the shock ARi;t
for industry i at day t is dened as the absolute dierence between the actual industry
return Ri;t and its expected return as given by a simple OLS market model:
ARi;t =j Ri;t   bi;t   bi;tRm;t j (3.1)
Parameter estimates are obtained from rolling time-series regressions based on daily return
data over the previous year. We later augment the model with well-established risk factors.
Third, we condense these shocks into a single measure Distractiont. Out of the several
plausible weighting schemes, we choose an approach that takes the expected level and
frequency of industry-specic shocks into account. Each industry weight wi;t is determined
by the inverse of the volatility i;t of the industry shock variable ARi;t as follows:
Distractiont =
49X
i=1
wi;tARi;t where wi;t =
1
i;t
49P
i=1
1
i;t
(3.2)
Shock volatilities i;t are estimated from ARi;t over the previous year. The weighting ap-
proach ts with the intuition that a pronounced return shock in an industry for which
3Specically, we use the 48 industries dened in Fama and French (1997), and group stocks that are not assigned to
any industry in category 49. In the baseline approach, we focus on this industry classication as markets are partially
segmented by industrial boundaries (e.g. Menzly and Ozbas (2010)), as the Fama and French (1997) system appears to
identify economically similar companies (e.g. Chan et al. (2007)), as it is widely relied on in academic studies, and as it is
available for the whole sample period.
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large shocks are a common occurrence is less likely to unexpectedly demand extra atten-
tion than a pronounced shock in an industry which \usually behaves as expected".4 Figure
3.2 displays the time-series of the resulting raw proxy from January 1962 to December
2008.
An intuitive way of exploring its ability to identify distracting moments is to explore when
it reaches its maximum. Indeed, these days are appealing. The highest values (in descend-
ing order) are achieved on October 20, 1987 (the day following the stock market crash),
on March 15, 2000 (massive sell-o of technology stocks towards traditional industries
right before the burst of the bubble), and on September 17, 2001 (rst trading day after
9/11).5 Figure 3.2 also reveals that there are several phases (but no general time trend),
in which proxy values typically dier substantially from the sample average.6
To thoroughly test for distraction eects despite these episodes, we perform yearly sorts of
the proxy as the nal fourth step. For each year separately, we assign a decile-based rank to
each trading day. Pooling the data results in roughly 1,180 days for each decile rank. Figure
3.2 shows the time-series of the monthly number of high distraction days (decile 10) and
low distraction days (decile 1). It also shows Spearman rank order correlation coecients
between distraction proxy decile ranks and the rank order of market-level variables. The
proxy is only weakly correlated with standard risk premiums and (moderately) positively
with factors each assumed to capture a specic aspect of turbulent markets (squared
market return, market turnover, rolling ten day return volatility from t-10 to t-1).
4In unreported ndings, we nd that volatility-weighting often appears a compromise between value-weighting, where
few large industries substantially drive the aggregate measure, and equal-weighting, where the impact of small industries
is much stronger. Nevertheless, all three weighting schemes result in highly pairwise correlated (0.9 or greater) distraction
proxies. All weighting schemes are relied on in later robustness tests in section 3.4.6.
5Note that the proxy not simply picks up market movements. The value-weighted market return on these days is 0.40%,
0.68% and -5.07%, respectively.
6This appears in line with recent ndings on the behavior of idiosyncratic volatility (e.g. Brandt et al. (2010), Fink et al.
(2010)).
58 CHAPTER 3. PAIRS TRADING AND ATTENTION SHIFTS
F
ig
u
re
3
.2
:
T
im
e
S
er
ie
s
C
h
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
of
In
v
es
to
r
D
is
tr
ac
ti
on
P
ro
x
y
T
h
e
u
p
p
er
g
ra
p
h
sh
o
w
s
th
e
d
a
il
y
d
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t
o
f
th
e
ra
w
d
is
tr
a
ct
io
n
p
ro
x
y
fr
o
m
J
a
n
u
a
ry
1
9
6
2
to
D
ec
em
b
er
2
0
0
8
.
F
o
r
it
s
co
n
st
ru
ct
io
n
,
a
th
re
e-
st
ep
p
ro
ce
d
u
re
is
em
p
lo
y
ed
.
F
ir
st
,
fo
r
J
a
n
u
a
ry
1
9
6
0
to
D
ec
em
b
er
2
0
0
8
,
w
e
co
m
p
u
te
d
a
il
y
v
a
lu
e-
w
ei
g
h
te
d
re
tu
rn
s
fo
r
th
e
4
9
F
a
m
a
a
n
d
F
re
n
ch
(1
9
9
7
)
in
d
u
st
ri
es
.
S
ec
o
n
d
,
w
e
co
n
st
ru
ct
d
a
il
y
re
tu
rn
sh
o
ck
s
d
e
n
ed
a
s
th
e
a
b
so
lu
te
d
i
er
en
ce
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
a
ct
u
a
l
in
d
u
st
ry
re
tu
rn
a
n
d
it
s
ex
p
ec
te
d
re
tu
rn
a
s
im
p
li
ed
b
y
a
n
O
L
S
m
a
rk
et
m
o
d
el
.
P
a
ra
m
et
er
es
ti
m
a
te
s
a
re
o
b
ta
in
ed
fr
o
m
ro
ll
in
g
ti
m
e-
se
ri
es
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
b
a
se
d
o
n
d
a
il
y
re
tu
rn
d
a
ta
o
v
er
th
e
p
re
v
io
u
s
y
ea
r.
T
h
ir
d
,
sh
o
ck
s
a
re
co
n
d
en
se
d
in
to
a
si
n
g
le
ra
ti
o
.
T
o
th
is
en
d
,
in
d
u
st
ry
sh
o
ck
s
a
re
w
ei
g
h
te
d
b
y
th
e
in
v
er
se
o
f
th
e
v
o
la
ti
li
ty
o
f
th
ei
r
sh
o
ck
v
a
ri
a
b
le
o
v
er
th
e
p
re
v
io
u
s
y
ea
r.
T
h
e
lo
w
er
g
ra
p
h
sh
o
w
s
th
e
m
o
n
th
ly
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
h
ig
h
a
n
d
lo
w
d
is
tr
a
ct
io
n
d
a
y
s
b
a
se
d
o
n
y
ea
rl
y
so
rt
s
o
f
th
e
ra
w
d
is
tr
a
ct
io
n
p
ro
x
y
in
d
ec
il
e
ra
n
k
s.
D
a
y
s
w
it
h
d
ec
il
e
ra
n
k
1
0
(1
)
a
re
re
fe
rr
ed
to
a
s
h
ig
h
(l
o
w
)
d
is
tr
a
ct
io
n
d
a
y
s.
S
p
ea
rm
a
n
ra
n
k
o
rd
er
co
rr
el
a
ti
o
n
co
e
ci
en
ts
b
et
w
ee
n
th
es
e
d
ec
il
e
ra
n
k
s
a
n
d
th
e
ra
n
k
o
rd
er
o
f
m
a
rk
et
-l
ev
el
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
b
a
se
d
o
n
d
a
il
y
d
a
ta
a
re
a
s
fo
ll
o
w
s.
S
ta
ti
st
ic
a
l
si
g
n
i
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
,
5
%
,
a
n
d
1
%
le
v
el
is
in
d
ic
a
te
d
b
y
*
,
*
*
,
a
n
d
*
*
*
,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
M
a
rk
et
ex
ce
ss
re
tu
rn
S
m
a
ll

rm
fa
ct
o
r
V
a
lu
e/
g
ro
w
th
fa
ct
o
r
M
o
m
en
tu
m
fa
ct
o
r
S
h
o
rt
-t
er
m
re
v
er
sa
l
fa
ct
o
r
E
q
u
a
l-
w
ei
g
h
te
d
m
a
rk
et
re
tu
rn
0
.0
5
4
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
7
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
3
1
*
*
-0
.1
0
6
2
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
0
4
0
.0
3
9
9
*
*
*
S
q
u
a
re
d
m
a
rk
et
re
tu
rn
V
a
lu
e-
w
ei
g
h
te
d
tu
rn
o
v
er
E
q
u
a
l-
w
ei
g
h
te
d
tu
rn
o
v
er
R
o
ll
in
g
1
0
d
a
y
v
o
la
ti
li
ty
T
u
rn
o
v
er
d
is
p
er
si
o
n
R
et
u
rn
d
is
p
er
si
o
n
0
.2
1
0
9
*
*
*
0
.1
3
5
0
*
*
*
0
.1
0
3
0
*
*
*
0
.2
2
1
7
*
*
*
-0
.0
8
4
8
*
*
*
-0
.0
3
5
2
*
*
*
-1
5
-1
0-5051
0
1
5
Days per Month
H
ig
h
 D
is
tr
a
c!
o
n
 D
a
y
s
(D
e
ci
le
 1
0
)
Lo
w
 D
is
tr
a
c
!
o
n
D
a
y
s 
(D
e
ci
le
1
)
0
.0
0
%
0
.5
0
%
1
.0
0
%
1
.5
0
%
2
.0
0
%
2
.5
0
%
3
.0
0
%
Distrac!on Proxy
3.2. RELATED LITERATURE AND EMPIRICAL DESIGN 59
The appendix illustrates the relationship between the distribution of (dierent types of)
abnormal industry returns and distraction proxy deciles ranks. Higher ranks tend to go
along both with a generally more pronounced level of abnormal returns and with a higher
dispersion of these returns. However, the maximum weight of a single industry-level shock
is similar across decile ranks and moreover tends to be moderate. Together, these ndings
suggest that high distraction days typically identify moments where there is widespread
turbulence across markets segments.
3.2.2 Pairs Trading
There are still only few comprehensive empirical studies on pairs trading so far, possibly
due to its proprietary and computationally intensive nature. Gatev et al. (2006) report
statistically and economically signicant prots between 1962 and 2002, which are not
driven by standard risk factors, unrealized bankruptcy risk, or short sales constraints.
Focussing on same-industry pairs between 1993 and 2006, Engelberg et al. (2009) further
explore cross-sectional characteristics of pairs trading. They nd that part of the prots to
pairs trading seem to stem from dierential immediate response to common information,
i.e. news that aects both stocks in the pair. Thus, studying dynamics in the level of
investor distraction, which might cause such frictions, seems an intuitive way to gain
deeper insights. Do and Fa (2010) and Do and Fa (2011) report a declining trend
in standard pairs trading protability over the recent past, which is partly driven by
higher fraction of nonconvergent pairs. Again, identifying and understanding scenarios in
which pairs are ex ante more likely to converge appears crucial to understand the price
formation process. In the international context, Andrade et al. (2005) document annual
excess returns of about 10% for the Taiwanese stock market between 1994 and 2002. They
show that uninformed trading shocks are a major driver of the strategy's protability.
For our empirical analysis in the US stock market, we obtain daily stock price data on
all common shares (CRSP share code 10 or 11) traded on NYSE or AMEX on any time
between January 1960 and December 2008. We impose several restrictions to assure that
only relatively large and liquid stocks enter the analysis. We discard all stocks with at
least one missing return or zero trading volume on any day of the 12 months estimation
period, during which pairs are matched. Moreover, we only consider stocks whose market
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capitalization is larger than the median of the NYSE/AMEX stock universe at that time.
To mitigate data mining concerns and to facilitate comparison with previous work, we
widely follow the methodology developed in Gatev et al. (2006).7 Specically, at the rst
day of the 12 months estimation period, we set the price of each eligible stock to equal
unity. We use daily price data to compute stock-specic time-series of cumulative total
returns (with reinvested dividends) over the whole estimation period. A simple algorithm
is then relied on to determine to what extent two stocks, which we require to belong
to dierent (out of the 49) Fama and French (1997) industries, have moved together
historically. The algorithm is intended to provide a parsimonious, intuitive framework to
identify pairs. Let Ri;t (Rj;t) be the normalized return series of stock i (j) in estimation
period t, comprising of trading days 1 to n. The distance measure is then dened as:
1
n
nX
i=1
(Ri;t  Rj;t)2 (3.3)
We compute this value for all possible pair combinations, whose number grows quadrati-
cally with the number of eligible stocks. Then, we choose, at the beginning of each month,
the top 100 pairs with minimum distance. These top pairs only represent a tiny fraction
(on average less than 0.03%) of all pairs, which aims at identifying strongly linked rms.
The 100 pairs are then eligible for trading in the immediately following six months eval-
uation period. At the beginning of this period, prices are again set to equal unity. If the
spread between the cumulative return series of two substitutes exceeds a certain threshold,
we go long in the relatively underpriced stock and short in the relatively overpriced stock.
Following Gatev et al. (2006), we open a pair if prices diverge by more than two historical
standard deviations, as estimated from equation 3. The self-nancing pair is then hold
for up to one month. If prices convergence before this cut-o date, the trade is closed
with a gain. If prices do not convergence within a month, positions are oset, which, if
prices diverge even further, results in a loss.8 A pair may trade several times during the
7Note that their setup slightly diers from our baseline scenario in several dimensions. Their sample period is shorter,
their eligible stock universe broader, their maximum holding period longer, and their method to identify the top 100
pairs slightly dierent. In unreported results, we have replicated their main analysis to the extent possible. We obtained
ndings very similar to theirs. In section 3.4, we assess the sensitivity of our results. They are robust with regard to several
plausible changes in methodology (i.e. regarding maximum holding period or top pair identication). Moreover, we provide
out-of-sample evidence for in total eight major international stock markets.
8A third reason for closing a pair is delisting of a rm. In this case, we use the delisting return or the last available price.
Unreported results suggest that the economic impact of this scenario on our ndings is weak as the likelihood of delisting
within the month after divergence is low. The qualitative nature of our main ndings remains unchanged even if we set the
return of the long stock to  100% when it is delisted.
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six months evaluation period. The amount of money invested in later trades diers de-
pending on whether we report event-time results (the baseline analysis) or calendar-time
results. In event-time, we just again go one dollar long (short) into the cheap (expensive)
stock. In calendar-time, proceeds from previous trades are reinvested, which implies that
pairs in a portfolio are weighted by the cumulative returns of the component pairs. The
bottom-line dierences between both methods are small though. We initiate the pairs es-
timation period at the beginning of every month from January 1960 to July 2007, leading
to an evaluation period from January 1961 to December 2008.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the trading process with examples. Pairs therein open several times
during the trading period, however not always in the same direction. This is a common
behavior. Out of the large fraction of pairs that open in total at least three times, roughly
85% hold each stock at least once in both a long and a short position. Therefore, the
phenomenon is dierent from the lead-lag relationship studied in earlier work (e.g. Lo
and MacKinlay (1990), Hou (2007), Hong et al. (2007)).
Despite the strict screening process as outlined above, microstructural eects might still
be an issue. To mitigate these concerns, we report the results from two return compu-
tation schemes, that might be considered a lower and upper bound for the magnitude
of our ndings. For the upper bound, we simply compute returns on zero-cost portfolios
between the day of divergence (closing price) and the day of convergence (closing price).
For simplicity, we call this scheme \no waiting". For the lower bound, we employ a more
conservative return computation approach as discussed in Gatev et al. (2006). Specically,
we skip one day after the divergence and add one day following the crossing of the prices.
This method is intended to account for the impact of the bid-ask spread. Moreover, it
works strongly against nding eects attributable to investor distraction, as any informa-
tion overlooked at the day of divergence might be impounded into prices during the next
day without entering our return estimates. We call this scheme \one day waiting".
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Figure 3.3: Illustration of Pairs Trading Process
This gure illustrates the trading process with two examples. Each month, the 100 pairs with minimum
distance between normalized 12 month daily return indices are selected. They are then eligible for trading in
the immediately following six months evaluation period. At the beginning of this period, prices are set to equal
unity. If the spread between the cumulative return series of the two stocks exceeds two historical standard
deviations (as estimated in the estimation period), we go one dollar long in the relatively underpriced stock,
which is nanced by short-selling the relatively overpriced stock. The self-nancing pair is then hold for up
to one month. If prices convergence before this cut-o date, the trade is closed with a gain. If prices do not
convergence within a month, positions are oset, which, if prices diverge even further, results in a loss. A
pair may open several more times during the trading period. In this case, the trading process is repeated as
outlined above.
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3.3 Baseline Results
3.3.1 US Evidence
We have to ensure that our ndings capture the impact of variations in investor inattention
rather than variations in other important variables. Therefore, table 3.1 compares rm-
level and pair-level variables separately for all trades, for trades opening on low distraction
days (decile 1) and for trades opening on high distraction days (decile 10). Inferences are
very similar when we also include the remaining deciles in the analysis.
Characteristics related to liquidity and limits to arbitrage are deemed particularly rele-
vant. Our proxies for liquidity comprise market capitalization (NYSE/AMEX decile rank),
the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio and average pre-event turnover. The latter two are
estimated from daily data over the pairs formation period. Besides market capitalization,
we employ idiosyncratic risk as a proxy for limits to arbitrage (e.g. Ponti (2006)). The
role of arbitrage constraints will later be analyzed in more detail. Following previous lit-
erature, we compute idiosyncratic risk as the volatility of the residual from time-series
regressions of daily stock returns on factors for the market premium, size, value and mo-
mentum. Again, the twelve months immediately preceding the pair's trading period serve
as estimation period. Table 3.1 shows four main ndings. First, as aimed at with our
selection criteria, rms in general tend to be large and liquid. The medium rm belongs
to the ninth NYSE/AMEX decile and has an average daily turnover of 0.11%. Relying
on I/B/E/S data from 1980 on (see e.g. Hong et al. (2000)), the medium rm is covered
by nine analysts. Second, there are typically only small dierences in rm characteristics
within pairs and across distraction deciles. The only statistically signicant result is found
for idiosyncratic risk, where dierences seem small from an economic perspective. Third,
with regard to industry structure, both rms and pairs are, in the overall picture, well
diversied. For instance, both on high and low distraction days, rms from all 49 indus-
try groups and pairs from well more than 600 industry group combinations are traded.
However, utility stocks pose an exception. They make up close to 30% of all sample rms
and are part of all top industry group combinations. We address this issue in later tests.
Fourth, the day of divergence appears an interesting date. Pairs on average are opened
when cumulative standardized returns have diverged by 6.68%. More than 40% of this
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Stock and Pair Characteristics by Distraction Deciles
In panel A, NY SE=AMEX macap decile refers to the rm's market capitalization decile rank computed at
the beginning of the pair's six month trading period. Amihud illiquidity ratio is computed as the average
of a stock's absolute daily return divided by its total daily trading volume in million dollars. The estimation
period for the illiquidity ratio, for average daily turnover as well as for idiosyncratic risk is the 12 month period
ending at the beginning of a pair's trading period. Idiosyncratic risk is computed as the standard deviation of
the residual obtained from time series regressions of a stock's daily return on factors for the market premium,
size, value and momentum. Maximum industry weight denotes the largest fraction of sample rms belonging
to a specic industry group (out of the 49 Fama/French industries). Industry concentration is computed as
the sum of squared industry weights. In panel B, the rst four rows report within-pair dierences of stock
characteristics, which are computed as in panel A. The last column reports dierences in mean characteristics
between decile 10 and decile 1. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by day of pair
divergence. Statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Variable All Distraction Decile 1 Distraction Decile 10 10-1 (Mean)
Panel A: Firm Characteristics by Distraction Deciles
NYSE/AMEX macap decile Mean 8.86 8.85 8.86 0.0189
Median 9 9 9
Amihud illiquidity ratio Mean 0.0578 0.0567 0.0566 -0.0002
Median 0.01 0.0107 0.0094
Average daily turnover Mean 0.16% 0.16% 0.17% 0.008%
Median 0.11% 0.11% 0.11%
Idiosyncratic risk Mean 1.12% 1.10% 1.13% 0.032%**
Median 1.06% 1.05% 1.07%
No. Analysts (since 1980) Mean 10.41 10.56 10.21 -0.34
Median 9 9 9
No. industry groups 49 49 49
Maximum industry weight Fraction 29.14% 29.20% 29.53%
Industry Utilities (across all deciles)
Industry concentration 0.114 0.115 0.115
Panel B: Pair Characteristics by Distraction Deciles
Macap decile dierence Mean 1.25 1.25 1.24 -0.0052
Median 1 1 1
Average daily turnover dierence Mean 0.072% 0.072% 0.073% -0.00%
Median 0.040% 0.040% 0.039%
Amihud illiquidity ratio dierence Mean 0.063 0.061 0.061 -0.000
Median 0.013 0.0130 0.0130
Idiosyncratic risk dierence Mean 0.248% 0.237% 0.252% 0.015%***
Median 0.20% 0.19% 0.20%
Cumulative price dierence upon divergence Mean 6.68% 6.44% 7.04% 0.60%***
Median 6.28% 6.05% 6.58%
Return dierence at day of divergence Mean 2.84% 2.38% 3.59% 1.21%***
Median 2.29% 1.93% 2.89%
No. industry group combinations 931 623 697
Maximum industry group weight Fraction 15.89% 16.04% 15.13%
Industries Utilities/Communication (across all deciles)
Industry group concentration 0.039 0.041 0.037
No. round-trip trades 104,125 8,222 14,199 5,977
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dierence are on average attributable to the day of divergence itself. Thus, understanding
what causes prices of related stocks to diverge exactly on these days is critical for the
success of any strategy that bets on short-term convergence. On high (low) distraction
days, the return spread at the day of divergence is signicantly larger (smaller) than on
average, which seems consistent with an investor attention story.
We rst perform univariate analysis to examine the impact of time-varying investor dis-
traction on pairs trading. To this end, we compare the average event-time return on pairs
sorted by distraction proxy decile ranks as observed on the day of pair divergence. Table
3.2 shows ndings based on more than 100,000 round trip trades from January 1962 to
December 2008. Panel A (B) reports ndings under the \no waiting" (\one day waiting")
return computation scheme. The rst row in both panels reports returns on zero-cost pairs
generated within the month following the day of divergence. If pairs converge before this
cut-o date, we assume that the proceeds are hold in cash with zero interest rate until the
month has passed. As all cash-ows before the cut-o date are positive by construction,
this is a conservative approach. In line with previous literature, traditional pairs trading
averaged over the whole sample period appears highly protable. One month returns are
estimated between 97 (\one day waiting") and 138 (\no waiting") basis points. When
analyzing returns by investor distraction deciles, a clear pattern emerges. Pairs opening
on low distraction days are far less protable, both from a statistical and an economic
point of view, than pairs on average. The one month return ranges only from 53 (\one
day waiting") to 89 (\no waiting") basis points. On the other hand, pairs opening on high
distraction days are far more protable than pairs on average. Estimates range here from
130 to 190 basis points. The dierence between decile 10 and decile 1 amounts to highly
signicant and economically meaningful 77 to 101 basis points per month. The eect is
not conned to the extreme distraction deciles: Decile 2 to 9 show an almost monotonic in-
crease in protability. The appendix provides more detailed information about the return
distribution by distraction deciles.
To gain more insights, we study the mechanisms behind these return dierences. In gen-
eral, higher returns on pairs opening on specic days can stem from three sources: First
and foremost, the probability of convergence can be higher. This is indeed what a limited
attention story would predict for high distraction days. As implied by e.g. the model of
Peng and Xiong (2006), we expect, all else equal, cross-stock information to diuse more
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slowly during these times. Imagine, for instance that common news is released, which
clearly and directly aects the rst rm in the pair, but only indirectly and less clearly
the second rm. Market frictions due to high investor distraction are then likely to prevent
the news from being instantaneously and fully impounded into the price of the second
stock. This might induce temporary price divergence and thus the opening of the pair.
Consistent with this line of reasoning, far more pairs open on high distraction than low
distraction days (see table 3.2). When investors nally become fully aware of the link
between both rms, relative prices should adjust gradually and the pair is likely to nally
converge again. The second row of panel A and B shows that this prediction is supported
by the data. The average fraction of pairs converging within the month after divergence
is 36.3%. For pairs opening on low distraction days, however, the convergence rate is only
33.4%. This value almost monotonically increases by distraction deciles, culminating in a
convergence rate of 39.7% for decile 10. In other words, simply switching from low distrac-
tion to high distraction days increases the likelihood of convergence by almost 20 percent.
Figure 3.4 shows the probability of convergence on a given day in event time. In line with
the idea of time-varying investor distraction being an important driver of divergence, the
likelihood of convergence within the rst event days is considerably higher (lower) for
pairs diverging on high (low) distraction days. After about ve days, convergence rates
begin to approximate each other more closely, until they appear indistinguishable.
Higher returns might also stem from average returns conditioned on convergence being
higher. Arguably, this is also what a limited attention explanation of our ndings would
suggest. To the extent that a slower cross-stock information ow on high distraction days
translates ceteris paribus into a higher cumulative return dierence at the time of diver-
gence, we would expect to nally gain higher returns upon convergence. Table 3.2 shows
ndings supporting this line of reasoning. The dierence in returns upon convergence be-
tween decile 10 and decile 1 is estimated to range between 56 (\one day waiting") and
106 (\no waiting") basis points. In other words, and as also shown in table 3.2, simply
switching from low distraction to high distraction days appears to increase the average
return upon convergence by roughly 10%. Again, gure 3.4 provides graphical evidence.
It also shows that average daily returns almost monotonically decline in event-time, in
particular for pairs opening on high distraction days. This again highlights the important
role of the day of divergence.
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Figure 3.4: Probability of Convergence and Average Daily Return by Event Day
The upper graph shows the empirical probability of US stock pairs converging on a given event day after
divergence. See section 3.2.2 for a denition of divergence and convergence. The lower graph shows the average
daily return of open pairs in event-time. Both gures are based on more than 100,000 round-trip trades between
January 1962 and December 2008 (see sections 3.2 and 3.3 for details).
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Finally, a third potential source of prot is that the average return conditioned on non-
convergence could be less negative for pairs opening on high distraction days. A limited
attention story does not imply that this should be the case: Non-convergence is (compar-
atively more) suggestive of idiosyncratic news aecting only one stock in the pair (e.g.
Engelberg et al. (2009)). As this type of information is arguably often easier to grasp
and process than common news aecting the potentially complex relationship between
both rms in the pair, attention constraints should be less binding. Again, table 3.2 dis-
plays ndings consistent with this line of reasoning. The dierence in returns upon non-
convergence between decile 10 and decile 1 is virtually zero and statistically insignicant.
In fact, the returns for this scenario are similar across all distraction deciles.
Taken together, ndings are in line with the implications of investor distraction. Pairs
opening on high distraction days are more attractive for two reasons: They are more
likely to convergence, and, if they do, they generate higher abnormal returns.
To control for other factors that might partially drive our ndings so far, we conduct
several multivariate tests. Main results are presented in table 3.3. The dependent variable
is the pooled one-month event-time return on long-short pairs. For brevity, we only report
the more conservative results from the \one day waiting" return computation scheme. The
independent variable of interest is the investor distraction proxy. In dierent specications,
we employ either the distraction proxy decile rank or a high/low distraction dummy, which
is zero for low distraction days (decile 1) and one for high distraction days (decile 10). The
remaining independent variables comprise up to three control sets. The rst set controls
for calendar and industry eects (indicator variables for year, month, day of week as well
as pair industry group combinations). The second set controls for market-level conditions
on the day of divergence (market return, squared market return, market turnover, 10 day
rolling volatility, factors for daily return premia on size, value, momentum and short-term
reversal). The third set includes almost all pair and rm characteristics outlined at the
beginning of this section (see table 3.3 for details).
Depending on the model specication, the dierence in one month abnormal returns
between pairs opening on high distraction days and those opening on low distraction days
is estimated to range from 39 to 73 basis points in the multivariate case. Coecients
remain all strongly statistically signicant at the one percent level.
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3.3.2 International Evidence
A powerful way to test the validity of our baseline ndings is to evaluate the success of
the approach in independent samples. This is particular appealing as, up till now, hardly
anything is known about the nature of pairs trading prots in other major international
stock markets. Finding similar return patterns across countries would strongly suggest
that our ndings represent a generalized phenomenon rather than are attributable to
US-specic factors or elaborate data mining. Therefore, we study the dynamics of pairs
trading prots in eight countries. This number is somewhat arbitrarily set and meant
to be a compromise between maximizing the sample size and minimizing the fraction of
error-prone daily return and volume data as well as the number of months with too few el-
igible stocks for a reasonable analysis. Given this trade-o, we rely on Japan, UK, France,
Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Netherlands, and Hongkong. These markets represent the
eight largest non North-American stock markets based on domestic stock market capital-
ization at the end of 2002, as reported by Datastream. This date roughly represents the
middle of the sample period for most of these countries, for which we gather data from
the Compustat Global Daily Stock File. Depending on the availability of reliable trading
volume data, the sample period starts at some point in the middle of the 90ies and ends,
for all markets, in December 2009. The appendix gives more detailed information about
the samples. In total, the analysis is based on an initial data set of about 14,000 stocks
accounting for 25 million rm days. The computation of the country-specic distraction
proxy relies on the 10 GICS industry sectors. For the country-specic monthly top 100
pairs, we discard all stocks with at least one missing return or at least two zero/missing
trading volume days within the 12 months estimation period. Apart from that, the analy-
sis closely mirrors the US approach in table 3.2. Main ndings from in total about 200,000
round-trip trades are displayed in table 3.4.
Findings reveal that traditional pairs trading appears in general highly protable in all
countries. This may seem surprising given the fact that we focus on the recent past in
which returns on pairs trading in the US have been far smaller than in earlier periods.
However, even under the conservative \one day waiting" scheme, annualized returns range
from 6% (Italy) to more than 13% (Germany, France). While these results are interesting
in their own right, we again focus on the role of investor distraction at the day of diver-
gence. We nd strong evidence for distraction eects. With the exception of Japan, the
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return on pairs opening on low (high) distraction days is smaller (larger) than average
sample returns in every singly country. The positive return dierence between decile 10
and decile 1 is, with the exception of Italy and Japan, persistently and strongly statis-
tically signicant. In addition, their size is economically meaningful and sometimes even
very large. Moreover, the nature of pairs trading prots in Japan does not seem to be
that dierent. Focussing on distraction quintiles instead of deciles yields ndings which
become more in line, both statistically and economically, with the ones obtained for the
other countries. Digging deeper, panel C of table 3.4 reveals that the key to the pro-
nounced prots on high distraction days is again a higher likelihood of convergence. From
low distraction days to high distraction days, the fraction of converging pairs increases
between 12% (from 43.8% to 49.1% in Japan) to 87% (from 15.9% to 29.8% in Hongkong).
Remarkably, while self-nancing pairs trading generates seemingly abnormal returns in
all countries, its nature appears to dier substantially e.g. with regard to the number of
pairs traded, the impact of the \one day waiting" scheme, or the (unconditional) fraction
of converging pairs. Exploring the sources and consequences of these cross-sectional dif-
ferences might be an interesting eld for further research. In any case, the results in the
overall picture strongly conrm the baseline results obtained for the US market.
3.4 Robustness Checks
In this section, we test the sensitivity of our baseline ndings from various perspectives.
For the sake of brevity and if not mentioned otherwise, we only report results obtained
under the more conservative \one day waiting" scheme.
3.4.1 Subperiod Analysis
To assess whether our ndings are robust across time, we repeat the analysis for three
consecutive subperiods of (close to) equal length. Panel A of table 3.5 shows ndings for
the periods from 1962 to 1977, from 1978 to 1993, and from 1994 to 2008.
In line with results from previous work (Gatev et al. (2006), Do and Fa (2010)), returns
to traditional pairs trading seem to decline over time, though they remain statistically
signicant. For the most recent subperiod, the one-month return is only 24 basis points,
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Table 3.5: Robustness Checks
This table presents results from various robustness checks. For brevity, we only report results obtained un-
der the more conservative \one day waiting" return computation scheme. Panel A displays subperiod results
from the baseline approach. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clus-
tered by day of pair divergence. In Panel B, the way the monthly top 100 pairs are identied is modied.
Excluding utility firms means we do not consider any pair with at least one rm belonging to Fama/French
(1997) industry group 31. Only different firmsmeans we do not select a pair if at least one the rms is already
a component of any higher-ranked pair. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroscedasticity
and clustered by day of pair divergence. Panel C reports results from Fama-MacBeth-type regressions. We rst
estimate yearly pooled cross-sectional regressions of one-month pairs returns on distraction decile ranks and
then use the time-series of resulting coecients to assess the statistical signicance of the distraction proxy.
Newey-West-adjusted standard errors are reported in parentheses. Panel D shows results for same pairs, i.e.
a subsample of pairs that diverge both at least once on a high distraction day and on a low distraction days.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered by day of pair divergence.
Statistical signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Panel A: Subperiod Analysis
Distraction Decile: All Distraction Decile: 1 Distraction Decile: 10 Dierence: 10-1
Subperiod: 1962-1977 0.0149*** 0.0104*** 0.0177*** 0.0073***
(0.000511) (0.00173) (0.00153) (0.00231)
Subperiod: 1978-1993 0.0109*** 0.00706*** 0.0129*** 0.0059**
(0.000528) (0.00175) (0.00171) (0.00245)
Subperiod: 1994-2008 0.0024*** -0.0025 0.0079*** 0.0104***
(0.000598) (0.00174) (0.00187) (0.00255)
Panel B: Variations in the Data Set (Monthly Top 100 Pairs)
Distraction Decile: All Distraction Decile: 1 Distraction Decile: 10 Dierence: 10-1
Excluding utility rms 0.01019*** 0.00588*** 0.01347*** 0.0076***
(0.00031) (0.00102) (0.00097) (0.00102)
Only dierent rms 0.01080*** 0.00785*** 0.01435*** 0.0065***
(0.00029) (0.00091) (0.00087) (0.0013)
Panel C: Alternative Regression Approach
Coecient on distraction decile rank 0.00057***
(0.0001509)
Panel D: Limitation to Firms that Diverge both at Least Once on High and Low Distraction Days
Distraction Decile: All Distraction Decile: 1 Distraction Decile: 10 Dierence: 10-1
Same pairs 0.0202*** 0.0140*** 0.0213*** 0.0073***
(0.000611) (0.00178) (0.00160) (0.00239)
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possibly as a result of the increasing popularity of such strategies as well as decreasing
transaction costs. More importantly though, in all cases, returns originating from diver-
gence on high (low) distraction days are higher (lower) than on average. In fact, between
1994 and 2008, returns on pairs opening on low distraction days are even negative. Never-
theless, for high distraction days, the average return in the same period is 78 basis points,
which is three times larger than the return obtained from unconditional pairs trading.
The dierence between decile 10 and decile 1 is highly signicant in all subperiods, both
economically and statistically. In sum, our results appear robust across time.
3.4.2 Variations in the Data Set
As shown in table 3.1, rms from the utility sector represent about 30% of all rm-
level observations. To analyze whether our ndings represent a widespread phenomenon,
we control for the impact of utility rms in two ways. In the rst scenario, we simply
exclude these stocks. We rerun the selection process and the baseline analysis, but only
consider pairs that do not include any utility rm. In the second scenario, we identify
the monthly top 100 pairs under the constraint that each rm is only considered once
at maximum. This approach not only decreases the fraction of utility stocks to roughly
17%, but also changes the composition of the data set considerably.9 Panel B of table 3.5
veries, however, that the baseline ndings are robust to such variations in the eligible
pairs universe.
3.4.3 Alternative Econometric Approach
We also modify our empirical design by running Fama-MacBeth-type regressions. We rst
estimate yearly pooled cross-sectional regressions of one-month pairs returns on distrac-
tion proxy decile ranks and then use the time-series of the resulting coecient to assess
its statistical signicance. Panel C of table 3.5 shows the result. The coecient is positive
in about 75% of all years, highly statistical signicant, and economically meaningful.
9Again, we rank pairs by minimum distance of rms' normalized return series. However, we skip a pair if at least one
of the rms is already a component of any higher-ranked pair. As a result, the top 100 pairs always consist of 200 dierent
rms. The rank of the last selected pair is always 100 in the baseline scenario, but on average 782 in the new scenario.
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3.4.4 Same Pairs
Though descriptive statistics and multivariate tests suggest that rm and pair charac-
teristics are widely comparable across distraction deciles, the analysis could potentially
still suer from an omitted variables problem. To mitigate these concerns, we analyze a
subsample specically designed to isolate the impact of variations in investor distraction.
We restrict our focus to those pairs which happen to diverge both at least once on a low
and at least once on a high distraction day. Implementing this idea requires to impose a
restriction on the maximum time span between these events. We here report results for
the subset of pairs, for which the time dierence between the average date the divergence
on low distraction days took place and the average date the divergence on high distrac-
tion days took place, is less than a year.10 In total, this leaves 5,488 trades on high or low
distraction days. This procedure controls for all rm and pair-level variables, including
unobserved ones, that do not vary within this typically rather short time period. Findings
are shown in panel D of table 3.5. Results verify that inferences from our baseline ndings
carry over.
3.4.5 Implementability
The distraction proxy is constructed from yearly decile sorts. This implies that the infor-
mation it contains is not fully available in real time to market participants, in particular
in the rst months of a given year. To assure that a trading strategy based on our nd-
ings would actually have been implementable, we have modied the proxy construction
by relying on rolling historical values. Specically, the sorting into deciles for a given day
is now based on the raw proxy values over the immediately preceding 250 trading days.
Put dierently, all required information would have been easily at hand in real time. The
appendix provides a transition matrix between the baseline proxy and its modication. In
the nal pairs trading sample, both variables are highly positively correlated (0.87). And
indeed, as the appendix shows, ndings broadly carry over. Univariate results are only
slightly weaker and multivariate results even slightly stronger than in the baseline case.
10Results are not sensitive to this specic choice. We have experimented with modications, such as omitting the one
year restriction or such as only considering the rst trade in each six months trading period.
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3.4.6 Modied Distraction Proxies
Our results might partly be driven by the specic design of our distraction proxy. To ad-
dress potential data mining concerns, we repeat our baseline analysis with ten alternative
proxies, which modify the original approach in many dimensions. Specically, these prox-
ies dier with respect to the type and number of market segments used (49 industries, 100
portfolios sorted on book-to-market and size, 25 portfolios sorted on size and short-term
reversal), with respect to the weighting scheme of return shocks (volatility weighting,
equal weighting, value weighting, interquartile range), with respect to the model of ex-
pected return (market model, four factor model), and with respect to the type of returns
used (abnormal returns, raw returns as in Stivers and Sun (2010)). Table 3.6 gives more
information about these proxies and also shows returns by distraction deciles.
Table 3.6 provides a pervasive picture. The dierence between decile 10 and decile 1 is
statistically highly signicant in all cases. Moreover, it keeps its strong economic impor-
tance. Finally, results are not conned to the extreme deciles. Instead, in many cases, there
seems to be a close to monotone relationship between distraction deciles and returns.
3.4.7 Limits to Arbitrage
In unreported results, we nd that only few of the market-level and pair-level control vari-
ables in the multivariate analysis are persistently statistically signicant. The strongest
eect (t-statistic 4.48 in model 4 and 2.60 in model 8 in table 3.3), however, is found
for average idiosyncratic risk, supporting the notion that pairs consisting of dicult to
arbitrage rms generate larger returns on average. This cross-sectional nding appears
in line with insights from related literature (e.g. Gagnon and Karolyi (2010), Engelberg
et al. (2009))). It further raises the question whether similar forces are at work in the
time-series and whether these might reduce the importance of our distraction proxy. As a
proxy for arbitrage risk in the time-series, we rely on the Chicago Board Options Exchange
Market Volatility Index (VIX). The VIX a popular measure of the volatility implied in
S&P 500 index options and widely considered a forward-looking measure of overall market
uncertainty.11 Several theories suggest that the anticipation of fundamental shocks might
11The VIX is not included in the baseline analysis, as daily data is only available on a daily basis from 1990 on. In the
time-series, the correlation of our distraction proxy and the raw VIX (yearly decile ranks of the VIX) is 0.22 (0.31).
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impede capital-constraint arbitrageurs from eliminating potential mispricings, or alterna-
tively, that the behavior of arbitrageurs themselves may amplify fundamental shocks.12
The appendix shows results from various regressions of pooled one-month pairs trading
returns on the VIX and the distraction proxy over the period January 1990 to December
2008. We both employ raw values of the VIX as well as its yearly decile ranks, computed
as for the distraction proxy.
We nd that time-varying risk in arbitrage activities does appear to matter, as the VIX
often shows up as a signicant variable. However, the distraction proxy has a pronounced
incremental impact, and remains economically and statistically highly signicant.
3.4.8 Return Factor Exposure
In the following, we test whether the return dierence between high and low distraction
days is attributable to loadings on pervasive well-known risk factors. To transfer the
event-time results of our baseline analysis to calendar time, we extend the maximum
holding period from one month (our baseline approach) to six months (as in Gatev et al.
(2006)). Doing so works against nding dierences across distraction deciles.13 Separately
for pairs opening on high and on low distraction days, we construct a time series of daily
portfolio returns which are weighted by the cumulative returns of the component pairs.
Returns for both time series are then compounded to calculate monthly returns. Finally,
we compute the dierence between the monthly return for the high distraction portfolio
and the monthly return for the low distraction portfolio. This approach might be thought
of as mimicking a trading strategy designed to exploit time-varying investor attention for
pairs trading in calendar time.
12See for instance Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Long et al. (1990), Shleifer and Vishny
(1997), Hong et al. (2011). Moreover, hedge funds' arbitrage ability has been documented to be reduced in times of market
turbulence and high levels of VIX (e.g. Ben-David et al. (2011)).
13Note that this can be inferred from e.g. gure 3.4: Pairs opening on high (low) distraction days are characterized by a
higher (lower) probability of convergence as well as higher (lower) average returns during the rst few days after divergence.
After roughly two weeks, pairs behave similarly. Moreover, pairs not converging within the rst days are increasingly unlikely
to converge at all (Engelberg et al. (2009) and gure 3.4). We extend the maximum holding period to six months to obtain
smooth time-series of returns on pairs opening on high or low distraction days. As high respectively low distraction days only
comprise a tenth of all trading days, simply computing time series returns with a maximum holding period of one month
yields a substantial fraction of non-trading days with missing returns. However, relying on distraction quintiles instead of
deciles, or simply sticking to the original approach does not change the qualitative nature of our ndings.
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We regress this return time series on various well-established risk factors. The rst model
includes the Fama and French (1993) factors. The second model additionally includes
factors designed to capture persistent patterns in return autocorrelation at dierent time
lags. Specically, we rely on factors for short-term reversal, medium-term momentum, and
long-term reversal. The inclusion of these variables is motivated by the contrarian nature
of pairs trading, whose success could at least partly be subsumed by these risk premiums.
The third model is augmented by the traded liquidity factor constructed in Pastor and
Stambaugh (2003). It is intended to control for the strategy's exposure to the aggregate
(market-wide) liquidity risk (see e.g. Avramov et al. (2006), Engelberg et al. (2009)). For
data availability reasons, this model starts in January 1968, which is six years later than
the other models.
Table 3.7 veries that, in contrast to standard pairs trading14, the distraction strategy
appears market-neutral. It hardly loads notably on any risk premium. Alphas, however, are
persistently statistically signicant. In sum, the return dierence between pairs opening
on high and low distraction days does not seem attributable to standard risk factors.
3.5 Further Insights
In this section, we conduct additional tests to further establish the link between time-
varying investor distraction and pairs trading protability.
3.5.1 Time-Series Evidence
As a rst test, we analyze the role of other investor distraction proxies, which are inspired
by previous work. Specically, we construct four simple alternative dummy variables for
limited attention in the time series. Following DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) and Peress
(2008), we employ a Friday dummy. Following the idea developed in Hirshleifer et al.
(2009) and Peress (2008), we construct a variable based on the number of same-day events
competing for investors' attention. To this end, we compute the number of pairs that start
trading on a given day. There is considerable variation in each year and no general time
14In line with ndings in e.g. Gatev et al. (2006), we nd that the monthly return series on traditional pairs trading loads
signicantly negative on momentum and positive on short-term reversal.
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Table 3.7: Risk Factor Exposure of High Distraction Minus Low Distraction Portfolio Returns
This table shows results from monthly calendar time-series regressions which aim at quantifying the impact of
well-known risk factors on our ndings. To this end, we rst construct monthly returns on zero-cost portfolios
separately for pairs opened on high distraction (decile 10) and low distraction (decile 1) days. To mitigate
the problem of days without trading, the maximum holding period is extended to six months (as opposed to
one month in the baseline approach). We distinguish between a \no waiting" and a \one day waiting" return
computation scheme as outlined in the text. We then compute the dierence between the return on the high
distraction portfolio and the return on the low distraction portfolio. The resulting time series of monthly long-
short returns is regressed on well-known risk factors. The traded liquidity factor is taken from Lubos Pastor's
homepage. The remaining factor returns are obtained from Kenneth French's data library. T-statistics (in
parentheses) are computed using Newey-West standard errors with six lags.
Model Specication "no waiting" "one day waiting"
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample Start Jan 1962 Jan 1962 Jan 1968 Jan 1962 Jan 1962 Jan 1968
Sample End Dec 2008 Dec 2008 Dec 2008 Dec 2008 Dec 2008 Dec 2008
Observations 564 564 492 564 564 492
Market Factor -0.0633 -0.0581 -0.0324 -0.0189 -0.0122 0.0058
t-statistic (-1.23) (-1.10) (-0.59) (-0.44) (-0.28) (0.13)
Size Factor 0.0480 0.0586 0.0957* 0.0638 0.0682 0.0961*
t-statistic (1.07) (1.21) (1.93) (1.44) (1.42) (1.92)
Value Factor -0.0780 -0.0560 -0.0300 -0.0556 -0.0362 -0.0192
t-statistic (-1.52) (-0.90) (-0.49) (-1.08) (-0.63) (-0.33)
Momentum Factor 0.0270 0.0179 0.0482 0.0371
t-statistic (0.59) (0.38) (1.12) (0.84)
Short Term Reversal Factor -0.0094 -0.0263 0.0017 -0.0149
t-statistic (-0.18) (-0.48) (0.032) (-0.27)
Long Term Reversal Factor -0.0322 -0.0519 -0.0152 -.02308
t-statistic (-0.42) (-0.67) (-0.23) (-0.34)
Liquidity Factor 0.0416 0.0588
t-statistic (0.81) (1.30)
Alpha 0.0038*** 0.0035** 0.0037** 0.0030** 0.0025* 0.0029**
(2.79) (2.48) (2.41) (2.39) (1.88) (2.04)
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trend. The latter is not surprising, as the number of pairs eligible for trading remains
constant after the rst six months of the sample period, which we exclude. However, the
number of opening pairs is signicantly positively correlated (0.25) with distraction proxy
decile ranks. Therefore, we rely on the residuals from a regression of the logarithmized
number of diverging pairs on distraction proxy decile ranks. Finally, we condense this
information into a dummy variable. We use the top and bottom quintile to identify days
with an unexpectedly large number (dummy=1) or small number (dummy=0) of newly
opening pairs. With regard to the third and fourth proxy, we follow Hou et al. (2009) and
Karlsson et al. (2009) who provide evidence that investors tend to be less attentive during
down market periods. We rely on NBER recession dates and create a dummy variable that
takes the value of one if NBER classies a month as recession. We also create an alternative
dummy that is one if the cumulative three year value-weighted market return is negative
and zero otherwise.
We then imitate our baseline approach of section 3.3 by regressing pair returns separately
on each of these limited attention dummies (specication 1) as well as additionally on
the full set of control variables used in model 8 of table 3.3, including the distraction
proxy decile rank (specication 2). As we have four alternative proxies, two regression
specications, and two return computation schemes, we run 16 regressions in total. Each
of the attention dummies is constructed in a way that a positive coecient is expected.
The main ndings are presented in panel A of table 3.8.
As predicted, the coecient is positive in all 16 cases.15 The persistent positive sign
of the coecients is broadly consistent with the idea of limited attention aecting the
relative eciency of linked assets, although most proxies lack signicance once one controls
for calendar, industry, market and pair characteristics. In all multivariate regressions,
however, the distraction proxy decile rank remains highly statistically and economically
signicant, suggesting that its explanatory power tends to be greatest.
Given these insights, we explore whether the sensitivity of pairs trading returns to dis-
traction proxy decile ranks becomes even higher once one considers the proxy's possible
interaction with the attention proxies inspired by previous work. Specically, consider
15By far the strongest eect, both statistically and economically, is found for the attention proxy based on NBER recession
periods. Note, however, that in contrast to e.g. decile ranks of our novel proxy, recession months are far from being uniformly
distributed across sample years.
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Table 3.8: Further Tests (I): Investor Distraction and Pairs Trading Protability
Panel A reports the impact of alternative limited attention dummies on the protability of pairs trading.
Details about the construction of each proxy are given in the text. Specication 1 displays ndings from
univariate tests. In specication 2, control variables correspond to those used in model 8 of table 3.3. Standard
errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered by day of pair divergence. T-statistics are reported
in parentheses. Panel B shows interaction eects and corresponding t-statistics. In specication 1 (2), we
regress the one-month event-time pairs return on the distraction proxy decile rank, an alternative limited
attention dummy as in panel A, and on the interaction eect (as well as on the full set of controls). Panel C
shows the implied percentage increase in return dierence between high and low distraction scenarios when
benchmarked against the baseline ndings in tables 3.2 and 3.3. High (low) distraction scenarios are dened as
days satisfying both distraction proxy decile rank 10 and alternative limited attention dummy=1 (distraction
decile 1 + alternative dummy=0). In Panel D, we compare mean and median returns of pairs opening on the
last trading day before federal holidays with mean and median returns of pairs opening on any other day of the
year. The table shows the fraction of years in which returns on pre-holiday pairs trading are higher. P-values
(in parentheses) are computed from one-sided binominal probability tests with an assumed yearly success rate
of 50%. Excess probability of convergence is computed as the dierence between the fraction of converging
pairs that diverged immediately before the federal holiday and the fraction of converging pairs that diverged
on any other day of the year. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. In all panels, statistical signicance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Panel A: Impact of Limited Attention Proxies Derived from Previous Work
Model specification Return Computation Fridays No. pairs opening NBER recessions 3 year market return
Specification 1 (no further controls) No waiting 0.0006 0.0046*** 0.0113*** 0.0066***
(0.74) (4.20) (10.50) (6.36)
One day waiting 0.0002 0.0033*** 0.0090*** 0.0055***
(0.21) (3.18) (8.99) (5.51)
Specification 2 (full set of controls) No waiting 0.0010 0.0002 0.0050** 0.0006
(0.42) (0.18) (2.55) (0.37)
One day waiting 0.0006 0.0007 0.0041** 0.0004
(0.27) (0.68) (2.37) (0.22)
Panel B: Interaction Effects from Combining the Distraction Proxy with Limited Attention Dummies Derived from Previous Work
Model specification Return Computation Fridays No. pairs opening NBER recessions 3 year market return
Specification 1 (no further controls) No waiting 0.0004 0.0006 0.0006* 0.0004
(1.54) (1.50) (1.78) (1.21)
One day waiting 0.0005* 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003
(1.71) (0.81) (1.25) (1.03)
Specification 2 (full set of controls) No waiting 0.0004 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002
(1.34) (0.62) (0.79) (0.79)
One day waiting 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004
(1.50) (0.43) (0.69) (1.34)
Panel C: Implied Percentage Increase in the Return Difference between High Distraction and Low Distraction Scenarios
Model specification Return Computation Fridays No. pairs opening NBER recessions 3 year market return
Specification 1 (no further controls) No waiting 28.50% 51.47% 139.28% 80.13%
One day waiting 29.68% 50.86% 150.22% 94.45%
Specification 2 (full set of controls) No waiting 2.93% 4.59% 135.09% 30.17%
One day waiting 2.25% 9.73% 154.04% 35.36%
Panel D: Relative Success of Pre-Holiday Pairs Trading
Pairs Trading Returns Thanksgiving Day Christmas Day New Year's Day Independence Day
Mean 61%* 70%*** 72%*** 51%
Median 55% 63%* 70%*** 53%
Excess probability of convergence 0.42% 7.39%* 15.77%*** 5.61%
(baseline probability: 36.15%-36.3%) (0.10) (1.68) (3.67) (1.35)
Pairs Trading Returns Washington's Birthday Labor Day Memorial Day
Mean 61%* 60% 47%
Median 46% 60% 45%
Excess probability of convergence -0.48% 3.87% 3.87%
(baseline probability: 36.15%-36.3%) (-0.14) (1.14) (0.94)
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the following two extreme scenarios. The rst sample consists of all days with distraction
decile rank 10 for which, at the same time, the alternative distraction proxy also identies
a distracting situation (e.g. a Friday or a day with a higher than expected number of
diverging pairs). In these cases, attention constraints should become particularly binding.
The second sample consists of all days with distraction decile rank 1 for which, at the
same time, the alternative distraction proxy also identies a situation in which attention
constraints should be less binding. We expect the dierence in returns of pairs opening in
one of these two extreme situations to be larger than the return dierence between decile
10 and decile 1 in our baseline scenario (see tables 3.2 and 3.3).
To explore this possibility, we regress one-month pairs returns on the distraction proxy
decile rank, the alternative limited attention dummy variable and the interaction eect
(as well as a large set of control variables). Again, we have 16 regression specications in
total. Panel B of table 3.8 shows coecients obtained for each interaction eect, which
are persistently positive as expected. Panel C shows the implied percentage change in
return dierence between high and low distraction scenarios, as outlined above, when
benchmarked against our baseline ndings. As the return dierence increases in each
case, ndings lend further support to the notion that time-varying limited attention is an
important explanatory factor for pairs trading protability.
Next, we study whether pairs trading is particularly protable immediately before those
seven federal holidays for which NYSE has been closed over the whole sample period.16 We
expect investor distraction to be particularly high in these times. This line of reasoning is
backed up by DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) who provide evidence that, even on \ordinary
Fridays", investors are distracted by the upcoming weekend. It is also motivated by work
on holiday eects (e.g. Frieder and Subrahmanyam (2004), Hong and Yu (2009)). We
compare returns on pairs that diverge on the last trading day before the holiday with
returns on pairs that open on any other day. Specically, for each year and each holiday
separately, we determine whether the mean (median) pre-holiday pairs trading return is
larger or smaller than the return over the rest of the year. Panel D of table 3.8 shows
the fraction of years in which pre-holiday pairs trading is more protable. The fraction
is larger than 50% in 11 out of 14 cases, and often also statistically signicant. Before
16In chronological order of occurrence, these holidays are: New Year's Day, Washington's Birthday, Memorial Day, Inde-
pendence Day, Labor Day, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day.
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Christmas and New Year's Day, pairs trading seems particularly successful. For instance,
in about 70% of all sample years, mean and median returns from pairs opening on the last
trading day of the year are higher than corresponding returns over the rest of the year.
This is substantially driven by a considerably higher than usual fraction of converging
pairs. While on average less than 37% of pairs converge within a month, more than 50%
do if they diverge immediately before New Year's Day.
3.5.2 Cross-Sectional Evidence
We nish our analysis by exploring some cross-sectional implications of our setup. Specif-
ically, we are interested in determining which pairs react most sensitively to changes in
investor distraction on the date of pair divergence. Results for the \one day waiting" (\no
waiting") scheme are reported in table 3.9 (the appendix).
3.5.2.1 Alternative Assets
We expect the sensitivity to be positively related to the degree of informational frictions
between the constituents of the pair. So far, we have focused on pairs with stocks from
dierent industries. As market participants often specialize along industrial boundaries
(e.g. Hong et al. (2007), Menzly and Ozbas (2010)), we expect the sensitivity to be lower
for pairs consisting of stocks from the same industry. Therefore, we modify our baseline
approach by again identifying the monthly top 100 pairs, but now only considering same-
industry pairs. We expect the sensitivity to be even lower if we concentrate on trading
pairs of whole industries instead of pairs of stocks. To verify this prediction, we identify the
monthly top 20 pairs out of all possible combinations of the 49 value-weighted industries
as constituents.17
We compute two measures of return sensitivity to time-varying investor distraction. The
rst measure is the return dierence between pairs opening on high distraction days (decile
10) and those opening on low distraction days (decile 1). The second is the coecient on
the distraction proxy decile rank, as obtained from regressions of one-month event-time
17The lower number of top pairs is chosen as the maximum number of eligible pairs is only 49*48/2=1,176, and thus
extremely low when compared to the baseline approach.
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Table 3.9: Further Tests (II): Investor Distraction and Pairs Trading Protability
Panel A shows the sensitivity of pairs trading returns to distraction proxy decile ranks (as observed on the
day of divergence) for several samples of top pairs: The monthly top 100 pairs each consisting of rms from
dierent industries, the monthly top 100 pairs each consisting of rms from the same industries, and the
monthly top 20 pairs each consisting of two value-weighted industries. In all cases, we use the Fama/French
(1997) classication with 49 industries. The rst column shows the return dierence between pairs diverging on
high distraction days (decile 10) and pairs diverging on low distraction days (decile 1). The approach resembles
the methodology used in table 3.2. The second column shows ndings from regressing pairs returns on the
distraction proxy decile rank. Panel B reports results from a test similar in spirit. It compares the return
sensitivity for pairs whose constituent rms share (do not share) at least one business segment, as described
in detail in the text. Panel C compares returns from pairs consisting only of rms with high residual media
coverage and pairs consisting only of rms with low residual media coverage, as described in detail in the text.
The rst column compares average event-time one-month pairs trading returns. The second column shows
ndings from regressing pairs returns on the distraction proxy decile rank. In all panels, statistical signicance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered by day of pair divergence.
Panel A: Impact of Investor Distraction on Pairs Consisting of Alternative Assets
Return computation Di.: Decile 10-Decile 1 Distraction Decile Rank
Top 100 pairs with stocks one day waiting 0.00770*** 0.00065***
from dierent industries (N=103,386) (0.00143) (0.0000708)
Top 100 pairs with stocks 0.0071*** 0.00057***
from the same industry (N=100,726) (0.00120) (0.0000925)
Top 20 industry-level pairs 0.0039** 0.00033**
(N=14,180) (0.00181) (0.0001394)
Panel B: Pairs With and Without Common Industry Segments (since 1977)
Return computation Di.: Decile 10-Decile 1 Distraction Decile Rank
No shared industry segment one day waiting 0.0097*** 0.00073***
(0.0023) (0.00018)
Shared industry segment 0.0084** 0.00019
(0.0039) (0.00030)
Dierence 0.0013 0.00054*
(0.0038) (0.00029)
Panel C: Pairs with High and Low Residual Media Coverage
Return computation Return: All Deciles Distraction Decile Rank
Low residual media coverage one day waiting 0.0077*** 0.0010*
(0.0016) (0.0006)
High residual media coverage -0.0001 -0.0012
(0.0030) (0.0010)
Dierence 0.0082** 0.0022*
(0.0034) (0.0012)
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returns on the proxy such as in table 3.3. Panel A of table 3.9 shows ndings supporting
our line of reasoning. Compared to the baseline pairs universe, the sensitivity to the level
of investor distraction is slightly lower for pairs with stocks from the same industry. It is
considerably lower, though still signicant.
3.5.2.2 Common Industry Segments
Panel B shows ndings from a test similar in spirit. While pairs are based on rms from
dierent industries, it is reasonable to expect that at least some of them operate, at a more
disaggregated intra-rm industry level, in some common business segments. The economic
link for these pairs will arguably be more visible, which renders it comparatively less
likely that shocks in limited attention will cause prices to diverge. To test this hypothesis,
we exploit the fact that, starting from 1977, rms have to disclose detailed nancial
information of any industry segment comprising more than 10% of total consolidated
yearly sales. To gather this information, we rely on sales data reported in the Compustat
fundamentals annual les as well as Compustat segment les, which are then merged with
the CRSP data. Several screening procedures are intended to assure data quality.18 For
each pair traded at least once between January 1977 and December 2008, we determine
whether rms have at least one business segment in common. We nd that about 18% of
pairs that satisfy all data requirements share at least one segment, where segments are
again dened by the 49 Fama/French industries. We then conduct an analysis analogous
to the one described in the previous paragraph. Findings reported in Panel B suggest that
the return sensitivity to time-varying investor distraction appears indeed lower for pairs
with same industry segments, though the dierence is not always signicant.
18See e.g. Berger and Ofek (1995) or Cohen and Lou (2011) for more detailed information about the relevant segment
reporting regulations. We loosely follow these studies in imposing various criteria rms have to meet in order to enter this
test. First, for a given year, rms are required to have data both in the Compustat fundamentals annual as well as segment
le. Second, the sum of reported segment sales must be within 1% of total sales. Third, we exclude segment eliminations or
segments with missing SIC codes.The Compustat segment le provides four-digit SIC codes for industry segments, which
we transform in the 49 Fama/French industries.
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3.5.2.3 Press Coverage
Finally, we explore the role of press coverage. Previous work focussing on other setups has
shown that the extent of a rm's media coverage appears directly linked to the speed of
information diusion and thus to price eciency (e.g. Peress (2008), Huberman (2001)).
As press articles catch many investors' attention (e.g. Barber and Odean (2008)), dissem-
inate information to a broad audience, and increase rm visibility (e.g. Fang and Peress
(2009)), coverage should help to keep relative prices in line, also and in particular in tur-
bulent moments. Thus, rst, a highly covered pair should be less protable than a pair
that is widely neglected by the press. Second, the highly covered pair should also react
less sensitive to distracting overall market situations.
To explore these predictions, we rely on the Dow Jones News Service (DJNS) database as
accessible via factiva. Due to its comprehensive coverage, this database has widely been
used in previous studies, and argued to be \the best approximation of public news for
traders" (Chan (2003), p. 230). For each rm that meets our data requirements on pairs
trading (see section 3.2.2) at some point after 1990, we collect the yearly number of news
articles between 1991 and 2008.19 As this number is strongly positively related to rm size
(e.g. Fang and Peress (2009)), we perform yearly regressions of ln (1+number of news)
on ln(average market capitalization). We use the yearly top and bottom quintile of the
resulting yearly residuals to identify rms with particularly high or low DJNS coverage.
Finally, we dene a pair as being highly (lowly) covered, if both of its components are
rms with high (low) coverage in the year the divergence occurs. Panel C of table 3.9
compares return characteristics for both types of pairs. Our predictions largely prove
true. The one-month return dierence between pairs receiving disproportionately much
coverage and those widely neglected reaches at least 80 basis points. In fact, trading highly
covered pairs turns out to be completely unprotable, whereas trading lowly covered pairs
is considerably more protable than trading the average pair in 1991 to 2008. Moreover, as
predicted, the pair's sensitivity to changes in the level of investor distraction is statistically
and economically signicantly higher for lowly covered pairs.
19Tetlock (2010) argues that DJNS articles before November 1996 might suer from some measurement error and sur-
vivorship bias towards larger rms. Therefore, we have replicated the following analysis also for the subperiod 1997 to 2008.
The qualitative nature of our ndings does not change.
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3.6 Conclusion
Understanding how markets impound information into stock prices is one of the central
concerns of nancial economics. We provide new insights by analyzing how the price
formation of linked stocks, as identied by pairs trading techniques, is aected by investor
distraction, as quantied with a novel proxy. Our results lend support to the notion that
the relative eciency of linked assets might not be stable over time, but be aected by
short-term investor attention shifts. Pairs opening on high distraction days, on which
exceptional market circumstances force investors to concentrate on understanding the big
picture, are much more protable than pairs opening on low distraction days. This key
nding does not only hold in the US market, but also in all eight major international stock
markets we study. It is economically meaningful, statistically signicant, and survives a
number of robustness checks. Several further tests are also consistent with the idea of
investor attention constraints being an important source of friction in nancial markets.
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Chapter 4
Twin Stock Returns and Investor
Attention Shifts
4.1 Introduction
As dual-listed companies (DLCs) pool their operations and cash-ows, their stocks should
move in lockstep in frictionless, ecient markets. A substantial body of research, however,
has documented that these essentially identical, but separately listed securities often sell at
dierent prices. Fundamental factors are unlikely to fully explain the level and time-series
variability of deviations from theoretical parity. By now, this phenomenon is in fact often
referred to as textbook evidence of puzzling mispricing in stock markets (e.g. Barberis
and Shleifer (2003), Brealey et al. (2008), Lamont and Thaler (2003b), Mullainathan and
Thaler (2001), Shleifer (2000)). Previous work has revealed that noise trader risk appears
to prevent arbitrageurs from quickly eliminating these apparent mispricings, so they can
persist. However, the lack of riskless arbitrage opportunities does not explain why returns
deviate in the rst place. What exactly causes returns of twin stocks to diverge?
So far very little is known about the underlying mechanisms. The empirical literature
attributes deviations primarily to consequences of some rather abstract form of noise
trading in the sense of Black (1986) or Long et al. (1990). However, as Froot and Dabora
(1999) stress: \The main problem with this story - here and more generally - is that
the source of noise or persistent irrationality is dicult to identify." (p. 215). We aim
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to take a step in this direction by exploring the role of one specic potential driver of
temporary return deviations: Time-varying investor attention. Our line of reasoning is
quite simple and inspired by recent theoretical work. We hypothesize that investors tend
to be distracted in moments where understanding the big picture is the most pressing
issue. If attention-constraint investors need to pool most resources in order to assess
complex unexpected market conditions, they have necessarily less resources to focus on
rm-level interdependencies. In particular, they might not pay as close attention as would
be necessary to keep relative returns of internationally listed twin stocks in line. Our main
contribution is to present ndings supportive of this view. Changes in the level of daily
as well as weekly return deviations are reliably correlated with a number of conceptually
quite diverse proxies deemed to measure changes in investor attention. Return deviations
are signicantly higher (lower) than usual in moments of high (low) investor distraction.
This is arguably surprising. In essence, twin stocks represent almost perfect substitutes,
typically large and liquid, which simply trade in two dierent countries. Investors should
be reasonably expected to always be aware of the blatant, contractual, and sometimes
long-standing economic relationship these rms have. On the other hand, there is some
reason to ex ante believe that attention constraints might be binding enough to cause
returns of even twin stocks to drift apart. First, and in contrast to other settings, the
literature has already established strong evidence of limits to arbitrage. This is a necessary
prerequisite for the possibility of identifying traces of not fully rational investor behavior
in stock returns. Second, there is rst evidence that attention constrained investors fail
to take economic links into account, which, however, are arguably less clear-cut than in
our study. Cohen and Frazzini (2008) and Menzly and Ozbas (2010) demonstrate that
investors temporarily neglect well-dened customer-supplier links at the rm or industry
level, thereby causing return predictability. Klibano et al. (1998) show that closed-end
country funds' prices react more quickly than usual to changes in fundamentals when
prominently broadcasted, but salient, country-specic news catches investors' attention.
Designing promising proxies for (changes in) investor distraction is a challenge for any em-
pirical work, as attention allocation in nancial markets is not observable. Our approach
is twofold. First, we design a set of baseline proxies, which build on the intuition of recent
models on information processing in the presence of attention constraints. Second, we also
investigate the role of several previously proposed, intuitive, and conceptually dierent
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proxies for investor distraction in the time-series.
Models as Peng and Xiong (2006) or Peng (2005) propose that market participants aim to
optimally allocate their nite attention across several aggregation levels. The allocation
is based on priority and urgency. Market- and sector-level information typically have
the largest impact on the investors' overall portfolio and therefore get most attention.
Remaining resources are used to process more disaggregate, rm-level information. A
natural time-series implication of this setup is that investors' attention towards such
information is not stable, but subject to temporary shifts. As Peng and Xiong (2006) put
it: \In severely constrained cases, the investor allocates all attention to market- and sector-
level information and ignores all the rm-specic data" (p. 565). Inspired by this idea, we
construct a set of baseline distraction proxies whose goal is to capture the unexpected daily
information load investors face in order to timely assess the general market situation. Their
design closely follows the approach proposed in chapter 3. Building on the assumption
that information shocks are partly reected in abnormal returns, we construct country-
specic proxies by condensing the magnitude and dissemination of unanticipated daily
return shocks in a broad range of market segments. We then perform yearly decile sorts
of the resulting values. Finally, we combine the information contained in the two country-
specic proxies relevant for each twin under consideration. We employ several approaches
to distinguish between low distraction days (i.e. low decile ranks) and high distraction
days (i.e. high decile ranks).
Univariate regressions reveal that average currency-adjusted dierences in daily returns
are 35 to 60 basis points higher on high distraction days than on low distraction days. At
the weekly frequency, the dierence is even 45 to 70 basis points. These values correspond
to roughly 25% to 50% of the typical standard deviation of return discrepancies. The
link can be identied for each of the twelve international and quite heterogeneous DLCs
we study. In multivariate regressions, we aim at controlling for comovement eects with
domestic stock market return shocks, for imperfect synchronization of return data, for
changes in arbitrage risk as well as for variables potentially related to the distraction
proxies. The latter retain their strong statistical signicance with coecients close to two
thirds in magnitude. This nding survives a number of sensitivity checks. Moreover, it
largely carries over to the price perspective. Price deviations from theoretical parity tend
to be somewhat higher (lower) than usual in moments of high (low) investor distraction.
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To address concerns about the ability of our baseline proxies to pick up pure attention
eects, we further test intuitive alternative measures proposed in earlier work. In line with
our expectations, return deviations are higher (lower) than usual on Fridays (Mondays).
They are more pronounced in down market periods. Moreover, they are higher when many
corporate events in the respective stock markets compete for investors' attention.
In a related out of sample setting, we nally investigate return deviations of 23 liquid US
dual-class shares (e.g. Schultz and Shive (2010)). These shares dier in voting rights, but
not in cash-ow rights. Findings again appear in line with a limited attention story.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 gives background infor-
mation about DLCs and provides an overview of related research. Section 4.3 discusses
our data and the construction of baseline distractions proxies. Section 4.4 provides main
empirical ndings. Section 4.5 shows results from tests designed to further investigate the
role of limited attention. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Background and Related Literature
The terms \dual-listed companies" or \Siamese twin stocks" refer to a setting where
two requirements are met. Two rms, typically incorporated in dierent countries, have
contractually agreed to combine their operations and to split all of their current and future
cash-ows in a xed proportion.1 Despite this quasi merger, however, these rms remain
separate entities and have distinct legal identities. They have their own stock exchange
listings in their own countries and they retain their own investor clienteles.
Consider, for example, the arguably most widely recognized twin stocks Royal Dutch and
Shell, which are extensively discussed in Rosenthal and Young (1990) and Froot and Dab-
ora (1999). Until their unication in July 2005, Royal Dutch and Shell were independent
rms incorporated in the Netherlands and UK, respectively. While they traded in princi-
ple on several exchanges, they did predominantly so in their home countries, and, in the
case of Royal Dutch, in the US. Based on a long-standing merger agreement from 1907, all
cash ows, adjusted for corporate taxes and control rights, were split so that Royal Dutch
1See Bedi et al. (2003) for a discussion of why companies choose DLC structures and Jong et al. (2009) for a description
of dierent types of DLCs.
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shares always received 60 percent and Shell shares always received 40 percent. Froot and
Dabora (1999) argue that there was a considerable amount of public and readily available
information clarifying this very fundamental relationship. Consequently, in ecient and
frictionless markets, dividing the market value of Royal Dutch by the market value of
Shell should result in a value of 1.5 at any point in time.
In essence, twin stocks are two securities with nearly identical claims and can thus be con-
sidered close-to-perfect substitutes. When investigating price discovery for these stocks,
one does not have to make strong assumptions about the properties of fundamentals. This
unique setting allows to circumvent the joint hypothesis problem (Fama (1998)), which
plagues many other tests of market eciency. DLCs therefore provide an interesting op-
portunity to deepen our understanding of how markets actually work.
A number of papers have explored these special cases and thereby established some key
facts. Starting with Rosenthal and Young (1990), several studies have identied strong
and persistent deviations from the ratio of adjusted cash ows for a number of twin
stocks. Attempts to fully rationalize this phenomenon have largely failed. Rosenthal and
Young (1990), Froot and Dabora (1999) as well as Jong et al. (2009) collectively show that
fundamental factors such as currency risk, voting rights, legal issues, liquidity, taxation,
institutional obstacles, short-sale constraints, and dierent time zones are not the major
determinant of deviations from theoretical parity. Instead, Froot and Dabora (1999) as
well as Bedi et al. (2003) demonstrate that the return on each twin stock comoves ex-
cessively with the market on which the stock is traded most.2 In the overall picture, the
behavior of twin stocks represents \a deep challenge to the ecient markets hypothesis"
(Shleifer (2000), p. 31). Another key insight previous work has gained is to understand
that arbitrage appears limited in these cases. While there is hardly any fundamental risk,
and while there are no major implementation costs, arbitrageurs are exposed to sub-
stantial noise trader risk (e.g. Shleifer (2000), Barberis and Shleifer (2003)). Cumulative
return deviations show considerable time-series variation. It is hardly predictable when
2This nding might be regarded as being in line with implications of limited investor attention. Theoretical work such
as Barberis and Shleifer (2003) or Barberis et al. (2005) assumes that, to simplify the complexity of portfolio decisions,
investors tend to group assets into categories and then trade them at the level of these categories. Alternatively, investors
might have preferred habitats, i.e. trade primarily a specic subset of all available securities. Both mechanisms can delink
returns from fundamentals. In this sense, our analysis might be considered as an attempt to provide direct evidence of the
impact of investor attention shifts, controlling for and going above and beyond what has been documented before.
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their prices will converge again. Scruggs (2007) and Jong et al. (2009) demonstrate in
detail that arbitrage trading strategies bear large risks, which might prevent rational in-
vestors from aggressively betting against the apparent mispricing (see also Long et al.
(1990), Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). These limits to arbitrage are able to explain why
deviations from theoretical parity might persist, yet they are not able to explain why
these deviations arise in the rst place.
There appears to be consensus in the literature that at least some part of the seemingly
abnormal behavior of twin stocks is likely to be the result of some form of noise trading.
An important question, however, remains largely unanswered: Why do investors at least
temporarily fail to take the seemingly obvious fundamental relationship between twin
stocks into account? Why is the law of one price violated?
A partial answer might be found in another stream of theoretical and empirical research,
which highlights the importance of attention constraints in nance. This literature builds
on extensive evidence from psychological research stressing that attention is a scarce cog-
nitive resource. Focussing attention on one task necessarily goes along with a substitution
of cognitive resources from other tasks (Kahneman (1973)).
On the empirical side, most research so far has concentrated on the return predictability
of individual assets. The common line of arguments here is that cognitively overloaded
investors tend to neglect value-relevant information, thereby inducing predictable price
drifts. For example, DellaVigna and Pollet (2009), Hirshleifer et al. (2009), Hou et al.
(2009) as well as Peress (2008) all analyze the market reactions to earnings announce-
ment. All studies conclude that immediate reactions are weaker, but post-announcement
abnormal returns are higher in moments of high investor distraction.
The impact of attention constraints is not restricted to this specic corporate event. In-
stead, the literature suggests that stressing the implications of limited investor attention
is a powerful approach, which can help to uncover and better understand a broad spec-
trum of return phenomena. For example, it appears to matter in the context of large
merger announcements (Louis and Sun (2010)), of long-run industry return predictability
(DellaVigna and Pollet (2007)), and even of information transfer from the industry to the
overall market level (Hong et al. (2007)).
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A few studies so far have concentrated on the relative pricing eciency of fundamentally
linked assets, and are thus particularly related to our study. Cohen and Frazzini (2008)
and Menzly and Ozbas (2010) show that attention constraints prevent investors from
immediately processing value-relevant information for rms or industries linked through
the supply chain. As a consequence, returns of supplier and customer rms cross-predict
each other. Klibano et al. (1998) show that the prices of closed-end funds better reect
their net asset value if salient news about the country under consideration is presented in
an attention-grabbing matter on the front page of the New York Times.
Overall, the literature lends supports to assumption that attention constraints might
potentially be binding enough to matter even for the case of twin stocks.
4.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
4.3.1 Twin Stocks
Our data on in total twelve DLCs is obtained from Mathijs A. van Dijk's homepage at
http://mathijsavandijk.com/dual-listed-companies. This ensures data quality and facili-
tates comparison with previous work, as it has, for instance, already been the basis of
Jong et al. (2009). Table 4.1 shows sample characteristics.
The twin stocks are heterogeneous in several dimensions, proposing a hurdle for the iden-
tication of any common factors aecting their behavior. For instance, the twelve DLCs
represent eight dierent country pairs and nine stock markets in total: Australia, Belgium,
Finland, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the USA. There are
three Anglo-Dutch twins (Royal Dutch/Shell, Unilever, Elsevier/Reed International) as
well as three Australian-Anglo twins (Rio Tinto, BHP Billiton, Brambles Industries). The
remaining twins represent unique country combinations.
The start date of the sample period for each DLC is determined by the joint availability
of distraction proxy data (see below) and return data on the twins (i.e. the post-merger
period). The earliest sample start is January 1991 and available for the Anglo-Dutch twins.
The sample period ends on the earlier of two dates: 20 trading days before the unication
announcement or on October, 3, 2002. The latter corresponds to the end of the sample
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period in the study of Jong et al. (2009), who provide detailed information about the time-
line of each twin series. The nal sample exhibits substantial cross-sectional variation
in sample start, sample end, and the number of observations. Despite these apparent
dierences, each DLC exhibits substantial return deviations as table 4.2 reveals.3
Throughout the chapter, the term return deviation is used to refer to the absolute value
of the dierence between the currency-adjusted daily or weekly log returns of the twins.
We report results obtained for the daily as well as weekly return frequency to obtain a
comprehensive and clear picture of the role of time-varying investor distraction. Atten-
tion constraints should arguably be particular binding in the short run, which in general
suggests using high frequency data. At the same time, however, these data are likely to
suer from microstructural eects. While some factors like bid-ask bounce or measures
of market impact are less of an issue for the large rms under consideration, imperfect
synchronization of return data matter, particularly at the daily level.4 Weekly estimates
are less aected by such imperfections. Moreover, to the extent that very short-term liq-
uidity shocks account for the variability in return dierences, they should do less so at
the weekly frequency. Weekly returns are overlapping and constructed on a rolling basis
over the previous ve trading days.
The mean daily return dierence across all observations is 1.06%, with a standard devia-
tions of 1.10%. Non-synchronous closing prices, in particular for the the Australian-Anglo
DLCs, clearly contribute to this nding. However dierent trading hours are by far not suf-
cient to explain the magnitude and the time-series variation in return deviations. First,
they exist irrespective of time dierences. For instance, the mean daily return dierence
(standard deviation) for ABB (Switzerland/Sweden), Fortis (Netherlands/Belgium) and
3The appendix also shows return summary statistics from the time-series perspective. Findings verify that return dis-
crepancies exist in each sample year. While this chapter focusses primarily on return dierences, the appendix also contains
descriptive statistics and gures on the well-documented deviations from theoretical price parity. In the cross-section, the
average absolute deviation ranges from about 4% (Dexia) to close to 12% (Zurich Allied). For all but two twins, the devia-
tion takes on both positive and negative values. For many twins, the sign changes several times. Absolute values often take
on extremes 15% or more.
4As can be seen from table 4.1, time dierences range from 0 to 10 hours. However, as we will show, these lags are
unlikely to distort our analysis. First, ndings hold for the twins with no time lag. Second, ndings are stronger at the
weekly than at the daily frequency. Third, we control for time dierences in section 4.4.2. Fourth, in section 4.5.2, we also
study a sample of 23 pairs of US dual-class shares, for which time and currency eects do not play a role at all. Findings
are qualitatively very similar. Fifth, see Jong et al. (2009) for evidence that dierent time zones and currency eects are
unlikely to have noteworthy explanatory power for price deviations from theoretical parity.
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Dexia (France/Belgium) are 0.87%, 1.02%, and 1.11% (0.76%, 0.95%, 1.22%), respec-
tively. These values are close to the overall sample average. However, the stock markets of
these twins are all in the same time zone. Moreover, deviations are also observable after
1998, when the introduction of the Euro eliminated any currency uctuations for Dexia
and Fortis. Second, and potentially more importantly, return dierences are even larger if
one focuses on the weekly frequency, where microstructural eects should be of much less
importance. Across all observations, the average divergence in returns is 1.57%, with a
standard deviation of 1.56%. Both values are about 50% higher than the values obtained
at the daily frequency. In fact, weekly return deviations seem to be more pronounced
and more volatile for each DLC. Figure 4.1 exemplarily depicts the time-series of weekly
return deviations for the rst six DLCs in our sample. They show no overall trend, but
uctuate widely throughout the sample period.
102 CHAPTER 4. TWIN STOCK RETURNS AND INVESTOR ATTENTION SHIFTS
F
ig
u
re
4.
1:
W
ee
k
ly
R
et
u
rn
D
ev
ia
ti
on
s
of
T
w
in
S
to
ck
s
T
h
is
g
ra
p
h
d
ep
ic
ts
th
e
ti
m
e-
se
ri
es
o
f
w
ee
k
ly
re
tu
rn
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
s
o
f
se
le
ct
ed
tw
in
st
o
ck
s.
R
et
u
rn
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
s
a
re
co
m
p
u
te
d
a
s
th
e
a
b
so
lu
te
v
a
lu
e
o
f
th
e
d
i
er
en
ce
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
cu
rr
en
cy
-a
d
ju
st
ed
w
ee
k
ly
lo
g
re
tu
rn
s
o
f
th
e
tw
in
s.
W
ee
k
ly
re
tu
rn
s
a
re
o
v
er
la
p
p
in
g
a
n
d
co
n
st
ru
ct
ed
o
n
a
ro
ll
in
g
b
a
si
s
o
v
er
th
e
p
re
v
io
u
s

v
e
tr
a
d
in
g
d
a
y
s.
4.3. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 103
As already suggested by these ndings, a considerable part of the return behavior of one
twin stock cannot be explained with the behavior of the other. Simple OLS time-series
regressions of the absolute weekly log return of the rst twin stock on the contemporaneous
currency-adjusted absolute return of the second twin yield, across all observations, a R2
of less than two thirds.
In the overall picture, the magnitude and time-series variation of return deviations might
be regarded as surprisingly large. In the following, we explore whether time-varying in-
vestor attention towards rm-level information might explain some of these ndings.
4.3.2 Baseline Investor Distraction Proxies
For the construction of distraction proxies as well as control variables, we require rm-level
data on a daily frequency for a number of stock markets. For the US stock market, we
gather data from CRSP. Specically, we consider all common shares (CRSP share code 10
or 11) traded on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ. Our data on international stocks markets
comes from the Compustat Global Daily Stock File. We impose several restrictions to
assure data quality and reliability.5
Inspired by recent models on attention constraints, we aim at identifying days on which
market participants are likely to be forced to spend more (or less) resources than usual on
understanding the big picture. Obviously, implementing this idea leaves many degrees of
freedom, which we address in later checks. First, we need to rely on a sensible classication
scheme for market segments, as the nal proxy aggregates abnormal return behavior in
these segments. We here rely on industries for several reasons. Industrial boundaries group
economically similar stocks (e.g. Chan et al. (2007)). At the same time, they represent
informational boundaries induced by the specialization of important market participants
5On the rm level, only common shares of companies incorporated in the respective country are considered. Firms are
required to have non-missing price, return, market capitalization, and industry membership data. We exclude very small
and presumably illiquid rms with a market capitalization of less than ve million Euro. Finally, we manually check extreme
return outliers. On the market level, we require a full calendar year with a continuous daily return time series for at least 25
eligible stocks before considering the country under consideration. This approach is intended to be a compromise between
maximizing the sample period and minimizing missing or otherwise problematic observations, which appear to be most
frequent at the beginning of stock market coverage. To eliminate potentially remaining data errors, we also discard any day
from the analysis for which Compustat reports price data for less than half of as many companies as on average over the
preceding month.
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such as analysts or institutional money managers (e.g. Hong et al. (2007), Menzly and
Ozbas (2010)). Industry membership is also readily and reliably available for all interna-
tional stock markets we study. Finally, ndings in chapter 3 strongly suggest that main
inferences are likely to be insensitive to other denitions of market segments, such as
portfolios (double-) sorted on standard rm characteristics.
Baseline distraction proxies are then constructed in a ve step procedure. First, we com-
pute daily value-weighted industry-level returns for each stock market separately. For the
US stock market, we thereby use the Fama and French (1997) taxonomy based on 49
industry groups.6 For the other stock markets, we base on our analysis on the Global In-
dustry Classication Standard (GICS). For consistency, we rely on the 10 GICS industry
sectors in each stock market. Results are very similar if we make use of the more detailed
24 industry groups for the comparatively large UK stock market instead.
Second, we decompose these returns to obtain daily market segment-level return shocks
for each country. Let ARi;t denote the shock for industry i on day t. It is computed as
the absolute dierence between the actual industry return Ri;t and its expected return as
implied by the market model:
ARi;t =j Ri;t   bi;t   bi;tRm;t j (4.1)
bi;t and bi;t are estimated from rolling time-series regressions based on daily return data
over the previous year.
Third, industry-level shocks are aggregated to obtain a single country-specic raw dis-
traction measure Distractiont. In doing so, one has to decide on how to weight each of
the in total n individual shocks on a given day t. Shocks are likely to be most distracting
if they are a rare event. The respective market segment should arguably obtain a higher
weight. On the other hand, market segments in which investors expect frequent shocks
should obtain a lower weight. To formalize this idea, we weight each industry shock ARi;t
by the inverse of its volatility i;t over the previous year:
Distractiont =
nX
i=1
wi;tARi;t where wi;t =
1
i;t
nP
i=1
1
i;t
(4.2)
Figure 4.2 shows the resulting time-series exemplarily for Australia and the United States.
6Specically, we use the 48 industries dened in Fama and French (1997), and group stocks that are not assigned to any
industry in category 49.
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Figure 4.2: Baseline Distraction Proxy Characteristics: Australia and US
These gures depict time-series characteristics of country-specic distraction proxies for Australia and the
United States. The upper graphs show the evolution of the raw proxies, the lower graphs depict the number
of high and low distraction days per month. High (low) distraction days are dened as deciles ranks 9 and 10
(1 and 2), as obtained from yearly deciles sorts of the country-specic raw proxy.
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As a fourth step, we construct measures of relative distraction within each year, thereby
making our estimates more conservative. Specically, we perform yearly sorts of the raw
proxy. For each year separately, we assign a decile-based rank to each trading day. For the
construction of weekly variables, the raw distraction proxy is averaged on a rolling basis
over the preceding ve trading days before the decile sorts take place.
Thus, in each year, we have the same number of high and low distraction days, as obtained
by an arbitrary symmetric decile rank threshold. Figure 4.2 illustrates this again for
Australia and the United States. It also veries that high and low distraction days are
not heavily clustered in a given year.
Panels A (daily data) and C (weekly data) of table 4.3 display pairwise Spearman rank
order correlation coecients between country-specic distraction proxies for all sample
stock markets.
Correlations uctuate around 0.3 for daily and 0.2 for weekly data. While these values are
all highly statistically signicant, their moderate economic level also justies our approach
of computing attention measures for each country separately. Apparently, proxies share a
common factor, but also have a country-specic component.
It is important to verify that the proxies do not simply mirror the behavior of well-known
market-level measures of turbulent markets or overall uncertainty. To explore this possibil-
ity, we consider value- and equal-weighted measures of absolute domestic market returns,
domestic turnover as well as domestic illiquidity.7 We also consider the Chicago Board
Options Exchange Market Volatility Index (VIX), a popular measure of the volatility
implied in S&P 500 index options.8
Panels B (daily data) and D (weekly data) of table 4.3 demonstrate that the correlation of
7Our market-wide daily illiquidity proxy is inspired by Amihud (2002). We rst compute stock-level illiquidity measures
as the ratio of absolute daily return and daily trading volume. Second, on each day, we equally weight the values for each
stock in the respective stock market to obtain a market-wide proxy. The weighting scheme follows Pastor and Stambaugh
(2003), who argue that an equal-weighted (as opposed to a value-weighed) measure shows more desirable characteristics,
as it is not dominated by large caps. For robustness, though, we also report a value-weighted measure. Third, we discard
values above the 99th percentile to exclude outliers, which can materially aect our daily data. For the illiquidity proxy at
the (overlapping) weekly frequency, we average daily market-level values on a rolling basis.
8We rely on this US proxy as it is the only implied volatility index available over the whole sample period. Indices for
Belgium, the Netherlands, France, and the UK are available from January 2000 on. The correlation of the VIX and these
indices for the period January 2000 to December 2010 ranges from 0.88 to 0.94, which justies our approach.
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Table 4.3: Correlations of Country-Specic Attention Proxies
Panel A (daily data) and panel C (overlapping weekly data) display pairwise Spearman rank order correlation
coecients between country-specic attention proxy decile ranks. Panel B (daily data) and panel D (overlapping
weekly data) display correlation coecients between attention proxy decile ranks and market-level variables. All
market-level variables except for the VIX are computed for domestic stock markets. vw(ew) is short for value-
weighted (equal-weighted). Details on the illiquidity proxy are given in the text. Statistical signicance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
1. Daily Values
Panel A: Pairwise correlations of country-specific attention proxies (daily values)
US UK France Switzerland Sweden Finland Belgium Netherlands
US (since Jan 91) 1
UK (since Jan 91) 0.36*** 1
France (since Jan 91) 0.32*** 0.36*** 1
Switzerland (since Jan 92) 0.26*** 0.28*** 0.34*** 1
Sweden (since Jan 94) 0.45*** 0.32*** 0.35*** 0.23*** 1
Finland (since Jan 96) 0.40*** 0.30*** 0.35*** 0.31*** 0.42*** 1
Belgium (since Jan 93) 0.25*** 0.28*** 0.34*** 0.35*** 0.24*** 0.36*** 1
Netherlands (since Jan 91) 0.36*** 0.34*** 0.45*** 0.32*** 0.36*** 0.39*** 0.29*** 1
Australia (since Jan 91) 0.20*** 0.23*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.22*** 0.24*** 0.19*** 0.19***
Panel B: Correlation of country-specific attention proxies with domestic market-level variables (daily values)
VIX Abs. return Abs. return Turnover Turnover Illiquidity Illiquidity
Weighting scheme vw ew vw ew vw ew
US (since Jan 91) 0.18*** 0.20*** 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.05**
UK (since Jan 91) 0.10*** 0.19*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.05**
France (since Jan 91) 0.12*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.03 0.01
Switzerland (since Jan 92) 0.13*** 0.24*** 0.23*** 0.11*** 0.06** 0.11*** 0.07***
Sweden (since Jan 94) 0.11*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.23*** 0.14*** 0.05** 0.03
Finland (since Jan 96) 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.23*** 0.14*** 0.05* 0.10*** 0.11***
Belgium (since Jan 93) 0.11*** 0.24*** 0.21*** 0.17*** -0.028 0.07*** 0.03
Netherlands (since Jan 91) 0.12*** 0.21*** 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.14*** 0.03 0.04*
Australia (since Jan 91) 0.07*** 0.20*** 0.08*** 0.19*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.03
2. Weekly Values
Panel C: Pairwise correlations of country-specific attention proxies (weekly values)
US UK France Switzerland Sweden Finland Belgium Netherlands
US (since Jan 91) 1
UK (since Jan 91) 0.20*** 1
France (since Jan 91) 0.17*** 0.23*** 1
Switzerland (since Jan 92) 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.18*** 1
Sweden (since Jan 94) 0.25*** 0.14*** 0.18*** 0.14*** 1
Finland (since Jan 96) 0.20*** 0.14*** 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.22*** 1
Belgium (since Jan 93) 0.12*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 1
Netherlands (since Jan 91) 0.18*** 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.16*** 1
Australia (since Jan 91) 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.15*** 0.07*** 0.07***
Panel D: Correlation of country-specific attention proxies with domestic market-level variables (weekly values)
VIX Abs. return Abs. return Turnover Turnover Illiquidity Illiquidity
Weighting scheme vw ew vw ew vw ew
US (since Jan 91) 0.21*** 0.24*** 0.29*** 0.26*** 0.15***
UK (since Jan 91) 0.15*** 0.22*** 0.27*** 0.10*** 0.17*** 0.10*** 0.08***
France (since Jan 91) 0.18*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.15*** 0.29*** 0.06*** 0.04*
Switzerland (since Jan 92) 0.18*** 0.27*** 0.24* 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.09***
Sweden (since Jan 94) 0.17*** 0.24*** 0.22*** 0.24*** 0.19*** 0.07*** 0.04*
Finland (since Jan 96) 0.33*** 0.13*** 0.23*** 0.11*** 0.04 0.21*** 0.21***
Belgium (since Jan 93) 0.17*** 0.23*** 0.20*** 0.10*** -0.02 0.01 0.05**
Netherlands (since Jan 91) 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.23*** 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.05** 0.06***
Australia (since Jan 91) 0.10*** 0.16*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.03 0.07***
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the distraction proxy with all these variables is (only) moderately positive. Values typically
are in the range of 0.2, suggesting that the proxy combines information incorporated in a
variety of standard measures deemed to represent specic aspects of unexceptional market
conditions. At the same time, it appears to capture information not already incorporated
in these measures, for which we later also control.
So far, we have focussed on country-specic distraction proxies. To create a measure of
common inattention, we combine, in the nal fth step, the information contained in the
two proxies relevant for each twin stock under consideration. For deeper insights and to
assure robustness, we do so in three dierent ways. The rst distraction proxy is simply
the decile rank sum of the two country-level distraction proxies. It thus takes on values
between two (low distraction) and twenty (high distraction). The second set consists of
two dummy variables, a high and a low distraction dummy. The high distraction dummy
takes on a value of one if, on a given day, both country-specic proxies obtain decile ranks
of seven or greater. It is zero otherwise. The low distraction dummy takes on a value of
one if both proxies obtain decile ranks of four or lower. It is zero otherwise. Both the
high and low distraction dummy are non-zero in roughly 20% of all observations in our
nal sample. The third proxy set represents a more accentuated version of the second set.
Consequently, we expect stronger results in the following tests. The high (low) distraction
dummy now only takes on a value of one if both country-specic proxies obtain decile
ranks of nine or greater (two or lower). In the pooled nal sample, the likelihood of such
a high or low distraction observation is roughly 6%.
In sum, our sets of distraction proxies can be expressed as follows:
Set 1t=Proxy Country Twin1t+Proxy Country Twin2t (4.3)
Set 2t=High Distraction Dummyt+Low Distraction Dummyt
High Distraction Dummyt=1 j (Proxy Country Twin1t7 \ Proxy Country Twin2t7)
Low Distraction Dummyt=1 j (Proxy Country Twin1t4 \ Proxy Country Twin2t4)
(4.4)
Set 3t=High Distraction Dummyt+Low Distraction Dummyt
High Distraction Dummyt=1 j (Proxy Country Twin1t9 \ Proxy Country Twin2t9)
Low Distraction Dummyt=1 j (Proxy Country Twin1t2 \ Proxy Country Twin2t2)
(4.5)
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4.4 Empirical Results
4.4.1 Univariate Tests
We start with univariate tests by regressing currency-adjusted return deviations, expressed
in basis points, on investor distraction proxies. We do so for each DLC and each proxy set
separately. Moreover, we run regressions both at the daily and at the weekly frequency.
To increase the statistical power, estimates on the weekly frequency are based on rolling
regressions with overlapping daily data. To control for heteroscedasticity and autocorrela-
tion, all standard errors are adjusted by the method of Newey and West (1987).9 Proxies
are constructed in a way that we expect a positive (negative) coecient for high (low)
distraction proxies. Tables 4.4 and 4.5 present the main ndings.
Results support our hypothesis that investor attention shifts matter for keeping relative
returns of twin stocks in line. At the daily (weekly) frequency, out of the in total 65
coecients of investor distraction proxies, 62 (57) obtain the predicted sign. The majority
of these coecients is statistically signicant, often at the 1% level. Judging from the p-
values for the high distraction proxy in set 1 as well as from the p-values for the joint
signicance for the distraction dummies in set 2 and set 3, the ndings appear broadly in
line with our expectations for almost each DLC and each specication.
Findings are also economically meaningful. Judging from the pooled regressions, the av-
erage absolute daily (weekly) return dierence is about 35 to 60 (45 to 70) basis points
higher on a high distraction day than on a low distraction day. As the eect is slightly
stronger for weekly regressions, our ndings do not appear to be driven by microstructural
eects. As a rough estimate, these values correspond to about 25% to 50% of the standard
deviation of the return dierence across all observations (see table 4.2).
4.4.2 Multivariate Tests
To isolate the impact of investor distraction, we include two sets of control variables in
the following multivariate regressions.
9As proposed by Newey and West (1994), we set the lag length equal to the integer portion of 4(T=100)2=9, where T
denotes the number of observations in the regression. Note that there is no adjustment for the reported R2.
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The rst set is designed to control for imperfections in the return data as well as to
account for comovement eects with local market indices (Froot and Dabora (1999)). For
instance, it might be that large return deviations of twin stocks tend to go along with
of large overall market movements. To control for relative market shocks, we include the
absolute log returns of both domestic market indices. Market index returns are computed
in local currencies10 and self-constructed from the value-weighted portfolio of all stocks
incorporated in the respective country (see section 4.3). The advantage of using self-
constructed indices is that we can exclude the twin stocks under consideration. Due to
their large market capitalization, their weight within the respective stock market indices
is often non-trivial. Not excluding them could result in a spurious loading on the domestic
market factor. To allow for a dierent impact of positive and negative returns, we construct
two variables for each domestic market index: Indextwin;t;+ (Indextwin;t; ) is dened as the
absolute value of the log return if the signed return on the twin's domestic stock market is
positive (negative) and zero otherwise. To control for currency eects, we also include the
absolute change in the log exchange rate between the currencies of the countries the twins
are mainly traded in. To account for the eect of dierent time zones in the regression with
daily return frequency, we also add leads and lags as suggested by actual time dierences.
Specically, for twin stock 1, which always trades in the same or an earlier time zone (see
table 4.1), we include the return at t as well as t-1. For twin stock2, we include the return
at t and t+1. As we have two domestic indices as well as two market states (positive and
negative return) and two points of time for each index (only for the daily regressions), we
have four to eight market return controls in total. For the exchange rate, we add both a
lead and a lagged value in the daily regressions. For consistency, we follow this baseline
approach for each DLC, irrespective of actual time lags.
The second set of control variables is intended to account for potential changes in the
risk of arbitrage activities, both at the DLC level as well as at the market level. Relative
mispricings can only arise in the presence of at least some limits to arbitrage. To the
extent these are time-varying, they might induce changes in the impact limited investor
attention can have on price discovery.
10Froot and Dabora (1999) argue that decomposing a foreign market's total return into the market return expressed in
local currency as well as into an exchange rate component reduces measurement error induced by non-synchroneities and
yields sharper insights.
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Ponti (2006) argues that idiosyncratic risk is an important impediment to arbitrage.
Gagnon and Karolyi (2010) verify this by showing that the level of price parity deviations
of U.S. cross-listed stocks is reliably positively related to the lagged idiosyncratic risk of a
long-short strategy designed to exploit this apparent mispricing. As a very simple measure
of predeterminate idiosyncratic risk at the DLC level in our setting, we use the volatility
of the absolute daily return dierences, measured on a rolling basis over the previous three
months.11 This implies that, compared to the univariate analysis, multivariate regressions
start three months later. As a market-level proxy for the risk of arbitrage activities, we
use the VIX, which is widely regarded as a forward-looking measure of overall market
uncertainty. Several theories suggest that the expectation of fundamental shocks might
impede arbitrageurs from trying to eliminate potential mispricings, or alternatively, that
the behavior of constrained arbitrageurs themselves may amplify fundamental shocks.12
In sum, our multivariate regression, here at the daily level with eight market controls, can
be expressed as follows:
jr1;t r2;tj=+
8P
k=1
kIndexk+
11P
k=9
kCurrencyk+12IdioV olat+13V IXt+DistractionProxySet+t (4.6)
Again, we run regressions at daily and weekly frequencies, both separately for each DLC
and for the pooled sample. For the weekly estimates, returns (such as market returns) are
compounded. For the other control variables (such as the VIX), we use the average over
the preceding ve trading days. Main ndings are presented in tables 4.6 and 4.7.
The main insight from these regressions is that the impact of investor distraction proxies
still matters. At the daily (weekly) frequency, 55 (58) out of the in total 65 distraction
coecients obtain the predicted sign.
Estimations from the pooled regression suggest that the absolute daily (weekly) return
dierence is about 20 to 30 (30 to 45) basis points higher on a high distraction day (in a
11We have experimented with several other measures of idiosyncratic risk, such as with the volatility of signed return
dierences or with a return dierence adjusted for comovement with domestic market indices. Inferences remain intact. See
Scruggs (2007) for a detailed discussion of the role of idiosyncratic risk in the context of DLCs.
12See for instance Long et al. (1990), Shleifer and Vishny (1997) or Hong et al. (2011). High expected volatility as implied
by high level of VIX is likely to go along with tightened funding constraints and reduced liquidity supply of speculators (e.g.
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Nagel (2011)). Moreover, hedge funds' arbitrage ability
has been documented to be reduced in times of market turbulence and high levels of VIX (e.g. Ben-David et al. (2011)).
Our ndings are similar if we rely on innovations of VIX instead on its raw value.
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high distraction week) than on a low distraction day (in a low distraction week). These
values correspond to about 20% to 25% of the average standard deviation of the return
dierence. These estimates are lower than the ones obtained for the univariate analysis.
However, they remain statistically highly signicant and economically meaningful.
Judging from (unreported) ndings from the pooled regressions, control variables broadly
take on values as predicted. Most notably, idiosyncratic volatility is strongly signicant,
both statistically and economically. As a rough estimate, a one standard deviation change
in lagged idiosyncratic volatility is associated with a fourth standard deviation change in
return deviations. This seems in line with the ndings of Gagnon and Karolyi (2010) for
US cross-listed stocks. The VIX is far less important, and only (slightly) signicant at
the weekly level. Contemporaneous domestic market returns often are signicant, which
appears in line with the ndings of Froot and Dabora (1999) and Jong et al. (2009).
4.4.3 Deviations from Price Parity
Our focus so far has been on short-term return deviations. However, if attention con-
straints really mattered, than they should also cause deviations from theoretical price
parity, i.e. aect the magnitude of the cumulative return discrepancy between twin stocks.
In other words, as a consequence of limited attention, investors should fail to keep relative
prices in line.
Table 4.8 explores this prediction. It reveals that our main ndings from the return per-
spective indeed tend to carry over to the price perspective.
The table contrasts the level of twin stock price deviations during moments of high dis-
traction with those during moments of low distraction. Moments of high (low) distraction
are here dened as days (in panel A) or weeks (in panel B), during which the distrac-
tion proxy takes on values of 16 or greater (6 or smaller). This is a somewhat arbitrary
choice. We have veried that the qualitative nature of our results does not depend on
these specic breakpoints.13
13For example, see the appendix for ndings when we simply use a median split, i.e. dene high (low) distraction moments
as days or weeks in which the proxy takes on values greater (smaller) than 11. As expected, the overall eect is slightly
weaker when we rely on this less clear-cut distinction. However, basic inferences are unaected.
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In line with our expectations, nine (daily analysis) or ten (weekly analysis) out of the in
total twelve twin stocks exhibit higher price discrepancies in times of high as opposed to
low investor distraction. While there is considerable cross-sectional heterogeneity in the
absolute and relative magnitude of this eect, 24 out of the in total 28 reported dierences
take on the predicted sign. In the pooled regression specications, these dierences are all
highly statistically signicant. They are also economically meaningful. Depending on the
way to compute it, the average absolute attention-driven dierence in price deviations,
both at the daily and the weekly frequency, is in the range of 50 to 70 basis points.14
As a rough estimate, this corresponds to a relative increase in average price deviations
of around 7% to 9% during moments of high distraction as opposed to periods of low
distraction. Including the controls used in the multivariate setting in the previous section
yields very similar results.
In sum, moments of limited investor attention do not only seem to go along with larger
return deviations. These deviations appear systematic in the sense that they drive prices
further apart from theoretical price parity.
4.4.4 Robustness Checks
Robustness across subperiods Findings are fairly stable. We have rerun all pooled
multivariate regressions for each year separately. Summing up over all specications, co-
ecients on distraction proxies obtain the predicted sign in more than 85%.
Alternative and additional control variables We have experimented with various
modications and extensions of our explanatory variables. For instance, we have replaced
the self-constructed domestic market indices with popular broad domestic indices.15 The
pairwise correlation between the domestic indices is very high (0.9 to 0.99), and inferences
remain unchanged. Moreover, we have rerun our regressions with dierent lead-lag speci-
14For instance, equal-weighting the ndings for all twelve twins results in a dierence of 62 (63) basis points at the daily
(weekly) level. Value-weighting the twin-specic results with the number of observations yields a dierence of 51 (62) basis
points at the daily (weekly level).
15Specically, we employed the indices also relied on by e.g. Jong et al. (2009). These indices are the ASX All Or-
dinaries index (Australia), the Brussels Allshare index (Belgium), the SBF 250 index (France), the Helsinki HEX index
(Finland), the CBS Allshare index (Netherlands), the Stockholmboersen Allshare index (Sweden), the Swiss Performance
index (Switzerland), the FTSE Allshare (UK), as well as the S&P 500 (US).
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cations of return controls. The impact of the distraction proxies is persistent, no matter
if one excludes all leads and lags, or if one includes a lead and a lagged value for each
return variable. Furthermore, we have experimented with a variable intended to control
for the absolute level of twin stock returns. The qualitative nature of our ndings does
not change.16 Finally, we have explored the role of market-level illiquidity and turnover,
as outlined in section 4.3. These variables are not included in the baseline multivariate
regressions, as reliable and non-missing data is often not available in the early years of
the sample period. The importance of the distraction proxies remains unaected.
Impact of currency uctuations We have rerun all univariate and multivariate tests
with return dierences expressed in local currencies (as opposed to a common currency
as in the baseline tests). Doing so is intended to get a feeling for the impact of short-
term currency uctuations on our ndings. In the overall picture, results are very similar,
suggesting that currency eects only play a minor role.
Modied distraction proxies One might be concerned that our results might be driven
by the specic design of our distraction proxies. This is not the case. For instance, the
appendix shows ndings from pooled regressions, which mirror the baseline case, but use
a dierent weighting scheme for segment-level return shocks. Specically, we weight each
shock equally or, alternatively, with the fraction of the total domestic market capital-
ization the specic industry group accounts for. Inferences remain unaected. Sensitivity
checks reported in chapter 3 moreover suggest that the impact of distraction proxies
remains fairly stable if one modies its construction in several further dimensions.17
Inclusion of lagged return deviations We have followed the framework of Froot and
Dabora (1999) in adding a lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side of the mul-
tivariate regression. This allows us to capture dynamic eects. The model assumes that
the eect of attention shocks on return deviations occurs at the same day (in the same
week) and then persists across future days (weeks), thereby decaying at an exponential
16This variable is constructed analogously to distraction proxy set 1. We rst compute a raw measure as the absolute
value of the sum of the twin's daily or weekly returns. Then, for each year separately, we sort these values into deciles. In
the nal pooled sample, the correlation between the distraction proxy decile rank and the return level decile rank is about
0.2. In the pooled multivariate regressions, the coecient of the distraction proxy decile rank is reduced by about a tenth
on average, but remains highly signicant and economically meaningful.
17These checks include changes in the number and type of market segments, in the weighting scheme, in the model of
expected returns as well as in the type of returns used.
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rate. The coecients in front of the distraction proxies can be interpreted as the short-run
response of the return dierential to attention shifts. The total eect can be estimated
by dividing this value by (1-coecient on lagged return dierential). Main ndings are
presented in the appendix. As arguably expected, the immediate eect is the strongest18,
and inferences remain unchanged.
4.5 Further Insights
4.5.1 Conceptually Dierent Attention Proxies
Previous work has identied a number of promising proxies for investor distraction in
the time series. To verify that our ndings are indeed representative of a more general
attention-based phenomenon, we construct four alternative distraction proxies inspired
by a literature review, and then explore their explanatory power in our setup.
DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) show that the market underreacts more to earnings an-
nouncements made on Fridays. They interpret the apparent slow information diusion as
evidence for investor distraction caused by the upcoming weekend. Louis and Sun (2010)
extend their analysis to the case of merger announcements. Even for these large corpo-
rate events, the market reaction on Fridays is muted, as indicated by lower abnormal
trading volume and less pronounced abnormal stock returns. Louis and Sun (2010) also
provide anecdotal evidence suggesting that market participants tend to be most attentive
on Mondays. We thus construct a Monday (Friday) dummy as a low (high) distraction
proxy.
Hirshleifer et al. (2009) argue that the number of distracting stimuli should matter. They
show that the immediate (delayed) market reaction to earnings announcements is weaker
(stronger) in moments where more same-day announcements compete for investors' at-
tention. Following their line of reasoning, we rely on data from I/B/E/S to compute the
daily number of earnings announcements for each stock market in our sample. As for
our baseline distraction proxies, we then assign decile ranks to these values. We do so
18Attention shifts in period t, i.e. the dierence between high and low distraction days (weeks), are roughly estimated to
go along with a 20 to 25 (20 to 30) basis points increase in same period return dierences.
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separately for each year and for each country. For each DLC, we then dene the nal
distraction proxy simply as the sum of the daily decile ranks of the two countries under
consideration. In other words, the proxy can take on values between 2 (low distraction)
and 20 (high distraction).
Karlsson et al. (2009) uncover an phenomenon they dub \ostrich eect": In down market
periods, investors tend to \put their heads in the sand" and to pay less attention to their
investments. Hou et al. (2009) demonstrate that this individual behavior also matters for
market outcomes such as abnormal returns after corporate news. These ndings motivate
us to construct an investor distraction proxy, which takes on a value of one (zero) if
the three months cumulative return for both stock markets under consideration is (not)
negative.
For each of these distraction proxies, we mirror our baseline analysis by running pooled
regressions at the daily, and, where applicable, also at the weekly level. The multivariate
regressions contain the same controls as in tables 4.6 and 4.7. We exclude our baseline
distraction proxies, however, to study the role of the alternative proxies in isolation.19
Findings are broadly consistent with a limited attention story. For each proxy, each return
computation frequency, and each regression specication, the sign of the coecients is as
expected. Both their economic magnitude and statistical signicance are less pronounced
that the impact of our baseline distraction proxies.20 However, despite being conceptually
quite dierent, each distraction proxy appears to have at least some explanatory power.
Together, these ndings suggest that investor attention does matter.
19In unreported results we nd that additionally including our baseline distraction proxy sets in the regressions does
not change any inferences: Neither the level of their economic importance and statistical signicance, nor the role of the
alternative distraction proxies are materially aected. Depending on the distraction proxy set employed, the multivariate
analysis suggests that combined investor attention variables can account for a daily return deviation between 35 and 45
basis points. These values correspond to slightly more than 30% to slightly more than 40% of the average standard deviation
of daily return deviations.
20Results for the proxy based on I/B/E/Sdata are similar if we focus on earnings announcement after 1994 to assure data
quality, as suggested by DellaVigna and Pollet (2009).
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Table 4.9: The Impact of Alternative Investor Distraction Proxies
This table shows results from pooled regressions of twin stock return deviations on alternative proxies for
investor distraction as well as on several control variables, as described in detail in the text. Return deviations
are computed as the absolute value of the dierence between the currency-adjusted daily or weekly log returns
of the twins. In panel A, the distraction proxy is computed as the sum of two country-specic distraction
proxy decile ranks, as obtained from yearly sorts of the number of daily earnings announcements in the stock
market under consideration. In panel B, the distraction proxy is computed as a dummy variable which takes
on a value of of one (zero) if the three months cumulative domestic market return for both countries under
consideration is (not) negative. In panel C (D), the distraction proxy is a dummy variable which takes on a
value of one on Fridays (Mondays) and zero otherwise. All regressions contain rm-xed eects. To control
for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated with standard errors
adjusted by the method of Newey and West (1987). Statistical signicance at the ten, ve and one-percent
levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Panel A: Competing events (Prediction: positive sign)
Frequency Daily Daily Weekly Weekly
Regression framework Univariate Multivariate Univariate Multivariate
Coecient 0.53*** 0.36** 0.07 0.59**
t-value (2.78) (2.17) (0.25) (2.07)
p-Value 0.006 0.030 0.803 0.038
Adj. R2 0.12 0.19 0.13 0.17
Panel B: Down market periods (Prediction: positive sign)
Frequency Daily Daily Weekly Weekly
Regression framework Univariate Multivariate Univariate Multivariate
Coecient 26.99*** 3.98 24.25*** 5.80
t-value (8.64) (1.40) (5.53) (1.38)
p-Value 0.000 0.161 0.000 0.168
Adj. R2 0.13 0.19 0.14 0.17
Panel C: Fridays (Prediction: positive sign)
Frequency Daily Daily
Regression framework Univariate Multivariate
Coecient 3.61* 2.81
t-value (1.90) (1.48)
p-Value 0.057 0.138
Adj. R2 0.12 0.19
Panel D: Mondays (Prediction: negative sign)
Frequency Daily Daily
Regression framework Univariate Multivariate
Coecient -4.69** -6.61***
t-value (-2.51) (-3.66)
p-Value 0.012 0.000
Adj. R2 0.12 0.19
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4.5.2 Evidence from Dual-Class Shares
One might be concerned that our ndings and its implications are limited to the special
case of twin stocks. Moreover, data imperfections such as time lags or currency uctuations
might still matter to a certain extent. To address these concerns, we evaluate our line of
reasoning out of sample in a related setting. We explore the role of investor attention
for return deviations of US dual-class shares. Dual-class shares represent two classes of
common stock issued by the same company. They both have equal cash ow rights, but
dier in their voting rights. As we only consider US stocks, time and currency dierences
do not matter here.
However, in contrast to the twin stocks we have studied so far, returns and prices of dual-
class shares might well dier for rational reasons (e.g. Zingales (1995)). There might be
pronounced dierences in liquidity between both classes of stock. Moreover, voting shares
might contain a potentially time-varying premium due to the value of the voting rights.
However, for several reasons, these factors are unlikely to materially aect our analysis.
First, Schultz and Shive (2010) show that price deviations between dual-class shares are
widely uctuating, whereas the value of liquidity and voting rights should be rather sta-
ble on a day-to-day basis. Simple trading strategies designed to exploit temporary price
deviations yield abnormal returns, which would hardly be generated if prices diverged for
rational reasons. Using intraday TAQ data, the authors are able reveal that price pres-
sure or slow information diusion often cause price to dier, leading to clear mispricings.
We hypothesize that limited investor attention might provide a partial explanation for
this phenomenon. Second, we apply a strict screening procedure to assure that only very
liquid stocks enter the following tests.21 Our initial sample consists of all 100 pairs of
dual-class shares studied in Schultz and Shive (2010). In the nal sample, we are left with
18,676 eligible daily observations of 23 pairs over the sample period from January 1993
to December 2008. Third, in an attempt to control for the potentially time-varying value
21We only consider observations which meet the following four requirements. First, both stocks belong to NYSE market
capitalization decile 4 or larger. Second, the daily trading volume for each stock is at least one million dollar. Third, a daily
illiquidity ratio, computed as absolute daily return divided by trading volume in million dollars, is less than 0.01. Fourth,
there are at least 50 eligible observations for each pair. To reduce the eect of outliers, we nally discard daily return
dierences greater than the 99.9 percentile. Averaged across all observations in the nal sample, the median stock has a
market capitalization of close to three billion dollar and a daily trading volume of close to 15 million dollar. The qualitative
nature of our ndings is very robust with respect to modied screening procedures. Inferences are also unaected if we rely
on the initial sample without any screenings.
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contained in the extra votes, we have discarded all days or weeks for which we could gather
news articles from the Dow Jones News Service.22 This procedure is intended to identify
potentially relevant events such as annual meetings. In unreported tests, we verify that
our ndings remain qualitatively unchanged. Moreover, Schultz and Shive (2010) nd that
the exclusion of such events hardly aects the protability of their trading strategy.
To assure consistency and comparability, our tests follow the pooled analysis for twin
stocks to the extent possible. We start by constructing daily and weekly return deviations
for dual-class shares. At the daily (weekly) frequency, the average dierence is 0.57%
(0.83%) with a standard deviation of 0.69% (1.07%). We then regress them on proxies for
US investor distraction as well as on a number of controls. The investor distraction proxy
consists of the decile distraction rank or, alternatively, of two dummy variables. The latter
take on a value of one in the case of high (low) distraction days or weeks, as indicated by
distraction decile 10 (1). We consider two multivariate specications. The rst includes the
US market return, idiosyncratic risk, as well as the VIX. This set is roughly comparable
to the multivariate baseline analysis for twin stocks. The second specication additionally
includes several further rm-level and market-level controls.23.
Main ndings from various regressions are presented in table 4.10. They turn out to be
very similar to the ones obtained for twin stocks. Univariate regressions suggest that the
absolute daily (weekly) return dierence is about 15 to 20 (20 to 30) basis points higher on
a high distraction day (in a high distraction week) than on a low distraction day (in a low
distraction week). These values correspond to about 20% to 30% of the average standard
deviation of the return dierence. Multivariate ndings are about a third smaller, but
remain highly signicant. In sum, results are broadly in line with our expectations.
22Due to its comprehensive coverage, this database has widely been relied on in previous studies, and argued to be \the
best approximation of public news for traders" (Chan (2003), p. 230).
23We here use the dierences in NYSE market capitalization decile, in dollar trading volume, as well as in the illiquidity
ratio as rm controls. We use the Fama and French (1993) factors as well as the momentum and the short-term reversal
factor as market controls. We have experimented with further controls, which however did not aect any inferences.
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4.6 Conclusion
We believe that, due to their special nature, twin stocks present a unique opportunity to
study the importance of investor attention shifts for price discovery. First, in contrast to
most other settings, twins' fundamentals are identical. In other words, no model of intrinsic
value is required. This overcomes the bad model problem inherent in many asset pricing
tests. Second, previous research has shown that arbitrage is limited in these cases. Thus,
potentially arising mispricings are less likely to be quickly eliminated and consequences
of not fully rational investor behavior can easier be detected in equilibrium outcomes.
Third, ndings suggestive of a non-trivial role of limited attention could be considered a
conservative estimate for the impact attention constraints might potentially have on asset
pricing and market eciency. Arguably, economic links between securities in nancial
markets are often more less explicit and less transparent, and might thus be more prone
to mispricings induced by limited investor attention.
This chapter lends support to the idea that attention shifts can help to explain why returns
of twin stocks become temporarily delinked, thereby inducing or amplifying violations of
the law of one price. Clearly, highlighting the role of attention constraints alone is by
far not enough to satisfactorily explain the puzzling behavior of these stocks. However,
our approach might provide some directions for future research, as a gap in the literature
appears to exist. Previous work on DLCs has mainly elaborated on why mispricings can
persist, but oers little guidance on why twin stock returns diverge in the rst place.
Chapter 5
How Should Private Investors
Diversify? - An Empirical Evaluation
of Alternative Asset Allocation
Policies to Construct a \World
Market Portfolio"
5.1 Introduction
Despite the recognized benets of diversication as \the only free lunch in investment",
private investors seem to sometimes violate even its basic principles. In fact, \these dis-
crepancies, or investment mistakes, are central to the eld of household nance." (Camp-
bell (2006, p. 1554)). In this chapter, we thus aim to derive easily implementable asset
allocation guidelines for individual investors. Our approach allows us to evaluate numerous
competing policies for the construction of a \world market portfolio". Specically, we ask
the following questions: From the perspective of private investors in real-life situations,
what is the most promising way to diversify? Do simple rules of thumb already provide a
powerful remedy against widespread investment biases? Which heuristics are particularly
able to realize diversication potential? To what extent do these strategies underperform
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when benchmarked against sophisticated optimization models?
Empirical studies provide extensive evidence of private investors making portfolio choices
that are dicult to reconcile with standard nancial theory. As such, households often
fail to participate in the stock market at all (see, e.g., Campbell (2006) and Kimball and
Shumway (2010)). Given the size of the equity premium over the past, the welfare costs
of this behavior are likely to be high. Among those households that do invest in equities,
many studies document further costly mistakes. First, individuals tend to prefer domes-
tic over foreign investments thereby forgoing the benets of international diversication
(see French and Poterba (1991), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) and Kilka and Weber
(2000)). Second, many households own relatively few individual stocks which may cause
a signicant exposure to idiosyncratic risk (see, e.g., Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) and
Polkovnichenko (2005)). Third, data from online brokerage accounts show that many in-
dividuals are overcondent and trade too much (see Odean (1999) and Barber and Odean
(2000)). Puzzling investment behavior carries over to diversication over asset classes. An-
alyzing a large sample of retirement accounts, Agnew et al. (2003) show that most asset
allocations are extreme (either 100 percent or zero percent in equities) and there is inertia
in asset allocations. Tang et al. (2010) conclude that most participants make inecient
portfolio investment choices in retirement plans. The failure of diversifying adequately
over asset classes must be considered as particularly problematic as asset allocation has
been shown to be the main determinant of portfolio performance (see e.g., Brinson et al.
(1986) or Ibbotson and Kaplan (2000)). Additionally, recent ndings on the correlation
structure of international stock markets imply that even worldwide equity market diver-
sication can oer only limited benets. First, increasing return correlations within the
stock universe over the last decades (Goetzmann et al. (2005)) lead to decreasing diversi-
cation gains (Driessen and Laeven (2007)). Second, correlations tend to be particularly
high in periods of poor performance (see e.g. Longin and Solnik (2001)). Thus, benets
from global diversication in the stock market tend to be smallest when they are most
needed.
To sum up, risk-adjusted portfolios of most private households underperform even stan-
dard domestic stock market indices at a signicant margin, and thus leave substantial
room for improvement. But how should private investors diversify? While academic re-
search almost exclusively relies on the performance of various extensions of the Markowitz
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(1952) framework, we also concentrate on the relative investment value of heuristic diver-
sication strategies. This is particularly relevant for private investors as most individuals
will not have the knowledge and resources to implement sophisticated extensions of the
Markowitz model. In addition, Markowitz approaches, while being optimal in theory, suer
from estimation error in expected returns, variances and covariances when implemented
in practice. There is a large literature explicitly dealing with how to improve the out-of-
sample performance of these strategies - with partly disillusioning results. Recent studies
focussing primarily on U.S. stock portfolios show that the estimation error is so severe
that various optimization models are oftentimes unable to beat a naive 1/N diversica-
tion strategy (see, e.g. DeMiguel et al. (2009b), Tu and Zhou (2011), and Duchin and
Levy (2009)). Hence, it seems insucient to limit the analysis to these models.1 In the
empirical analysis, we thus analyze the performance of eleven well-established or recently
proposed extensions of the Markowitz framework as opposed to a broad range of plausible
heuristics. In doing so, we combine two prominent ways of diversication that are usually
analyzed separately: International diversication in the stock market and diversication
over dierent asset classes. To achieve comparability with the previous literature, the
following two-step procedure is employed.
First, we concentrate on global diversication in the stock market. Such an analysis might
be considered a complement of the inuential study of DeMiguel et al. (2009b). In addition,
we provide an out-of-sample test of the norm-constrained allocation strategies which have
been proposed recently in DeMiguel et al. (2009a). In their empirical analysis, the authors
are able to show that this novel class of models often outperforms existing portfolio-
strategies at a signicant margin. We rely on the bootstrap technique developed in Ledoit
and Wolf (2008) to assess the signicance of dierences in Sharpe ratios. In contrast to
the standard test statistic of Jobson and Korkie (1981), its validity is not sensitive to the
underlying distribution and thus particularly suitable for the analysis of nancial time-
series data. The approach is designed to provide reliable inference even when returns
exhibit fat tails or show typical time-series characteristics such as volatility clustering
or autocorrelation. With regard to performance evaluation, we gain additional insights
1The out-of sample performance of an equally weighted portfolio as compared to the performance of the standard
Markowitz approach is in fact a longstanding and controversial debate in portfolio optimization. Early discussions include,
for instance, Frankfurter et al. (1971), Brown (1979), or Jobson and Korkie (1981). For a recent study arguing that optimized
portfolios do outperform equally weighted portfolios, see Kritzman et al. (2010).
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by building on factor models borrowed from the mutual fund literature. We construct a
global Carhart (1997) four-factor model using Datastream's stock universe. This allows
us to draw inferences which are not seen from an analysis of traditional performance
measures alone.
Second, we extend our analysis to the multi-asset class case incorporating bonds and
commodities. In the baseline scenario, we derive simple xed-weight policies from the
academic as well as practitioner literature and compare them to the optimization models.
Again, we employ a multi-factor regression framework to identify the underlying drivers
of performance. To this end, we construct value and momentum factors for bonds and
commodities building on recent work of Asness et al. (2009). Our approach adds to the
literature on performance attribution of multi-asset class portfolios. Finally, we analyze the
performance of more than 5,000 alternative xed-weight strategies covering every possible
proportion of the asset classes in 1% steps. This enables us to gain deeper insights into
the structural composition of promising portfolios.
We nd that none of the Markowitz-based portfolio models is able to signicantly out-
perform simple heuristics out-of-sample. This holds for both international equity diversi-
cation and for the asset allocation case. Instead almost any well-balanced xed-weight
proportion of stocks, bonds and commodities is able to realize considerable diversica-
tion gains. A number of sensitivity checks assures the robustness of our results. We thus
suggest a simple and cost-ecient asset allocation approach for private investors.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes our data.
Section 5.3 discusses popular extensions of the Markowitz approach, leading to the selec-
tion of promising optimization models for the construction of a \world market portfolio".
Subsequently, we derive alternative heuristic asset allocation policies. Section 5.4 contains
the empirical analysis. A summary of the results is given in section 5.5.
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5.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
5.2.1 Asset Classes and Data
Given our focus, we pay particular attention to the practicability of our results. We
therefore base our study on renowned indices, which are investable for private investors
at low costs via exchange-traded funds. We concentrate on Euro-Zone private investors
within a yearly rebalanced buy-and-hold approach.2 We incorporate stocks, bonds as
well as commodities in the analysis. These asset classes are represented by indices whose
selection is based on the criteria transparency, representativeness, investability, liquidity
and data availability.3
Based on these requirements, we rely on the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI)
index family, which has been widely used in previous studies (e.g., Driessen and Laeven
(2007), De Roon et al. (2001)), to cover the global stock universe. In the baseline analysis,
stocks in the "world market portfolio" are represented by the four regional indices MSCI
Europe, MSCI North America, MSCI Pacic as well as MSCI Emerging Markets. Taken
together, they currently cover 45 countries and track the performance of several thousand
stocks. The MSCI indices are designed to cover 85% of the free oat-adjusted market
capitalization of the respective investable equity universe.
Bonds are incorporated because of their low correlation with stocks. In the baseline anal-
ysis, they are represented by the iBoxx Euro Overall index, which consists of Euro-Zone
bonds of dierent maturities and credit ratings.4 The index currently tracks the perfor-
2Our motivation to focus on Euro-Zone investors is twofold. First, many studies takting the special viewpoint of US (stock)
investors nd the additional benet from investing abroad to be economically small (e.g. De Roon et al. (2001), Driessen
and Laeven (2007)). Non-US perspectives have received far less attention so far. Second, hardly any of the nancial products
available to Euro-Zone private investors satises our requirements of a transparent, cost-ecient and broadly diversied
portfolio. On the one hand, there are passive products which are based on pure stock, bond or commodity indices. Even
within the respective asset class, they are often not comprehensively diversied. On the other hand, there are actively
managed multi-asset class funds. However, actively managed funds on average underperform passive benchmarks after costs
(e.g., Fama and French (2010) and Comer et al. (2009)).
3We require the index composition and index rules to be disclosed by the index provider (transparency). The index
should already cover most of the market within an asset category to reduce complexity (representativeness). In doing so,
the \world market portfolio" can be constructed with only few highly diversied indices. Moreover, low-cost exchange-traded
funds tracking these indices should exist to enable private investors to actually implement our suggestions (investability
and liquidity). Finally, we require a long return data history to conduct powerful statistical tests (data availability).
4As we aim to derive suggestions for private investors, we do not consider currency hedging. For internationally diversied
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mance of more than 2,200 bonds. In robustness checks, we also make use of the iBoxx
Euro Sovereign Index, which only consists of government bonds, the JPM Global Bond
Index, and the ML European Monetary Union Index.
Partly due to a lack of investability, commodities have long been neglected by private
investors. However, many studies provide evidence of the high diversication potential of
broad-based commodity futures indices.5 Furthermore, diversication benets tend to be
especially pronounced in times of unexpected ination and declining stock markets. In
the baseline analysis, commodities are represented by the S&P GSCI Commodity Total
Return Index. This world-production weighted index currently includes 24 commodity
futures contracts that track the performance of energy products, industrial and precious
metals, agricultural products and livestock. In sensitivity checks, commodities are also
represented by the Reuters/Jeeries Total Return Index and the DB Commodity Euro
Index, respectively.
We do not incorporate real estate in our analysis as individual investors are often already
heavily exposed to real estate risk (e.g., Calvet et al. (2007), Campbell (2006)). Thus, the
additional inclusion of real estate in the overall portfolio might lead to a lack of diversi-
cation. Moreover, we do not consider alternative asset classes such as hedge funds and
private equity for two reasons. First, their diversication potential in the multi asset case
is often found to be limited (e.g., Amin and Kat (2003), Ennis and Sebastian (2005), Pat-
ton (2009) and Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009)). Second, we could not identify indices
satisfactorily meeting our selection criteria.
Our evaluation period starts in February 1973 and ends in December 2009, thus extending
previous studies on international diversication in the stock market (e.g., Driessen and
Laeven (2007), De Roon et al. (2001) or De Santis and Gerard (1997)). For all indices, we
use Euro-denominated total return indices extracted from Thomson Reuters Datastream.
bond portfolios, Black and Litterman (1992) and Eun and Resnick (1994) nd that currency risk needs to be controlled
for. We thus restrict our analysis to Euro-denominated bonds. As the iBoxx index universe is only available from 1999 on,
we replace the return of the iBoxx Euro Overall Index with the return of the REXP for the time period before 1999. Our
approach is justied by a monthly return correlation of 0.965 between these two indices after 1999.
5Historically, these indices delivered equity-like returns and volatilities. At the same time, they provided low and partly
even negative correlations with stocks and bonds (e.g., Erb and Harvey (2006) and section 5.2.2). Other commodity exposure
such as physical trading, individual commodity futures or stocks of companies owning and producing commodities does
not oer the specic risk, return, and correlation features of broad-based commodity futures indices (e.g., Erb and Harvey
(2006) and Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006)). Thus, they are less suitable for our analysis.
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Hence, our ndings refer to an investment without currency hedging, which is a realistic
assumption for private investors.6
To implement our heuristic portfolio strategies in the stock universe, we require the gross
domestic product (GDP, in current U.S. dollars) and the stock market capitalization of
the MSCI index regions. We obtain these data from the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and Thomson Reuters Datastream, respectively. We use the three
month FIBOR as a proxy for the risk-free asset. Historical stock market capitalization
data is available from 1973 on, which marks the lower bound of our evaluation period.
5.2.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 5.1 gives an overview of the monthly return parameters of the asset classes which are
represented by the iBoxx Euro Overall index, the S&P GSCI Commodity Total Return
index and a number of stock indices. The latter comprise the four regional MSCI indices
as well as a global capitalization-weighted stock index constructed from the four regional
indices. The MSCI Emerging Markets are only incorporated from 1988 on, as this is the
starting point of the index calculation.7 Table 5.1 shows only small dierences in the
average monthly Sharpe ratio of the regional stock indices (0.091) compared to the global
stock index (0.098). Over the last 20 years, this dierence vanishes completely. This result
motivates, rst, the analysis of alternative allocation mechanisms for the stock market and,
second, the incorporation of additional asset classes.
To assess the diversication potential of a "world market portfolio", Figure 5.1 and Figure
5.2 illustrate the time-series behavior of correlations within the stock markets and across
asset classes, respectively. Correlation coecients are computed using a rolling window
approach based on the previous 60 months.
Figure 5.1 reveals an almost steady increase in the comovement of international stock mar-
6To convert index levels in Euro we refer to the time series of synthetical Euro/USD exchange rates as calculated by
Thomson Reuters Datastream. In robustness checks, we redo the analysis using the historical DEM/USD exchange rate as
published by Deutsche Bundesbank. The qualitative nature of our results does not change.
7Driessen and Laeven (2007) emphasize that investment restrictions were imposed on many emerging markets till the
mid 80s and that reliable index calculations have only been available since then. Thus, the return of our global stock index
can be considered a proxy for the performance of worldwide investable equity.
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics for the Dierent Indices
This table reports the return distribution of the various indices which we consider for portfolio construction.
Returns are calculated using Datastream's total return index (code: RI) and denominated in Euro. Global
Stock Index is a market-weighted stock index comprising the four dierent regional stock indices MSCI Europe,
MSCI North America, MSCI Pacic, and MSCI Emerging Markets.
Asset Class/ Sample Sharpe Mean Std. Dev. VaR 95%
Region Period Ratio Return Return
Stocks: Regional Indices
Emerging Markets 88-09 0.122 1.29% 7.45% -12.13%
Europe 73-09 0.116 1.01% 4.86% -7.75%
North America 73-09 0.093 0.95% 5.39% -8.11%
Pacic 73-09 0.065 0.83% 5.91% -8.61%
Average 73-09 0.091 0.93% 5.39% -8.16%
Average 88-09 0.072 0.82% 5.88% -9.57%
Global Stock Index 73-09 0.098 0.92% 4.79% -8.44%
Global Stock Index 88-09 0.060 0.68% 4.92% -8.73%
Other Asset Classes
Bonds 73-09 0.108 0.57% 1.12% -1.27%
Commodities 73-09 0.076 0.92% 6.28% -9.65%
kets since the 1980's. However, as Figure 5.2 illustrates, there is no (in the case of bonds)
or at best weak (in the case of commodities) evidence of an increase in correlations across
asset classes. Nevertheless, correlations vary considerably through time, which points to
potential estimation errors in Markowitz-based optimization methods (see section 5.3.1).
We discuss promising optimization approaches in the next section.
5.3 Asset Allocation Models
The models considered for portfolio selection in the case of both global stock market
diversication and diversication over asset classes are briey summarized in Table 5.2.
The last column of this table gives the abbreviation that we use to refer to the model in
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Figure 5.1: Time Series Behavior of Correlations within the Stock Market
This gure depicts the movement in the average correlation over the sample period for the regional stock
indices MSCI Europe, MSCI North America, MSCI Pacic and MSCI Emerging Markets with respect to
all other stock indices. Correlation coecients are computed using a rolling window approach based on the
previous 60 months.
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Figure 5.2: Time Series Behavior of Correlations between Asset Classes
This gure depicts the movement in the average correlation over the sample period for the iBoxx Euro Overall
Index and the S&P GSCI Commodity Total Return Index with respect to the regional MSCI stock indices.
Correlation coecients are computed using a rolling window approach based on the previous 60 months.
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the results section.
5.3.1 Markowitz-Based Optimization Models
We use a variety of model extensions that have been suggested in the existing literature
to deal with the well-known problem of estimation error, which is ignored in the tradi-
tional mean-variance model of Markowitz (1952).8 These models either impose additional
constraints in the optimization process, shrink the estimated input parameters in order
to mitigate the impact of estimation error, or both. Shortsale constraints prevent the
optimization model from taking extreme long and short positions to exploit even small
dierences in the return structure of assets. Shrinkage models correct the estimated pa-
rameters toward a common value. In doing so, they aim at reducing the error-maximizing
property of the mean-variance model when historical data is used for parameter estimation
(e.g., Jorion (1985)). As shown by Jagannathan and Ma (2003), both approaches work
similarly by increasing the number of assets with non-negative portfolio weights which
enforces a certain extent of diversication.
The rst model we implement is the mean-variance framework with non-negativity condi-
tion (maxsr). The objective of this model is to maximize the Sharpe ratio of the portfolio,
which allows us to refrain from considering individual risk preferences in the optimization
process. In addition, we employ three extensions of this model that either shrink the sam-
ple means (js maxsr), the sample variance-covariance matrix (ccm maxsr), or both
(js  ccm). The shrinkage estimation of expected returns is based on the work of James
and Stein (1961). In our study, we use the estimator proposed by Michaud (1998). We
shrink the elements of the variance-covariance matrix employing the constant correlation
model developed in Ledoit and Wolf (2004).9
In addition to models which try to maximize the Sharpe ratio, we employ several mod-
els which aim at constructing minimum variance portfolios. The superior performance
8Consistent with previous empirical evidence, the traditional mean-variance optimization without constraints leads to
extreme long and short positions with exorbitant high turnover. Therefore, we refrain from reporting these results.
9The authors provide the code on their web-site (http://www.ledoit.net/shrinkCorr.m). We assume a constant correlation
equal to the historical correlation average for the stock market indices and a correlation of 0 between dierent asset classes.
Our results are unchanged if we simply use the historical correlation average over all indices irrespective of the asset class
underlying the index.
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Table 5.2: List of Portfolio Models
This table lists the various Markowitz-based optimization models from the existing literature (Panel A) and
heuristic models (Panel B) which we consider for portfolio construction.  is the threshold parameter devel-
oped in DeMiguel et al. (2009a) to limit the norm of the portfolio weight vector. The last column gives the
abbreviation that we use to refer to the model.
No. Portfolio Model Abbreviation
Panel A: Markowitz-based portfolio optimization models from the existing literature
1 Maximum Sharpe ratio approach with shortsale constraints maxsr
2 Minimum variance approach without shortsale constraints minvar-nb
3 Minimum variance approach with shortsale constraints minvar
4 James/Stein estimator of expected returns with shortsale constraints js
5 James/Stein estimator of expected returns plus Ledoit/Wolf constant js-ccm
correlation model with shortsale constraints
6 Maximum Sharpe ratio approach plus Ledoit/Wolf constant correlation ccm-maxsr
model with shortsale constraints
7 Minimum variance approach plus Ledoit/Wolf constant correlation ccm-minvar
model with shortsale constraints
8 1-norm constrained minimum variance portfolio with  calibrated nc1v
using cross-validation over portfolio variance
9 1-norm constrained minimum variance portfolio with  calibrated nc1r
by maximizing portfolio return in previous period
10 2-norm constrained minimum variance portfolio with  calibrated nc2v
using cross-validation over portfolio variance
11 2-norm constrained minimum variance portfolio with  calibrated nc2r
by maximizing portfolio return in previous period
Panel B: Heuristic portfolio models considered in this paper
12 GDP-weighted stock portfolio gdp
13 Market-weighted stock portfolio macap
14 Equally-weighted stock portfolio naiv
15 Asset Allocation Model with the following weights: 60% stocks, 25% 60-25-15;
bonds and 15% commodities; stock portfolio is GDP-weighted gdp
16 Asset Allocation Model with the following weights: 60% stocks, 25% 60-25-15;
bonds and 15% commodities; stock portfolio is market-weighted macap
17 Asset Allocation Model with the following weights: 60% stocks, 25% 60-25-15;
bonds and 15% commodities; stock portfolio is equally-weighted naiv
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of minimum variance optimization, in particular compared to models that do not ignore
information about sample mean returns, has been demonstrated in various studies (see,
e.g., Haugen and Baker (1991), Chopra et al. (1993), and Jagannathan and Ma (2003)).
We implement the traditional minimum variance approach with and without short-sale
constraints (minvar, minvar  nb), the minimum variance approach with shrinkage esti-
mation of the variance-covariance matrix using the constant correlation model and short-
sale restriction (ccm minvar), and a set of extensions to the general minimum variance
framework (nc1v; nc1r; nc2v; nc2r) which have recently been developed by DeMiguel et al.
(2009a). In their empirical analysis, the authors are able to show that this novel class of
models often outperforms existing portfolio strategies at a signicant margin. They im-
pose the additional constraint that the sum of the absolute values of the portfolio weights
(known as 1-norm) or the sum of the squared values of the portfolio weights (known
as 2-norm) must be smaller than a given parameter threshold . Eectively, this con-
straint allows portfolios to have some short positions, but restricts the total amount of
short-selling. In order to calibrate the value of the threshold parameter , DeMiguel et al.
(2009a) use two dierent methods. First, they choose the parameter  which minimizes
the portfolio variance if the sample is cross-validated. Second, they set  to maximize the
portfolio return in the last period in order to exploit positive autocorrelation in portfolio
returns.10
Overall, we believe to use a promising set of scientic portfolio choice models against which
we test the heuristic construction rules, which are illustrated in the next subsection.
5.3.2 Heuristic Models
5.3.2.1 International Stock Market Diversication
We consider three dierent weighting schemes for a global stock portfolio: Equal-weighting
(1/N heuristic), market value-weighting and GDP-weighting.
An equally-weighted portfolio might be considered a natural benchmark for more sophis-
10For further information about the derivation of the portfolio models and the motivation of DeMiguel et al. (2009a),
we refer the reader to their study. We do not evaluate other portfolio models considered in their paper, because the design
of these models is very similar to the ones tested in our study and all models achieve very similar results in terms of
out-of-sample portfolio variance, Sharpe ratio and turnover.
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ticated methods of portfolio optimization. Firstly, it is very easy to implement. And,
secondly, private investors have been shown to often rely on this naive allocation rule
(e.g., Benartzi and Thaler (2007)).
Another strategy is to base portfolio weights on the relative market capitalization of the
constituents. This concept is at the heart of most major stock market indices and thus
easy to follow for private investors. Liquidity and investment capacity arguments are
important benets of these indices, though of minor relevance for our objective. However,
an undisputed advantage of this approach is its very low turnover as portfolio weights
automatically rebalance when security prices uctuate.
Nevertheless, concerns against this weighting scheme have recently been raised. Figure 5.3
gives the intuition behind these arguments. It shows the time series of portfolio weights
of a market-value weighted stock index constructed from the MSCI indices for North
America, Europe, the Pacic region and the Emerging Markets. Figure 5.3 illustrates
that the resulting global stock index tends to be dominated by single regions. Between
1998 and 2007, for example, the weight of North America was on average about 45%.
As the MSCI indices themselves are cap-weighted, US large caps substantially drove the
performance of the global stock universe during that period. In contrast, the portfolio
weights in the previous decade were heavily inuenced by the bull and subsequent bear
market of the Japanese stock market. The fraction of the Japan-dominated Pacic region
was more than 52% in 1989 and heavily dropped to about 15% in 1998. These examples
illustrate the pro-cyclical nature of value-weighted indices.
Motivated by many studies arguing that price uctuations sometimes do not fully reect
changes in company fundamentals (e.g., Shiller (1981)), a growing literature questions
the eciency of value-weighted indices (e.g., Treynor (2005), Siegel (2006)). Recently,
alternative index concepts aimed at better approximating true rm values have been
proposed. These indices are often weighted by fundamental measures such as earnings,
dividends or book values (Arnott et al. (2005)), building on the intuition that this scheme
might be less volatile and less driven by sentiment. Consistent with this rationale, back-
testing shows that fundamentally-weighted country-specic indices have outperformed
standard value-weighted indices in the past (e.g., Arnott et al. (2005)).
These ndings justify the inclusion of a fundamentally-oriented global stock market index
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Figure 5.3: Time Series Evolution of Portfolio Weights of a Cap-Weighted Stock Index
This gure depicts the portfolio weights of a market-value weighted stock index constructed from the MSCI
indices for North America, Europe, the Pacic region and the Emerging Markets over the sample period. The
data source is Thomson Reuters Datastream.
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Figure 5.4: Time Series Evolution of Portfolio Weights of a GDP-Weighted Stock Index
This gure depicts the portfolio weights of a GDP-weighted stock index constructed from the MSCI indices for
North America, Europe, the Pacic region and the Emerging Markets over the sample period. Data sources
are the World Bank for the period 1973-2005 and the International Monetary Fund for the period 2006-2008.
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in our analysis. To transfer the idea from the rm to the regional level, we weight the four
MSCI indices based on the relative GDP of their covered countries. As the MSCI indices
themselves are market-value weighted, this policy might be considered a compromise
between a cap-weighted and a fundamentally weighted approach. As can be seen from
Figure 5.4, this procedure indeed results in a less volatile, more balanced allocation.
5.3.2.2 Diversication over Asset Classes
The easiest asset allocation policy for private investors would arguably be to assign time-
invariant weights to stocks, bonds and commodities. The high number of potential xed-
weight strategies requires the denition of a benchmark against which Markowitz-based
models can be tested. As selecting any specic strategy is a somewhat arbitrary choice,
we employ a two step procedure. First, we screen the literature to derive a promising
baseline policy which we use in the empirical tests in section 5.4.2.2. Second, we analyze
the performance of more than 5,000 alternative portfolios with any possible xed-weights
(in 1% steps) in section 5.4.3 to assess the robustness of time-invariant allocation policies.
Regarding the ratio of stocks and bonds, we try to determine a best practice solution
as a benchmark. Specically, we study the security market advice of major investment
bankers and brokerage rms as reported in e.g. Annaert et al. (2005) and Arshanapalli
et al. (2001) as well as institutional holdings as reported in e.g. Blake et al. (1999),
Brinson et al. (1986) and Ibbotson and Kaplan (2000)). Most of these studies analyze the
allocation over cash, bonds and stocks and do not consider other asset classes. We focus on
the time-series average of the cross-sectional mean of these allocations, as Annaert et al.
(2005) and Arshanapalli et al. (2001) document the eciency of such a strategy. Based on
the overall picture, we derive a consensus recommendation of roughly 60% stocks and 40%
bonds. Next, we analyze the literature that explicitly deals with commodities in an asset
allocation context. Based on e.g. Erb and Harvey (2006) and Anson (1999), we estimate
a consensus weight of roughly 15% for commodities.
Constructing an ex-ante baseline portfolio from these results leaves us with some degrees
of freedom. Specically, commodities could be incorporated at the expense of less stocks,
less bonds or less stocks and less bonds. Given this arbitrary choice, we use stocks, bonds
and commodities in a xed proportion of 60%, 25% and 15%. Note again that our objective
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is just to derive a plausible ex-ante strategy as a starting point for the empirical analysis,
not an ex-post optimal portfolio.11
5.4 Empirical Analysis
5.4.1 Performance Evaluation Methodology
The performance of the portfolio strategies is assessed over the sample period from Febru-
ary 1973 to December 2009. Our implementation of the Markowitz-based models relies
on a "rolling-window" approach, i.e. we distinguish between estimation and evaluation
period. Specically, at the beginning of each February, we use return data of the previous
60 months to calculate the input parameters needed to determine the portfolio weights
of each index. Using these weights, we then calculate the portfolio returns over the next
12 months without rebalancing. The following February, new portfolio weights are deter-
mined by using the updates of the parameter estimates.
We use the resulting time series of out-of-sample returns to compute the Sharpe ratio of
each strategy. The ratio is dened as the average monthly excess return over the risk free
rate, divided by the standard deviation of monthly excess returns in the whole sample
period. To test for dierences in Sharpe ratios, we follow the bootstrap technique recently
developed in Ledoit and Wolf (2008).
For the market value-weighting scheme, we calculate the portfolio weights at the rebal-
ancing date using market values as of January, 1st. The one month lag has the aim of
ensuring real-time data availability. The GDP-weighting is based on GDP-data from the
previous year. We also compute the portfolio turnover of each strategy which results from
the annual adjustment of the portfolio weights. This allows us to estimate the transaction
costs associated with each strategy and to calculate the out-of-sample Sharpe ratio after
costs. In order to do so, we assume a proportional bid-ask-spread s equal to 40 basis
points per transaction.12 Then, the costs ct due to portfolio rebalancing in month t can
11In fact, we nd that our baseline heuristic performs slightly worse than the other two alternatives. Hence, from an
ex-post perspective, the benchmark against which we test scientic asset allocation models might be regarded conservative.
12The spread is assumed to be the same for each index. It is based on the average bid-ask spread in 2007 for selected
exchange-traded funds tracking the indices used in our analysis. Other trading costs and a potential price impact are
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be estimated as follows:
ct = s 
NX
i=1
jwi;t   wi;t j; (5.1)
where wi;t is the intended portfolio weight, wi;t  is the portfolio weight before rebalancing
and the expression
PN
i=1 jwi;t   wi;t j denes total portfolio turnover.
For international equity diversication, we also rely on factor models commonly employed
in the mutual fund literature. Specically, in addition to the Jensen (1968) one factor
alpha, we estimate the alpha from a global Carhart (1997) four factor model to infer to
what extent competing strategies load on the value, size and momentum premium. The
Carhart (1997) alpha is estimated from the following model:
rt rf;t = 4F +MKT MKTt+SMB SMBt+HML HMLt+WML WMLt+t; (5.2)
where rt and rf;t are the returns of strategy and the risk-free asset in period t and MKTt
is the excess return of the market-weighted global equity portfolio. The expressions SMB,
HML, and WML denote the returns of the following zero-investment strategies: SMB
is the return dierence between small and large capitalization stocks, HML is the return
dierence between stocks with high and low book-to-market ratios andWML is the return
dierence between stocks with high and low past stock returns. The Jensen (1968) one
factor alpha is calculated in a similar fashion but uses only the market factor. We construct
the global factors using Datastream's world-wide stock universe. Our computation of the
factors follows the instructions outlined on Kenneth French's website and employs the
methodology of Grin (2002). That is, the global factors are market weighted averages
of the country-specic components. The appendix provides the reader with a detailed
description of the construction of the size, value and momentum factors.
For the asset allocation case, we develop a framework aimed at decomposing the portfolio
returns of the competing strategies. In the rst step, we run a time-series regression of
the excess return of each model on the following three factors:
neglected. These costs should be marginal for broad-based indices, though.
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rt   rf;t = 3F + 1  Stockst + 2 Bondst + 3  Commoditiest + t; (5.3)
where Stockst, Bondst and Commoditiest represent the excess after-cost returns of the
stock, bond and commodity market, respectively. The economic interpretation of the
coecients is as follows. The betas represent the linear combination of asset class returns
which best approximates the time-series of returns as generated by the model. In this
sense, it gives an indication of the xed-weight strategy that comes closest to the model's
performance. For our heuristics, the alpha might be interpreted as the monthly return
contribution of the rebalancing approach. For the Markowitz-based models, it might be
regarded as the impact of the models' market timing on the overall portfolio return. For
instance, minimum variances approaches are expected to, on average, heavily rely on
bonds and much less on stocks and commodities. However, in some years, they might
exhibit a substantially dierent asset allocation, as the models attempt to prot from
uncommon changes in the risk-return-structure of the input parameters. The alpha from
the regression picks up the success from this market timing strategy.
In the second step, we extent this baseline approach to gain additional insights. To this
end, we rst construct zero-cost, long-short value and momentum portfolios for both
bonds and commodities. Our methodology (see the appendix for details) closely follows
recent work by Asness et al. (2009), who develop simple, intuitive value and momentum
measures for these asset classes. The resulting factors can be thought of as proxies for
return premia, which, so far, have primarily been studied exclusively in the stock market.
Our approach allows us to analyze to what extent portfolio returns generated by competing
asset allocation models are driven by loadings on these common factors. Specically, we
augment the regression specication as given above with three value factors (for stocks,
bonds, commodities), three momentum factors (for stocks, bonds, commodities) as well
as a size factor (for stocks only).13
13Data required for the construction of bond value and bond momentum factors is only available for the second subperiod
(1988-2009) of our analysis. For the sake of comparability, we thus report results from both our three and ten factor
regression only for this period. However, the qualitative nature of our ndings from the three factor model does not change
if we rely on the full sample period (1973-2009). Note further that, judging from the inspection of correlations and variance
ination factors, multicollinearity does not seem to be an issue of concern in the case of the ten factor model.
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5.4.2 Baseline Results
5.4.2.1 International Stock Market Diversication
We start the empirical analysis with a comparison of the performance of the eleven
Markowitz-based models and the various heuristic models for an internationally diver-
sied stock portfolio. Results are reported in Table 5.3.
Columns 2 and 3 show that after-costs average returns and standard deviations tend to be
quite similar for most models. The minimum variance approach and its various extensions
exhibit, as expected, the lowest uctuation in returns. However, in economic terms, the
reduction in risk, as compared to the standard deviation of the three heuristics, seems
small. Consequently, full sample after-costs Sharpe ratios tend to be similar for most
approaches. The traditional mean-variance model with short-sale restrictions achieves
the highest Sharpe ratio (0.124), but this is only marginally higher than the values of the
GDP- and naively-weighted portfolio heuristics (0.120 and 0.122, respectively). The value-
weighted heuristic performs somewhat worse with a Sharpe ratio of 0.098, suggesting that
it might be a less ecient diversication strategy.
To more formally address this issue, we analyze all pairwise dierences in Sharpe ratios
between the Markowitz models and the three heuristics using the bootstrap technique
developed in Ledoit and Wolf (2008). For the sake of brevity we only report p-values for
the hypothesis that the Sharpe ratio for each of these models equals the Sharpe ratio of
the GDP-weighted stock portfolio in Table 5.3, but using any of the other heuristics as
benchmark does not change the qualitative nature of our results. We nd that none of
the scientic models signicantly outperforms any of the three heuristics. Comparing the
three heuristics against each other, the outperformance of the GDP-weighted over the
popular value-weighted stock portfolio is marginally signicant (p-value: 0.08).
To explore potential reasons for the widespread lack of statistical signicance, we also
examine the performance separately for two subperiods. Results are reported in columns
6 and 7 of Table 5.3. In general, there is no consistency in ranking across subperiods. For
instance, the traditional mean-variance model exhibits the highest Sharpe ratio in the
second subperiod (1988-2009), but fails to add value over any of the heuristics in the rst
subperiod. Overall, the analysis suggests that there is no dominating approach.
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Alphas from time-series regressions of portfolio returns on a global one factor Jensen
(1968) or four factor Carhart (1997) model do not lead to a dierent conclusion. Four
models (two minimum variance models and the naively- and GDP-weighted heuristic)
exhibit a positive, statistically signicant and economically meaningful one factor alpha,
but this vanishes once one controls for global momentum, value and size eects. This
result highlights the importance of well-known risk premia for global index construction
and portfolio optimization, which is not seen from an analysis of the Sharpe ratio or
Jensen's alpha alone. For instance, we nd that the GDP-weighted global stock portfolio
loads signicantly on the premia associated with the international value and size factor,
which prevents its excess return from remaining statistically signicant. With regard to the
value factor, we nd a similar behavior also for the equal-weighted portfolio as well as for
all minimum variance approaches. A complete overview of the factor loadings associated
with the portfolio models is given in the appendix.
Our analysis is based on after-cost returns because we are interested in whether Markowitz
models add value under realistic conditions. It is a natural question to ask whether higher
transaction costs prevent the Markowitz models from achieving a better performance,
in particular as these models are only optimal under the assumption of no transaction
costs. If so, it might still be worthwhile to set up a Markowitz approach to manage an
equity portfolio, but to impose certain trading restrictions. As Table 5.3 shows, the mean
turnover of all Markowitz-based models is indeed substantially larger than the turnover
of the heuristics. However, its economic impact on our results is weak. Even before costs,
none of the Markowitz models is able to signicantly outperform any of the heuristics.
Nevertheless, assuming higher transaction costs (than 40 bp) and more frequent (than
yearly) rebalancing generally works in favor of the heuristic models.
5.4.2.2 Diversication over Asset Classes
In the following, we include bonds and commodities in the baseline analysis. Again, we
compare the performance of eleven scientic portfolio choice models with three heuristics.
The latter only dier in their stock weighting scheme (value-weighted, equal-weighted,
GDP-weighted). The proportion invested in bonds (25%) and commodities (15%) is the
same across heuristics and motivated by the literature survey in section 5.3.2.2. In section
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5.4.3, we extensively vary these portfolio weights to assess the sensitivity of our ndings.
Table 5.4 shows the main results. Compared to the international diversication in the stock
market, there is less homogeneity in mean returns, standard deviations and Sharpe ratios
across models. The minimum variance approach with short-sale constraints and shrunk
covariance matrix (ccm minvar) achieves the highest Sharpe ratio (0.161). In contrast,
other Markowitz-based strategies exhibit poor risk-adjusted returns. For instance, the
Sharpe ratio of the traditional mean-variance model with short-sale restrictions (maxsr)
is only 0.110, which is even lower than in the case of international equity diversication.
Hence, not all Markowitz approaches are able to realize the diversication potential of
additional asset classes.
The performance of the xed-weight heuristics is between the best and worst performing
Markowitz models. However, p-values reported in Table 5.4 reveal that we cannot reject
the hypothesis of equal Sharpe ratios for the 60-25-15 asset allocation policy with GDP-
weighting and any of the optimization models. In unreported results, we nd that the
same holds true when using the other heuristics as benchmark.
The evidence supports the conclusion that scientic portfolio choice models are not able to
outperform a passive benchmark, irrespective of whether we focus on international equity
diversication or on diversication over asset classes. However, the heterogeneity in Sharpe
ratios among the Markowitz models raises the intriguing possibility that some models are
better suited to the asset allocation context than others. To investigate this issue, we
implement our three and ten factor regression models. The intuition is to decompose
the portfolio weights induced by Markowitz-based approaches in a xed-weight and a
time-varying component. In that sense, Markowitz models are similar to the heuristic
portfolio strategies. In contrast to the latter, however, the time-varying component does
not reect the contribution from simple rebalancing back to the original asset allocation,
but the attempt to exploit recent changes in the return and risk characteristics of the
asset classes in order to optimize the portfolio. Our regression framework picks up both
the xed-weight and the time-varying contribution to portfolio performance. The betas
give an indication of which linear combination of xed-weight asset allocation schemes
would give a similar return time-series as the Markowitz models themselves. The alphas
might be interpreted as the additional value stemming from the time variation in portfolio
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weights.
However, as shown in the rightmost columns of Table 5.4, there is no additional value.
With the exception of one Markowitz model, which has a signicant negative three fac-
tor alpha, the alphas of all other models are economically close to and statistically not
signicantly dierent from zero. Interestingly, the three and ten factor alphas of the xed-
weight heuristics with GDP- and equal-weighting in the stock domain are positive. This
result provides further evidence that the value-weighted stock portfolio has not been a
particulary successful diversication strategy over the past compared to other potential
heuristics.
5.4.3 Variations in the Fixed Weight Asset Allocation Strategy
We derive the 60-25-15 asset allocation strategy from the existing literature and use it as
a benchmark for the dierent Markowitz models. One potential concern about this ap-
proach may be that the good performance of our baseline heuristic results from backward
optimization. To examine whether other possible heuristic strategies perform much worse
than our baseline, we calculate the Sharpe ratio after costs for a variety of dierent xed-
weight asset allocation schemes as well. In constructing the portfolios, we increase the
portfolio weight of each asset class in steps of 1% from 0% to 100%, reduce the weight of
the second class by the same amount and hold the weight of the third portfolio constituent
constant. Imposing a non-negativity constraint for portfolio weights, this approach yields
5,151 dierent portfolios.14 The stock component of the portfolios is based on the GDP-
weighting approach. Figure 5.5 displays our results. In order to interpret the Figure, note
that the portfolio weight of the commodity component indirectly follows from the weights
of the two other asset classes. For instance, the portfolio with 0% in stocks and 0% in
bonds is completely invested in the commodity index.
Figure 5.5 shows a substantial increase in Sharpe ratios when moving away from portfolios
with an extreme portfolio allocation (e.g., 100% of only one asset class). And, furthermore,
the slope in the Sharpe ratio becomes at as we move to the middle of the graph. This
14The number of portfolios can be explained as follows. Ignoring short-sale restrictions yields a N N matrix of dierent
portfolios, where N equals the number of steps. However, N  (N   1)=2 of these portfolios would lead to a short position in
one asset class. In our case with 101 steps we have 10,201 portfolios of which 5,050 imply a short position. The dierence
of 5,151 is the number of portfolios analyzed.
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Figure 5.5: Graphical Presentation of the Performance of Alternative Fixed-Weight Asset Allocation
Strategies
This gure depicts the Sharpe ratios of alternative heuristic portfolio strategies in the asset allocation context.
In constructing the portfolios, we increase the portfolio weight of each asset class at the rebalancing date
in steps of 1% from 0% to 100% and adjust the portfolio weights of the other 2 classes appropriately. This
approach yields 5,151 dierent portfolios. The stock component of the portfolios comprises the four regional
MSCI indices and is GDP-weighted.
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pattern suggests that a wide range of well-balanced allocation approaches over asset classes
are able to oer substantial diversication gains. In fact, of the 5,151 tested portfolios,
approximately 42% perform better or equal than our baseline heuristic and 58% perform
worse. Those that perform worse are very often heavily tilted towards only one asset class.
If we subdivide the sample period into the subperiods from 1973-1988 and 1988-2009, the
resulting gures look very similar. It follows that the 60-25-15 asset allocation policy is
only one out of many dierent xed-weight asset allocation schemes which achieve a good
performance and which are not dominated by sophisticated academic portfolio models.
This is good news for private investors: Although it is not possible to identify the best
performing portfolio ex-ante, almost any form of well-balanced allocation of asset classes
already oers Sharpe ratios similar to the best performing strategy.
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5.4.4 Further Results and Robustness Checks
In this section, we illustrate the economic meaningfulness of our results and verify their
robustness in a number of sensitivity checks. These tests dier with respect to the data
set, the rebalancing frequency, the input parameter estimation method for the Markowitz
models, the implementation of the GDP-weighting heuristic and the performance measure
used.
Illustration of Economic Signicance: Return Gap
Since dierences in Sharpe ratios are hard to interpret from an economic point of view, we
also rely on the return gap as a more intuitive performance measure, which is rooted in the
risk-matching procedure suggested by Modigliani and Modigliani (1997). By combining
the portfolio under consideration with the risk free asset, Modigliani and Modigliani
(1997) adjust the volatility of the portfolio to the volatility of the benchmark portfolio.
Afterwards, the returns of the combined portfolio can be compared to the returns of the
benchmark. More specically, the return gap, ReturnGapt, in month t is obtained from
the following equation:
ReturnGapt = rbm;t   [bm

rt + (1  bm

)rf;t]; (5.4)
where rf;t is the risk-free rate in t, rbm;t stands for the return of the benchmark and 
and bm denote the monthly standard deviation of the portfolio and benchmark return
over the sample period. We choose the GDP-weighted stock portfolio or the 60-25-15
asset allocation portfolio, our baseline heuristics, as benchmarks. Using the GDP-weighted
strategy as a benchmark allows us to assess the benet of heuristic diversication in the
stock universe. Relying on the 60-25-15 strategy as a benchmark is intended to exemplarily
quantify the additional benets obtained from a naive xed-weight allocation over dierent
asset classes. Table 5.5 veries that heuristic diversication, both in the stock market
and in the asset allocation case, adds value. With the exception of the MSCI Emerging
Markets, the GDP-weighted strategy outperforms every stock index as well as bonds
and commodities in terms of risk-adjusted return. Including additional asset classes, as
implemented in the 60-25-15 portfolio, strengthens these results. The outperformance
ranges here from 8.4 to 28.1 basis points per month (or roughly 100 to well more than 300
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Table 5.5: Return Gaps of Various Indices Compared to the GDP-Weighted Stock Portfolio and the
60-25-15 Asset Allocation Portfolio
This table reports the Sharpe ratio and Value-at-Risk at the 95% condence level of monthly returns for various
indices as well as the GDP-weighted stock portfolio and the 60-25-15 asset allocation portfolio with GDP-
weighting in the stock market, which are our baseline heuristic models for portfolio construction. Moreover,
the table presents the Return Gap of these indices in basis points (bp) per month compared to our baseline
heuristics. Portfolio weights are readjusted every February each year.
Asset Class/ Sample Sharpe VaR 95% Return Gap Return Gap
Region Period Ratio (bp per month) (bp per month)
GDP-stock portfolio 60-25-15 portfolio
Panel A: Stock Indices
MSCI Germany 73-09 0.101 -8.95% 7.8 12.4
MSCI France 73-09 0.104 -9.35% 6.2 11.3
MSCI Italy 73-09 0.064 -10.37% 28.1 26.2
MSCI United Kingdom 73-09 0.096 -9.02% 12.5 15.6
MSCI United States 73-09 0.089 -8.30% 15.4 17.6
MSCI Canada 73-09 0.087 -8.65% 16.0 18.0
MSCI Japan 73-09 0.055 -9.04% 30.9 28.1
MSCI Europe 73-09 0.116 -7.75% 1.8 8.4
MSCI North America 73-09 0.093 -8.11% 13.3 16.2
MSCI Pacic 73-09 0.065 -8.61% 26.0 24.8
MSCI Emerging Markets 88-09 0.122 -12.13% -12.0 -2.2
Panel B: Asset Classes
GDP-stock portfolio 73-09 0.120 -7.90% . 7.1
Bonds 73-09 0.108 -1.27% 5.7 11.0
Commodities 73-09 0.076 -9.65% 20.7 21.2
basis points per year) and thus is economically meaningful. Table 5.5 might be interpreted
as exemplied evidence that relying on simple rules of thumb in diversifying substantially
improves the risk-return prole of the overall portfolio.
Variation in the Data Set
We extensively vary the data set to examine whether our ndings are robust with respect
to the indices used to represent the asset classes. First, we exclude the MSCI Emerging
Markets index which is not available prior to 1988 from the calculations. Second, we
rely on the country-specic MSCI indices for the G7 states instead of the regional MSCI
indices. Third, we redo our analysis in the asset allocation context using only the MSCI
world as the stock market component. Fourth, we also use alternative indices for bonds
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and commodities.15 Overall, we nd that the variation in the data set does not alter any
conclusions drawn in this chapter.
Rebalancing Frequency
Monthly instead of annual rebalancing does not lead to signicantly better results before
costs for both the scientic portfolio models and the heuristics. After transactions costs,
performance tends to deteriorate for most approaches. In general, the performance drop
is more severe for the Markowitz models. This is rooted in their higher turnover in com-
bination with their poor market timing abilities, as analyzed in section 5.4.2.2. For the
heuristics, the rather minor importance of the rebalancing frequency can also be inferred
from the insigncant alphas in Table 5.4 as well as from Figure 5.5. The latter shows that
shifts in the portfolio weights are not harmful as long as the portfolio is not too much
tilted towards only one asset. In this regard, the major benet of portfolio rebalancing is
to avoid extreme portfolios consisting of mainly only one asset.
Parametrization
In the baseline analysis, we use a time window of 60 months to estimate the input pa-
rameters for the Markowitz-based models. To examine whether the performance of these
models improves when a longer time-series of historical returns is used for parametrization,
we base the estimation method also on a rolling-window approach with 1) 120 months and
with 2) all historical data available in a particular month. We do not observe a consistent
improvement in the results of the Markowitz models in the additional tests. Further-
more, the out-of-sample Sharpe ratios are still not signicantly dierent from those of the
heuristic models.
Implementation of the GDP-weighting Heuristic
We change the methodology of the GDP-weighting scheme in two ways. First, we base
portfolio weights on the relative GDP of the next year to proxy for rational expectations.
Second, we use GDP weights derived from purchasing power parity (PPP) valuations as
provided by the World Bank and the IMF. The performance of the GDP-weighting scheme
15Specically, we replace the iBoxx Euro Overall Index with the iBoxx Euro Sovereign Index, the JPM Global Bond Index
and the ML European Monetary Union Index, respectively. Commodities are also represented by the Reuters/Jeeries Total
Return Index and the DB Commodity Euro Index, respectively. In most cases this leads to a reduction in the sample size,
since most index alternatives have a shorter return data history.
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is virtually unchanged in the rst check and slightly improves in the second check.
Other Performance Measures
The recent literature has proposed a number of alternative performance ratios. So, we
repeat our analysis utilizing asymmetrical performance measures which have been shown
to be particularly suited for non-normal return distributions (e.g., Biglova et al. (2004),
Farinelli et al. (2008), Farinelli et al. (2009)). Specically, we employ the Sortino ratio,
the Rachev ratio and the Generalized Rachev ratio.16 The Sortino ratio is computed as
the average excess return over the risk free rate divided by the downside volatility of the
excess return. The Rachev ratio relies on the conditional value at risk of the excess return.
Portfolios with the highest Rachev ratios are the ones which best manage to simultane-
ously deliver high returns and get insurance for high losses. The General Rachev ratio
additionaly takes investors degree of risk aversion into account. Utilizing these alterna-
tive measures does not change the qualitative nature of our results. A broad spectrum of
heuristic portfolio allocation mechanisms still yields similar results as scientic portfolio
choice models. Furthermore, there is no consistency in ranking across performance ratios,
which again indicates that there is no overall dominating approach.
5.5 Conclusion
In this study, we examine the investment value of heuristic diversication strategies as
a possible remedy against widespread costly investment mistakes. The eld of household
nance suggests that many private investors do not fully exploit the benets of diversi-
cation and incur non trivial welfare costs as a consequence. Given this context, we ask
whether and which simplistic guidelines oer a promising way for investors to diversify. To
this end, we compare eleven Markowitz-based optimization methods favored or recently
proposed in the literature with a broad range of heuristic allocation strategies, both for
international stock market diversication and in the asset allocation case.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, for global equity diversication,
prominent Markowitz extensions do not outperform heuristic stock weighting schemes.
16For a detailed description of these ratios, we refer the reader to Biglova et al. (2004) and Rachev et al. (2007). To
implement the ratios, we apply the parametrization described in Biglova et al. (2004) and Farinelli et al. (2008).
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Global value, momentum and size premiums are important drivers of the portfolio perfor-
mance of many strategies, both scientic and heuristic. Second, the inclusion of additional
asset classes towards a \world market portfolio" is, in general, highly benecial. Diversi-
cation gains are mainly driven by a well-balanced allocation over dierent asset classes. As
long as the portfolio is not heavily tilted towards one asset class, almost any form of naive
xed-weight allocation strategy realizes diversication potential. Third, Markowitz-based
optimization methods again do not add substantial value.
Our ndings is good news for private investors: Relying on simple rules of thumb in asset
allocation signicantly improves upon the performance of any single asset class portfolio.
Moreover, following these easily implementable strategies does not lead to lower risk-
adjusted returns as compared to even very sophisticated and recently proposed portfolio
choice models.
Our study suggests several directions for further research. First, provided the availability
of reliable data, the analysis could be extended to other asset classes. Eun et al. (2008)
and Petrella (2005), for example, argue that investors can gain additional diversication
benets from small and mid caps. Second, alternatives to the estimation of input parame-
ters from historical data could be analyzed. Third, future research should explore whether
combining portfolio optimization concepts with heuristic allocation schemes is a fruitful
direction. Within a bottom-up approach, for example, minimum variance models could
be implemented on an individual asset level (see e.g., Jagannathan and Ma (2003)), while
plausible heuristics might be used on an index or asset class level.
Chapter 6
Supplemental Material
6.1 Appendix to Chapter 2
This appendix contains tables and gures that supplement the analysis in chapter 2. Fig-
ure 6.1 compares the cumulative distribution functions of shock variables on Epiphany.
Table 6.1 gives an overview of the data sets used. Table 6.2 illustrates the distribution of
legally recognized holidays across German states. Table 6.3 provides descriptive statistics
of the stock market data. Table 6.4 displays the distribution of industry groups across
samples. Table 6.5 illustrates the construction of the factors for size, value and momen-
tum. Table 6.6 provides further evidence on the level of dierences in shocks in absolute
abnormal returns between holiday and non-holiday rms.
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Figure 6.1: Comparison of Cumulative Distribution Functions of Shock Variables on Epiphany
The following graph is intended to illustrate the economic magnitude of the dierence in shock variables
between holiday and non-holiday rms (see section 2.4.3). As the largest dierence is observed for Epiphany
(see panel A of table 2.4), we employ the following procedure. For each year in which Epiphany falls on a
trading day, we compute the empirical cumulative probably distribution of the shock variable for holiday
rms and separately for non-holiday rms. To obtain an overall distribution, we then average the resulting
percentiles across time. This approach resembles the procedure used in the analysis relied on in the paper,
which aimed at obtaining an estimate for the shock variable of the median rm. The following graph shows the
two cumulative distribution functions. For better readability, only values above the 5th percentile and below
the 95th percentile are displayed.
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Table 6.6: Dierence in Shocks in Absolute Abnormal Returns: Further Evidence
This table provides supplementary material for the test on dierences in shocks in absolute abnormal returns,
as described in section 2.4.3. Panel A reports dierences in mean shocks in absolute abnormal returns. To this
end, daily absolute abnormal returns for each rm during t-5 to t+5, as obtained from a German version of the
Carhart (1997) four factor model, are computed. Factor loadings are estimated from time-series regressions
from t-66 to t-6. For both the holiday and the non-holiday sample, rm-specic shocks are computed as the
absolute abnormal return at t minus the average absolute abnormal return in t-5 to t+5 (excluding t). The
table reports the dierence between the mean shock value for the holiday sample and the mean shock value
for the non-holiday sample, averaged across years. To mitigate the eect of extreme outliers, we winsorize
the data at the 1% and 99% level before computing the mean. This is done for the holiday and non-holiday
sample in each year separately. Statistical signicance is assessed by bootstrapping as described in footnote
11. Large firms (Small firms) refer to stocks with a market value larger (smaller) than the median stock,
measured at the beginning of the year. Statistical signicance at the ten, ve and one percent level is indicated
by *, **, and ***, respectively. Panel B compares the frequency of extreme return events on the event day.
To this end, all holiday (non-holiday) rm-level shocks are pooled. Shock variable at least 0% means that
the idiosyncratic component of the stock's return on the event day has at least the same importance as on
average in a nearby benchmark period (t-5 to t+5, excluding t). The odds ratio is computed as the ratio of
the fraction of extreme events for holiday rms and the fraction of extreme events for non-holiday rms.
Panel A: Dierence in Mean Shocks in Absolute Abnormal Returns
Dependent Variable Epiphany All Saint's Day Corpus Christi Pooled
Abnormal absolute return: All rms -0.08%* 0.02% -0.07% -0.04%
Abnormal absolute return: Large rms -0.09%** 0.00% -0.08% -0.06%*
Abnormal absolute return: Small rms -0.07% 0.02% -0.06% -0.03%
Panel B: Frequency of Extreme Return Events on the Event Day
Event Holiday Firm Observations Non-Holiday Firm Observations Odds Ratio
% of Observations with Shock Variable at least 0% 34.57% 37.09% 0.93
% of Observations with Shock Variable at least 1% 15.22% 16.04% 0.95
% of Observations with Shock Variable at least 2% 7.63% 8.68% 0.88
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6.2 Appendix to Chapter 3
This appendix contains gures and tables that supplement the analysis in chapter 3.
Figures 6.2 to 6.4 illustrate the relationship between specic characteristics of abnormal
industry-level returns and resulting distraction proxy decile ranks. Figure 6.5 shows the
empirical cumulative distribution function of the return on US stock pairs sorted by
distraction proxy decile ranks as observed on the day of divergence. Table 6.7 gives an
overview of the data samples used in the study. Table 6.8 reports distribution details
of the return on US stock pairs sorted by distraction proxy decile ranks as observed on
the day of divergence. Table 6.9 provides descriptive statistics for pairs trading samples in
international stock markets. Table 6.10 displays a transition matrix of baseline distraction
proxy decile ranks and modied ranks available in real time. Table 6.11 shows ndings
from multivariate regression when relying on this real-time distraction proxy. Table 6.12
explores the impact of time-varying arbitrage risk on pairs trading protability. Table 6.13
reports cross-sectional tests (no waiting return computation scheme) on the link between
investor distraction and pairs trading protability.
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Figure 6.2: Mean of Abnormal Industry Returns by Distraction Proxy Decile Ranks
The following gures are intended to illustrate the relationship between specic characteristics of abnormal
industry-level returns and resulting distraction proxy decile ranks. To this end, we compute, at each day, the
mean of dierent types of abnormal industry returns, where industries are represented by the 49 Fama/French
(1997) segments. The upper graph uses (raw) abnormal returns, the middle graph uses absolute abnormal
returns, and the lower graph uses weighted absolute abnormal returns, where industry weights are determined
by the inverse of the volatility of their shock variables over the previous year. See section 3.2 for a detailed
description of how abnormal returns and weights are computed. By distraction proxy decile ranks, the boxes
illustrate the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of the time-series of the mean of these abnormal returns. The
adjacent values in the box plot are the most extreme values within 1.5*interquartile range (75th percentile-25th
percentile) of the nearer quartile.
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Figure 6.3: Standard Deviation of Abnormal Industry Returns by Distraction Proxy Decile Ranks
The following gures are intended to illustrate the relationship between specic characteristics of abnormal
industry-level returns and resulting distraction proxy decile ranks. To this end, we compute, at each day, the
standard deviation of dierent types of abnormal industry returns, where industries are represented by the 49
Fama/French (1997) segments. The upper graph uses (raw) abnormal returns, the middle graph uses absolute
abnormal returns, and the lower graph uses weighted absolute abnormal returns, where industry weights are
determined by the inverse of the volatility of their shock variables over the previous year. See section 3.2 for
a detailed description of how abnormal returns and weights are computed. By distraction proxy decile ranks,
the boxes illustrate the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of the time-series of the standard deviation of these
abnormal returns. The adjacent values in the box plot are the most extreme values within 1.5*interquartile
range (75th percentile-25th percentile) of the nearer quartile.
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Figure 6.4: Maximum Fraction of a Single Industry Return Shock by Distraction Proxy Decile Ranks
The following gure is intended to illustrate the relationship between specic characteristics of abnormal
industry-level returns and resulting distraction proxy decile ranks. To this end, we rst compute the baseline
distraction proxy as outlined in section 3.2. In short, the proxy is constructed as the sum of weighted absolute
abnormal industry returns, where industries are represented by the 49 Fama/French (1997) segments. For
each day, we then identify the maximum fraction a single industry return shock accounts for. By distraction
proxy decile ranks, the boxes illustrate the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of the time-series of this maximum
weight. The adjacent values in the box plot are the most extreme values within 1.5*interquartile range (75th
percentile-25th percentile) of the nearer quartile.
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Figure 6.5: Cumulative Distribution Function of Pairs Trading Prots by Distraction Deciles
This gure shows the empirical cumulative distribution function of event-time one-month returns on zero-cost
portfolios of US stock pairs sorted by distraction proxy decile ranks as observed on the day of divergence.
Breakpoints for the deciles are determined separately for each year. We only consider low distraction days
(=decile 1) and high distraction days (=decile 10). In Panel A (B), trading positions in each pair are initiated
on the day of divergence (on the day following the convergence) and liquidated on the day of convergence (on
the day following the convergence). For better readability, extreme returns (larger than 20% or smaller than
-20%) are not shown. Extreme returns account for roughly 1% of all sample observations.
−
.
2
−
.
15
−
.
1
−
.
05
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
Ev
en
t−
Ti
m
e 
O
ne
−m
on
th
 P
ai
rs
 T
ra
di
ng
 R
et
ur
n
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Cumulative Probability
Distraction decile 1 Distraction decile 10
A) Cumulative Distribution Function (one day waiting)
−
.
2
−
.
15
−
.
1
−
.
05
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
Ev
en
t−
Ti
m
e 
O
ne
−m
on
th
 P
ai
rs
 T
ra
di
ng
 R
et
ur
n
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Cumulative Probability
Distraction decile 1 Distraction decile 10
B) Cumulative Distribution Function (no waiting)
170 CHAPTER 6. SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
T
ab
le
6.
7:
O
v
er
v
ie
w
of
D
at
a
S
et
s
U
se
d
in
C
h
ap
te
r
3
D
at
a
S
o
u
rc
e
D
es
cr
ip
ti
on
S
am
p
le
P
er
io
d
C
R
S
P
D
ai
ly
st
o
ck
m
ar
k
et
d
a
ta
fo
r
al
l
U
S

rm
s
tr
ad
in
g
on
N
Y
S
E
,
A
M
E
X
or
N
A
S
D
A
Q
J
an
u
ar
y
19
60
-
D
ec
em
b
er
20
08
C
om
p
u
st
at
G
lo
b
a
l
D
ai
ly
S
to
ck
F
il
e
D
ai
ly
st
o
ck
m
ar
k
et
d
a
ta
fo
r

rm
s
of
ei
gh
t
la
rg
e
n
on
-N
or
th
A
m
er
-
ic
a
n
st
o
ck
m
ar
k
et
s
(J
ap
an
,
U
K
,
F
ra
n
ce
,
G
er
m
an
y,
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d
,
It
al
y,
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s,
H
on
gk
on
g)
M
id
d
le
of
th
e
19
90
ie
s
-
D
ec
em
b
er
20
09
C
om
p
u
st
at
F
u
n
d
am
en
ta
ls
A
n
n
u
al
an
d
S
eg
m
en
t
F
il
es
F
in
an
ci
al
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
ab
ou
t

rm
se
gm
en
ts
b
as
ed
on
y
ea
rl
y
d
at
a
19
77
-2
00
8
F
ac
ti
va
Y
ea
rl
y
n
u
m
b
er
of
D
ow
J
on
es
N
ew
s
S
er
v
ic
es
ar
ti
cl
es
ab
ou
t
ea
ch

rm
th
at
m
ee
ts
d
a
ta
re
q
u
ir
em
en
ts
on
p
ai
rs
tr
ad
in
g
in
so
m
e
p
er
io
d
af
te
r
19
90
19
91
-2
00
8
I/
B
/E
/S
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
I/
B
/E
/S
an
al
y
st
s
fo
r
sa
m
p
le

rm
s
J
an
u
ar
y
19
80
-
D
ec
em
b
er
20
08
K
en
n
et
h
R
.
F
re
n
ch
's
D
a
ta
L
ib
ra
ry
S
ev
er
al
p
o
rt
fo
li
o
re
tu
rn
s
an
d
ri
sk
fa
ct
or
s
M
id
d
le
of
th
e
19
60
ie
s
-
D
ec
em
b
er
20
08
L
u
b
o
s
P
a
st
or
's
h
om
ep
ag
e
T
ra
d
ed
li
q
u
id
it
y
fa
ct
or
J
an
u
ar
y
19
68
-
D
ec
em
b
er
20
08
N
B
E
R
U
S
b
u
si
n
es
s
cy
cl
e
ex
p
an
si
on
s
an
d
co
n
tr
ac
ti
on
s
b
as
ed
on
m
on
th
ly
d
at
a
J
an
u
ar
y
19
60
-
D
ec
em
b
er
20
08
6.2. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3 171
T
ab
le
6.
8:
D
is
tr
ib
u
ti
on
of
O
n
e-
m
on
th
P
ai
rs
T
ra
d
in
g
A
b
n
or
m
al
R
et
u
rn
s
b
y
D
is
tr
ac
ti
on
D
ec
il
es
T
h
is
ta
b
le
re
p
o
rt
s
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
d
et
a
il
s
o
f
ev
en
t-
ti
m
e
o
n
e-
m
o
n
th
re
tu
rn
s
o
n
ze
ro
-c
o
st
p
o
rt
fo
li
o
s
o
f
U
S
st
o
ck
p
a
ir
s
so
rt
ed
b
y
d
is
tr
a
ct
io
n
p
ro
x
y
d
ec
il
e
ra
n
k
s
a
s
o
b
se
rv
ed
o
n
th
e
d
a
y
o
f
d
iv
er
g
en
ce
.
B
re
a
k
p
o
in
ts
fo
r
th
e
d
ec
il
es
a
re
d
et
er
m
in
ed
se
p
a
ra
te
ly
fo
r
ea
ch
y
ea
r.
C
a
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s
a
re
b
a
se
d
o
n
d
a
il
y
d
a
ta
fr
o
m
J
a
n
u
a
ry
1
9
6
2
to
D
ec
em
b
er
2
0
0
8
.
In
P
a
n
el
A
(B
),
tr
a
d
in
g
p
o
si
ti
o
n
s
in
ea
ch
p
a
ir
a
re
in
it
ia
te
d
o
n
th
e
d
a
y
o
f
d
iv
er
g
en
ce
(o
n
th
e
d
a
y
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
th
e
co
n
v
er
g
en
ce
)
a
n
d
li
q
u
id
a
te
d
o
n
th
e
d
a
y
o
f
co
n
v
er
g
en
ce
(o
n
th
e
d
a
y
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
th
e
co
n
v
er
g
en
ce
).
D
is
tr
a
ct
io
n
D
ec
il
e
A
ll
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
0
P
a
n
el
A
:
O
n
e
D
a
y
W
a
it
in
g
,
F
u
ll
S
a
m
p
le
P
er
io
d
(1
9
6
2
-2
0
0
8
)
N
1
0
3
,3
8
6
8
,1
8
7
8
,6
7
9
9
,1
4
6
9
,3
9
8
1
0
,0
4
8
1
0
,0
7
9
1
0
,5
9
5
1
1
,0
1
9
1
2
,2
2
4
1
4
,0
1
1
m
ea
n
0
.9
7
%
0
.5
3
%
0
.8
6
%
0
.7
7
%
0
.8
7
%
0
.9
5
%
0
.9
4
%
1
.0
2
%
1
.1
0
%
1
.0
9
%
1
.3
0
%
sd
6
.5
7
%
6
.2
0
%
6
.3
0
%
6
.5
3
%
6
.3
2
%
6
.5
8
%
6
.5
6
%
6
.5
4
%
6
.5
2
%
6
.7
3
%
7
.0
5
%
p
1
-1
7
.8
3
%
-1
7
.2
3
%
-1
7
.0
8
%
-1
8
.0
8
%
-1
7
.3
7
%
-1
7
.0
4
%
-1
8
.7
0
%
-1
7
.7
2
%
-1
7
.7
3
%
-1
8
.0
6
%
-1
8
.5
9
%
p
1
0
-7
.0
4
%
-7
.1
6
%
-6
.6
0
%
-7
.0
2
%
-6
.9
5
%
-7
.0
2
%
-6
.9
5
%
-6
.9
8
%
-6
.9
4
%
-7
.2
8
%
-7
.2
8
%
p
2
5
-2
.7
3
%
-3
.1
6
%
-2
.7
3
%
-2
.7
7
%
-2
.7
0
%
-2
.7
6
%
-2
.6
1
%
-2
.7
0
%
-2
.5
8
%
-2
.6
8
%
-2
.6
4
%
p
5
0
1
.5
9
%
1
.2
4
%
1
.4
1
%
1
.3
6
%
1
.5
2
%
1
.5
7
%
1
.4
9
%
1
.6
2
%
1
.7
1
%
1
.7
2
%
2
.0
1
%
p
7
5
5
.2
3
%
4
.8
0
%
4
.9
7
%
5
.0
5
%
5
.0
2
%
5
.1
7
%
5
.2
4
%
5
.2
7
%
5
.3
3
%
5
.4
7
%
5
.7
1
%
p
9
0
8
.2
1
%
7
.4
9
%
7
.7
9
%
7
.8
5
%
7
.9
0
%
.0
8
0
9
0
8
2
8
.1
6
%
8
.2
8
%
8
.3
1
%
8
.5
4
%
9
.0
0
%
p
9
9
1
5
.1
9
%
1
3
.4
9
%
1
4
.6
2
%
1
4
.4
1
%
1
3
.8
1
%
1
5
.0
4
%
1
5
.2
5
%
1
5
.4
6
%
1
4
.9
2
%
1
6
.0
7
%
1
6
.7
7
%
P
a
n
el
B
:
N
o
W
a
it
in
g
,
F
u
ll
S
a
m
p
le
P
er
io
d
(1
9
6
2
-2
0
0
8
)
N
1
0
4
,1
2
5
8
,2
2
2
8
,7
3
8
9
,1
7
9
9
,4
3
6
1
0
,0
9
4
1
0
,1
2
2
1
0
,6
5
7
1
1
,1
4
6
1
2
,3
3
2
1
4
,1
9
9
m
ea
n
1
.3
8
%
0
.8
9
%
1
.2
0
%
1
.0
8
%
1
.2
3
%
1
.3
1
%
1
.3
5
%
1
.3
3
%
1
.5
3
%
1
.5
6
%
1
.9
0
%
sd
6
.7
7
%
6
.4
0
%
6
.4
1
%
6
.7
0
%
6
.5
7
%
6
.7
5
%
6
.7
1
%
6
.7
6
%
6
.6
9
%
6
.9
5
%
7
.3
0
%
p
1
-1
8
.5
5
%
-1
7
.2
1
%
-1
7
.6
5
%
-1
8
.7
4
%
-1
8
.3
3
%
-1
7
.9
8
%
-1
9
.2
2
%
-1
9
.1
7
%
-1
7
.9
3
%
-1
8
.6
1
%
-1
9
.2
9
%
p
1
0
-7
.1
1
%
-7
.2
0
%
-6
.6
5
%
-7
.1
3
%
-7
.0
6
%
-7
.0
5
%
-7
.0
0
%
-7
.1
0
%
-7
.1
3
%
-7
.3
1
%
-7
.3
6
%
p
2
5
-2
.6
2
%
-3
.0
3
%
-2
.5
8
%
-2
.7
4
%
-2
.6
1
%
-2
.6
3
%
-2
.4
4
%
-2
.7
5
%
-2
.4
9
%
-2
.6
3
%
-2
.4
5
%
p
5
0
2
.1
4
%
1
.4
8
%
1
.8
0
%
1
.6
8
%
1
.9
6
%
2
.0
3
%
2
.0
9
%
2
.1
6
%
2
.3
5
%
2
.5
4
%
2
.9
4
%
p
7
5
6
.3
3
%
5
.9
0
%
5
.9
6
%
6
.0
3
%
6
.1
1
%
6
.2
7
%
6
.2
9
%
6
.3
3
%
6
.4
5
%
6
.6
2
%
6
.9
5
%
p
9
0
8
.4
7
%
7
.7
9
%
7
.9
9
%
8
.0
4
%
8
.1
8
%
8
.3
3
%
8
.3
2
%
8
.4
5
%
8
.5
7
%
8
.8
2
%
9
.5
4
%
p
9
9
1
3
.8
0
%
1
2
.1
2
%
1
2
.4
0
%
1
3
.1
2
%
1
2
.8
3
%
1
3
.1
2
%
1
2
.9
9
%
1
3
.5
0
%
1
3
.6
3
%
1
4
.3
0
%
1
5
.8
5
%
172 CHAPTER 6. SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
T
ab
le
6.
9:
D
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
fo
r
P
ai
rs
T
ra
d
in
g
S
am
p
le
s
in
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
S
to
ck
M
ar
k
et
s
In
p
a
n
el
A
,
T
o
ta
l
m
a
r
k
et
ca
p
it
a
li
z
a
ti
o
n
re
fe
rs
to
th
e
v
a
lu
e
re
p
o
rt
ed
b
y
T
h
o
m
so
n
F
in
a
n
ci
a
l
D
a
ta
st
re
a
m
fo
r
th
e
to
ta
l
d
o
m
es
ti
c
m
a
rk
et
ca
p
it
a
li
za
ti
o
n
a
t
th
e
y
ea
r-
en
d
2
0
0
2
,
w
h
ic
h
ro
u
g
h
ly
m
a
rk
s
th
e
m
id
d
le
o
f
th
e
sa
m
p
le
p
er
io
d
fo
r
m
o
st
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
.
In
p
a
n
el
B
,
N
u
m
be
r
o
f
in
d
u
st
r
ie
s
st
a
te
s
h
o
w
m
a
n
y
o
f
th
e
1
0
G
lo
b
a
l
In
d
u
st
ry
C
la
ss
i
ca
ti
o
n
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
(G
IC
S
)
in
d
u
st
ry
se
ct
o
rs
a
re
re
p
re
se
n
te
d
in
th
e
p
a
ir
s
tr
a
d
in
g
sa
m
p
le
.
M
a
x
im
u
m
in
d
u
st
r
y
w
ei
g
h
t
d
en
o
te
s
th
e
la
rg
es
t
fr
a
ct
io
n
o
f
sa
m
p
le

rm
s
b
el
o
n
g
in
g
to
a
sp
ec
i
c
in
d
u
st
ry
g
ro
u
p
.
I
n
d
u
st
r
y
co
n
ce
n
tr
a
ti
o
n
is
co
m
p
u
te
d
a
s
th
e
su
m
o
f
sq
u
a
re
d
in
d
u
st
ry
w
ei
g
h
ts
.
In
p
a
n
el
C
,
v
a
lu
es
a
re
co
m
p
u
te
d
a
n
a
lo
g
o
u
sl
y
fo
r
w
it
h
in
-p
a
ir
in
d
u
st
ry
g
ro
u
p
co
m
b
in
a
ti
o
n
s.
J
a
p
a
n
U
K
F
ra
n
c
e
G
e
rm
a
n
y
S
w
it
z
e
rl
a
n
d
It
a
ly
N
e
th
e
rl
a
n
d
s
H
o
n
g
k
o
n
g
P
a
n
e
l
A
:
O
v
e
ra
ll
M
a
rk
e
t
C
h
a
ra
c
te
ri
st
ic
s
S
a
m
p
le
p
e
ri
o
d
1
/
1
9
9
5
-1
2
/
2
0
0
9
1
/
1
9
9
5
-1
2
/
2
0
0
9
1
/
1
9
9
6
-1
2
/
2
0
0
9
1
/
1
9
9
6
-1
2
/
2
0
0
9
6
/
1
9
9
7
-1
2
/
2
0
0
9
6
/
1
9
9
5
-1
2
/
2
0
0
9
1
/
1
9
9
5
-1
2
/
2
0
0
9
1
/
1
9
9
5
-1
2
/
2
0
0
9
T
o
ta
l
m
a
rk
e
t
c
a
p
.
(i
n
b
il
li
o
n
U
S
D
)
2
1
0
0
.1
9
1
8
1
9
.2
9
8
7
7
.8
7
6
5
1
.5
7
5
4
0
.7
6
4
4
8
.2
2
4
2
9
.8
0
4
1
7
.6
1
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
sa
m
p
le

rm
s
4
,8
7
3
4
,8
6
7
1
,4
2
4
1
,3
0
2
3
8
7
5
0
0
3
5
4
5
2
1
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f

rm
d
a
y
s
(i
n
m
il
li
o
n
)
1
2
.0
0
6
.3
5
2
.1
1
2
.5
4
0
.3
2
0
.4
7
0
.6
8
0
.8
7
P
a
n
e
l
B
:
F
ir
m
C
h
a
ra
c
te
ri
st
ic
s
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
in
d
u
st
ri
e
s
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
9
1
0
M
a
x
.
in
d
u
st
ry
w
e
ig
h
t
F
ra
c
ti
o
n
2
6
.5
0
%
2
0
.8
8
%
2
5
.8
8
%
2
1
.2
9
%
3
0
.1
3
%
3
1
.6
5
%
2
6
.9
9
%
3
8
.1
1
%
In
d
u
st
ry
In
d
u
st
ri
a
ls
C
o
n
s.
D
is
c
re
ti
o
n
a
ry
F
in
a
n
c
ia
ls
In
d
u
st
ri
a
ls
F
in
a
n
c
ia
ls
F
in
a
n
c
ia
ls
F
in
a
n
c
ia
ls
F
in
a
n
c
ia
ls
In
d
u
st
ry
c
o
n
c
e
n
tr
a
ti
o
n
1
6
.1
6
%
1
4
.8
1
%
1
6
.4
6
%
2
1
.2
9
%
1
8
.0
7
%
1
8
.7
9
%
1
7
.4
6
%
2
2
.1
6
%
P
a
n
e
l
C
:
P
a
ir
C
h
a
ra
c
te
ri
st
ic
s
T
o
ta
l
n
o
.
o
f
p
a
ir
s
tr
a
d
e
d
3
6
,9
9
2
2
7
,1
8
5
2
5
,8
3
3
2
6
,0
0
6
1
6
,8
4
1
2
5
,5
9
6
2
1
,3
2
0
2
0
,8
9
4
A
v
e
ra
g
e
tu
rn
o
v
e
r
M
e
a
n
0
.1
6
%
0
.4
4
%
0
.2
1
%
0
.3
5
%
0
.4
3
%
0
.4
1
%
0
.5
0
%
0
.5
6
%
a
t
d
a
y
o
f
d
iv
e
rg
e
n
c
e
M
e
d
ia
n
0
.0
9
%
0
.2
8
%
0
.1
2
%
0
.2
0
%
0
.2
5
%
0
.2
6
%
0
.2
8
%
0
.2
9
%
C
u
m
u
l.
re
tu
rn
d
i
e
re
n
c
e
M
e
a
n
6
.5
3
%
8
.1
7
%
9
.8
6
%
1
1
.7
0
%
1
2
.4
1
%
1
0
.9
0
%
1
1
.1
3
%
1
6
.5
0
%
u
p
o
n
d
iv
e
rg
e
n
c
e
M
e
d
ia
n
5
.9
9
%
7
.3
7
%
9
.4
5
%
1
1
.2
0
%
1
1
.4
7
%
9
.9
6
%
1
0
.6
9
%
1
4
.9
6
%
R
e
tu
rn
d
i
e
re
n
c
e
M
e
a
n
3
.7
0
%
3
.2
1
%
4
.0
7
%
4
.7
3
%
4
.2
4
%
4
.3
0
%
4
.1
8
%
5
.9
1
%
a
t
d
a
y
o
f
d
iv
e
rg
e
n
c
e
M
e
d
ia
n
2
.8
8
%
2
.4
0
%
3
.3
0
%
3
.6
9
%
3
.0
0
%
3
.3
4
%
3
.0
7
%
4
.4
6
%
N
o
.
in
d
u
st
ry
g
ro
u
p
c
o
m
b
.
4
1
4
5
4
4
4
2
4
2
4
4
3
6
4
5
M
a
x
.
in
d
u
st
ry
g
ro
u
p
w
e
ig
h
t
F
ra
c
ti
o
n
1
1
.5
5
%
1
3
.9
8
%
1
3
.3
9
%
1
2
.4
0
%
1
4
.9
6
%
2
1
.2
9
%
1
9
.2
0
%
2
4
.8
2
%
In
d
u
st
ri
e
s
In
d
u
st
ri
a
ls
C
o
n
s.
D
is
c
re
ti
o
n
a
ry
In
d
u
st
ri
a
ls
a
n
d
In
d
u
st
ri
a
ls
H
e
a
lt
h
C
a
re
C
o
n
.
D
is
c
re
ti
o
n
a
ry
In
d
u
st
ri
a
ls
In
d
u
st
ri
a
ls
a
n
d
F
in
a
n
c
ia
ls
a
n
d
F
in
a
n
c
ia
ls
a
n
d
F
in
a
n
c
ia
ls
C
o
n
s.
D
is
c
re
ti
o
n
a
ry
a
n
d
F
in
a
n
c
ia
ls
a
n
d
F
in
a
n
c
ia
ls
a
n
d
F
in
a
n
c
ia
ls
a
n
d
F
in
a
n
c
ia
ls
In
d
u
st
ry
g
ro
u
p
c
o
n
c
e
n
tr
a
ti
o
n
6
.6
1
%
6
.0
0
%
6
.7
1
%
6
.2
9
%
8
.3
1
%
9
.2
6
%
7
.8
3
%
1
3
.0
5
%
6.2. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3 173
T
ab
le
6.
10
:
T
ra
n
si
ti
on
M
at
ri
x
:
B
as
el
in
e
D
is
tr
ac
ti
on
P
ro
x
y
D
ec
il
e
R
an
k
s
an
d
M
o
d
i
ed
R
an
k
s
A
va
il
ab
le
in
R
ea
l
T
im
e
T
h
is
ta
b
le
sh
o
w
s
th
e
tr
a
n
si
ti
o
n
m
a
tr
ix
fo
r
b
a
se
li
n
e
d
is
tr
a
ct
io
n
p
ro
x
y
d
ec
il
e
ra
n
k
s
a
n
d
m
o
d
i
ed
d
ec
il
e
ra
n
k
s,
w
h
ic
h
a
re
b
a
se
d
o
n
ro
ll
in
g
h
is
to
ri
ca
l
ra
w
p
ro
x
y
d
a
ta
.
S
p
ec
i
ca
ll
y,
fo
r
a
g
iv
en
d
a
y,
w
e
u
se
th
e
p
re
ce
d
in
g
2
5
0
tr
a
d
in
g
d
a
y
s
to
co
m
p
u
te
th
e
d
is
tr
a
ct
io
n
d
ec
il
e
th
e
d
a
y
b
el
o
n
g
s
to
.
T
h
is
im
p
li
es
th
a
t
th
e
b
eg
in
n
in
g
o
f
th
e
sa
m
p
le
p
er
io
d
is
o
n
e
y
ea
r
la
te
r
(J
a
n
u
a
ry
1
9
6
3
)
th
a
n
in
th
e
b
a
se
li
n
e
ca
se
.
C
o
m
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
s
a
re
b
a
se
d
o
n
a
ll
1
0
2
,2
5
9
sa
m
p
le
p
a
ir
tr
a
d
es
,
w
h
ic
h
a
re
o
p
en
ed
b
et
w
ee
n
J
a
n
u
a
ry
1
9
6
3
a
n
d
D
ec
em
b
er
2
0
0
8
.
T
h
is
im
p
li
es
th
a
t
d
is
tr
a
ct
io
n
p
ro
x
y
ra
n
k
s
a
t
d
a
y
s
w
h
er
e
m
o
re
(l
es
s)
p
a
ir
s
d
iv
er
g
e
h
a
v
e
a
st
ro
n
g
er
(w
ea
k
er
)
im
p
a
ct
o
n
th
e
re
su
lt
s
d
is
p
la
y
ed
.
M
o
d
i
ed
d
is
tr
a
ct
io
n
p
ro
x
y
b
a
se
d
o
n
ro
ll
in
g
h
is
to
ri
ca
l
d
a
ta
D
ec
il
e
ra
n
k
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
0
T
o
ta
l
1
6
4
.5
5
%
1
7
.0
4
%
4
.8
2
%
1
.6
7
%
0
.9
7
%
0
.4
9
%
0
.2
1
%
0
.0
0
%
0
.0
0
%
0
.0
0
%
7
.9
1
%
2
2
1
.0
2
%
4
2
.5
5
%
1
8
.3
1
%
8
.6
8
%
5
.5
5
%
2
.3
6
%
0
.8
1
%
0
.4
4
%
0
.1
3
%
0
.0
0
%
8
.3
8
%
3
8
.3
2
%
1
9
.4
1
%
3
6
.2
0
%
1
8
.9
1
%
9
.4
6
%
8
.0
4
%
3
.0
6
%
0
.9
5
%
0
.4
2
%
0
.0
0
%
8
.8
3
%
4
4
.4
9
%
8
.5
2
%
1
8
.2
5
%
3
3
.5
5
%
1
5
.5
7
%
1
1
.0
3
%
7
.1
4
%
4
.1
4
%
1
.2
8
%
0
.1
1
%
9
.0
7
%
B
a
se
li
n
e
5
1
.4
1
%
6
.0
3
%
8
.1
3
%
1
7
.9
8
%
3
5
.4
0
%
1
7
.6
3
%
1
2
.4
6
%
7
.2
3
%
2
.3
9
%
0
.3
5
%
9
.7
0
%
6
0
.2
0
%
4
.8
8
%
5
.8
7
%
6
.7
1
%
1
7
.5
8
%
3
1
.4
8
%
1
7
.1
8
%
1
2
.8
2
%
4
.9
9
%
1
.4
8
%
9
.7
3
%
7
0
.0
0
%
1
.3
3
%
5
.6
2
%
6
.6
0
%
5
.8
9
%
1
6
.8
1
%
3
1
.6
2
%
2
1
.4
7
%
1
0
.9
3
%
2
.4
6
%
1
0
.2
6
%
8
0
.0
0
%
0
.2
3
%
1
.9
2
%
4
.3
0
%
5
.6
4
%
7
.3
5
%
1
7
.3
1
%
3
1
.1
4
%
2
4
.3
9
%
6
.9
3
%
1
0
.7
0
%
9
0
.0
0
%
0
.0
0
%
0
.8
9
%
1
.4
0
%
3
.4
6
%
3
.5
2
%
7
.3
4
%
1
6
.7
3
%
4
2
.4
7
%
2
1
.6
9
%
1
1
.8
2
%
1
0
0
.0
0
%
0
.0
0
%
0
.0
0
%
0
.2
0
%
0
.4
9
%
1
.2
9
%
2
.8
8
%
5
.0
8
%
1
2
.9
9
%
6
6
.9
7
%
1
3
.6
0
%
T
o
ta
l
1
0
0
.0
0
%
1
0
0
.0
0
%
1
0
0
.0
0
%
1
0
0
.0
0
%
1
0
0
.0
0
%
1
0
0
.0
0
%
1
0
0
.0
0
%
1
0
0
.0
0
%
1
0
0
.0
0
%
1
0
0
.0
0
%
1
0
0
.0
0
%
174 CHAPTER 6. SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
T
ab
le
6.
11
:
M
u
lt
iv
ar
ia
te
A
n
al
y
si
s:
In
v
es
to
r
D
is
tr
ac
ti
on
(R
ea
l-
T
im
e
A
va
il
ab
il
it
y
)
an
d
R
et
u
rn
s
on
P
ai
rs
T
ra
d
in
g
T
h
is
ta
b
le
d
is
p
la
y
s

n
d
in
g
s
fr
o
m
p
o
o
le
d
m
u
lt
iv
a
ri
a
te
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
o
f
th
e
o
n
e-
m
o
n
th
re
tu
rn
o
n
ze
ro
-c
o
st
U
S
st
o
ck
p
a
ir
s
o
n
a
p
ro
x
y
fo
r
in
v
es
to
r
d
is
tr
a
ct
io
n
a
n
d
u
p
to
th
re
e
se
ts
o
f
co
n
tr
o
l
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s.
T
h
e
p
ro
x
y
fo
r
in
v
es
to
r
d
is
tr
a
ct
io
n
is
th
e
D
is
tr
a
ct
io
n
P
r
o
x
y
D
ec
il
e
R
a
n
k
(s
p
ec
i
ca
ti
o
n
s
1
-4
)
o
r
a
H
ig
h
=
L
o
w
D
is
tr
a
ct
io
n
D
u
m
m
y
(s
p
ec
i
ca
ti
o
n
s
5
-8
),
w
h
ic
h
is
ze
ro
fo
r
lo
w
d
is
tr
a
ct
io
n
d
a
y
s
(d
ec
il
e
1
)
a
n
d
o
n
e
fo
r
h
ig
h
d
is
tr
a
ct
io
n
d
a
y
s
(d
ec
il
e
1
0
).
In
co
n
tr
a
st
to
th
e
b
a
se
li
n
e
a
n
a
ly
si
s
in
th
e
p
a
p
er
,
d
ec
il
e
ra
n
k
s
a
re
n
o
w
co
n
st
ru
ct
ed
o
n
th
e
b
a
si
s
o
f
ro
ll
in
g
h
is
to
ri
ca
l
d
a
ta
to
a
ss
u
re
a
v
a
il
a
b
il
it
y
in
re
a
l
ti
m
e.
S
p
ec
i
ca
ll
y,
fo
r
a
g
iv
en
d
a
y,
w
e
u
se
th
e
p
re
ce
d
in
g
2
5
0
tr
a
d
in
g
d
a
y
s
to
co
m
p
u
te
th
e
d
is
tr
a
ct
io
n
d
ec
il
e
th
e
d
a
y
b
el
o
n
g
s
to
.
P
a
ir
s
tr
a
d
in
g
re
tu
rn
s
a
re
co
m
p
u
te
d
u
n
d
er
th
e
co
n
se
rv
a
ti
v
e
\
o
n
e
d
a
y
w
a
it
in
g
"
re
tu
rn
sc
h
em
e.
T
h
e

rs
t
se
t
o
f
ex
p
la
in
in
g
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
co
n
tr
o
ls
fo
r
ca
le
n
d
a
r
a
n
d
in
d
u
st
ry
e
ec
ts
(i
n
d
ic
a
to
r
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
fo
r
y
ea
r,
m
o
n
th
,
d
a
y
o
f
w
ee
k
,
a
n
d
p
a
ir
in
d
u
st
ry
g
ro
u
p
co
m
b
in
a
ti
o
n
s)
.
T
h
e
se
co
n
d
se
t
co
n
tr
o
ls
fo
r
m
a
rk
et
-l
ev
el
co
n
d
it
io
n
s
o
n
th
e
d
a
y
o
f
d
iv
er
g
en
ce
(m
a
rk
et
re
tu
rn
,
sq
u
a
re
d
m
a
rk
et
re
tu
rn
,
m
a
rk
et
tu
rn
o
v
er
,
1
0
d
a
y
ro
ll
in
g
v
o
la
ti
li
ty
,
fa
ct
o
rs
fo
r
d
a
il
y
re
tu
rn
p
re
m
ia
o
n
si
ze
,
v
a
lu
e,
m
o
m
en
tu
m
a
n
d
sh
o
rt
-t
er
m
re
v
er
sa
l)
.
T
h
e
th
ir
d
se
t
co
n
tr
o
ls
fo
r
a
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
p
a
ir
ch
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
co
m
p
u
te
d
a
s
o
u
tl
in
ed
in
ta
b
le
3
.1
(a
v
er
a
g
e

rm
m
a
rk
et
ca
p
it
a
li
za
ti
o
n
d
ec
il
e
ra
n
k
,
ln
(a
v
er
a
g
e
p
re
-e
v
en
t
tu
rn
o
v
er
),
ln
(a
v
er
a
g
e
p
re
-e
v
en
t
A
m
ih
u
d
il
li
q
u
id
it
y
ra
ti
o
),
a
v
er
a
g
e
id
io
sy
n
cr
a
ti
c
ri
sk
,
w
it
h
in
-p
a
ir
d
i
er
en
ce
s
in
th
es
e
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s,
re
tu
rn
d
i
er
en
ce
a
tt
ri
b
u
ta
b
le
to
th
e
d
a
y
o
f
d
iv
er
g
en
ce
,
ln
(a
v
er
a
g
e
tu
rn
o
v
er
o
n
d
a
y
o
f
d
iv
er
g
en
ce
)
a
n
d
ln
(d
i
er
en
ce
in
tu
rn
o
v
er
o
n
d
a
y
o
f
d
iv
er
g
en
ce
))
.
S
ta
ti
st
ic
a
l
si
g
n
i
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
,
5
%
,
a
n
d
1
%
le
v
el
is
in
d
ic
a
te
d
b
y
*
,
*
*
,
a
n
d
*
*
*
,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
(i
n
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
)
a
re
a
d
ju
st
ed
fo
r
h
et
er
o
sc
ed
a
st
ic
it
y
a
n
d
cl
u
st
er
ed
b
y
d
a
y
o
f
p
a
ir
d
iv
er
g
en
ce
.
M
o
d
e
l
sp
e
c
i
c
a
ti
o
n
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
S
a
m
p
le
p
e
ri
o
d
1
/
1
9
6
3
-1
2
/
2
0
0
8
1
/
1
9
6
3
-1
2
/
2
0
0
8
7
/
1
9
6
3
-1
2
/
2
0
0
8
7
/
1
9
6
3
-1
2
/
2
0
0
8
1
/
1
9
6
3
-1
2
/
2
0
0
8
1
/
1
9
6
3
-1
2
/
2
0
0
8
7
/
1
9
6
3
-1
2
/
2
0
0
8
7
/
1
9
6
3
-1
2
/
2
0
0
8
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
1
0
1
,5
3
9
1
0
1
,5
3
9
1
0
0
,4
2
6
9
9
,6
7
3
2
5
,9
6
3
2
5
,9
6
3
2
5
,7
0
5
2
5
,5
3
8
A
d
ju
st
e
d
R
2
0
.0
5
%
2
.6
3
%
2
.7
4
%
2
.8
4
%
0
.3
0
%
5
.0
2
%
5
.3
0
%
5
.3
6
%
D
is
tr
a
c
ti
o
n
P
ro
x
y
D
e
c
il
e
R
a
n
k
0
.0
0
0
5
2
*
*
*
0
.0
0
0
6
7
*
*
*
0
.0
0
0
4
5
*
*
*
0
.0
0
0
5
0
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
0
1
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
0
1
1
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
1
1
9
)
(0
.0
0
0
1
2
0
)
H
ig
h
/
L
o
w
D
is
tr
a
c
ti
o
n
D
u
m
m
y
0
.0
0
5
5
9
*
*
*
0
.0
0
8
3
9
*
*
*
0
.0
0
6
6
0
*
*
*
0
.0
0
7
2
9
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
1
3
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
1
4
8
6
)
(0
.0
0
1
6
1
5
)
(0
.0
0
1
6
5
0
)
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
fo
r
c
a
le
n
d
e
r
a
n
d
in
d
u
st
ry
e

e
c
ts
n
o
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
n
o
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
fo
r
m
a
rk
e
t-
le
v
e
l
c
o
n
d
it
io
n
s
n
o
n
o
y
e
s
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
y
e
s
y
e
s
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
fo
r
p
a
ir
ch
a
ra
c
te
ri
st
ic
s
n
o
n
o
n
o
y
e
s
n
o
n
o
n
o
y
e
s
6.2. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3 175
T
ab
le
6.
12
:
T
h
e
Im
p
ac
t
of
T
im
e-
V
ar
y
in
g
A
rb
it
ra
ge
R
is
k
an
d
In
ve
st
or
D
is
tr
ac
ti
on
on
P
ai
rs
T
ra
d
in
g
P
ro

ta
b
il
it
y
T
h
is
ta
b
le
d
is
p
la
y
s

n
d
in
g
s
fr
o
m
p
o
o
le
d
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
o
f
th
e
o
n
e-
m
o
n
th
re
tu
rn
o
n
ze
ro
-c
o
st
U
S
st
o
ck
p
a
ir
s
o
n
th
e
p
ro
x
y
fo
r
in
v
es
to
r
d
is
tr
a
ct
io
n
a
n
d
/
o
r
th
e
C
h
ic
a
g
o
B
o
a
rd
O
p
ti
o
n
s
E
x
ch
a
n
g
e
M
a
rk
et
V
o
la
ti
li
ty
In
d
ex
(V
IX
)
o
v
er
th
e
p
er
io
d
fr
o
m
J
a
n
u
a
ry
1
9
9
0
to
D
ec
em
b
er
2
0
0
8
.
T
h
e
p
ro
x
y
fo
r
in
v
es
to
r
d
is
tr
a
ct
io
n
is
th
e
D
is
tr
a
ct
io
n
P
r
o
x
y
D
ec
il
e
R
a
n
k
(s
p
ec
i
ca
ti
o
n
s
3
,5
,6
)
o
r
a
H
ig
h
=
L
o
w
D
is
tr
a
ct
io
n
D
u
m
m
y
(s
p
ec
i
ca
ti
o
n
s
4
,7
,8
),
w
h
ic
h
is
ze
ro
fo
r
lo
w
d
is
tr
a
ct
io
n
d
a
y
s
(d
ec
il
e
1
)
a
n
d
o
n
e
fo
r
h
ig
h
d
is
tr
a
ct
io
n
d
a
y
s
(d
ec
il
e
1
0
).
W
it
h
re
g
a
rd
to
th
e
V
IX
,
w
e
ei
th
er
u
se
it
s
ra
w
v
a
lu
e
(s
p
ec
i
ca
ti
o
n
s
1
,5
,7
)
o
r
it
s
d
ec
il
e
ra
n
k
s,
co
m
p
u
te
d
se
p
a
ra
te
ly
fo
r
ea
ch
y
ea
r
(s
p
ec
i
ca
ti
o
n
s
2
,6
,8
).
P
a
ir
s
tr
a
d
in
g
re
tu
rn
s
a
re
co
m
p
u
te
d
u
n
d
er
th
e
co
n
se
rv
a
ti
v
e
\
o
n
e
d
a
y
w
a
it
in
g
"
re
tu
rn
sc
h
em
e.
S
ta
ti
st
ic
a
l
si
g
n
i
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
,
5
%
,
a
n
d
1
%
le
v
el
is
in
d
ic
a
te
d
b
y
*
,
*
*
,
a
n
d
*
*
*
,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
(i
n
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
)
a
re
a
d
ju
st
ed
fo
r
h
et
er
o
sc
ed
a
st
ic
it
y
a
n
d
cl
u
st
er
ed
b
y
d
a
y
o
f
p
a
ir
d
iv
er
g
en
ce
.
M
o
d
e
l
sp
e
c
i
c
a
ti
o
n
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
S
a
m
p
le
p
e
ri
o
d
1
/
1
9
9
0
-1
2
/
2
0
0
8
1
/
1
9
9
0
-1
2
/
2
0
0
8
1
/
1
9
9
0
-1
2
/
2
0
0
8
1
/
1
9
9
0
-1
2
/
2
0
0
8
1
/
1
9
9
0
-1
2
/
2
0
0
8
1
/
1
9
9
0
-1
2
/
2
0
0
8
1
/
1
9
9
0
-1
2
/
2
0
0
8
1
/
1
9
9
0
-1
2
/
2
0
0
8
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
3
9
,6
6
6
3
9
,6
6
6
3
9
,6
6
6
8
,3
7
2
3
9
,6
6
6
3
9
,6
6
6
8
,3
7
2
8
,3
7
2
A
d
ju
st
e
d
R
2
0
.1
2
%
0
.1
5
%
0
.1
0
%
0
.3
0
%
0
.1
7
%
0
.1
8
%
0
.4
8
%
0
.5
2
%
V
IX
(R
a
w
V
a
lu
e
)
0
.0
0
0
2
8
*
*
*
0
.0
0
0
2
3
*
*
*
0
.0
0
0
1
1
(0
.0
0
0
0
7
9
)
(0
.0
0
0
0
8
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
1
2
4
)
V
IX
(Y
e
a
rl
y
D
e
c
il
e
R
a
n
k
s)
0
.0
0
0
9
5
*
*
*
0
.0
0
0
7
8
*
*
*
0
.0
0
0
7
0
8
*
(0
.0
0
0
1
8
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
1
8
7
)
(0
.0
0
0
4
0
3
)
D
is
tr
a
c
ti
o
n
P
ro
x
y
D
e
c
il
e
R
a
n
k
0
.0
0
0
7
9
*
*
*
0
.0
0
0
6
0
*
*
*
0
.0
0
0
5
3
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
0
1
7
7
)
(0
.0
0
0
1
7
7
)
(0
.0
0
0
1
8
4
)
H
ig
h
/
L
o
w
D
is
tr
a
c
ti
o
n
D
u
m
m
y
0
.0
1
0
7
0
*
*
*
0
.0
0
9
7
9
0
*
*
*
0
.0
0
8
3
2
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
2
2
1
0
)
(0
.0
0
2
2
2
1
)
(0
.0
0
2
4
3
0
)
176 CHAPTER 6. SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
Table 6.13: Further Tests (II): Investor Distraction and Pairs Trading Protability
Panel A shows the sensitivity of pairs trading returns to distraction proxy decile ranks (as observed on the
day of divergence) for several samples of top pairs: The monthly top 100 pairs each consisting of rms from
dierent industries, the monthly top 100 pairs each consisting of rms from the same industries, and the
monthly top 20 pairs each consisting of two value-weighted industries. In all cases, we use the Fama/French
(1997) classication with 49 industries. The rst column shows the return dierence between pairs diverging on
high distraction days (decile 10) and pairs diverging on low distraction days (decile 1). The approach resembles
the methodology used in table 3.2. The second column shows ndings from regressing pairs returns on the
distraction proxy decile rank. Panel B reports results from a test similar in spirit. It compares the return
sensitivity for pairs whose constituent rms share (do not share) at least one business segment, as described
in detail in the text. Panel C compares returns from pairs consisting only of rms with high residual media
coverage and pairs consisting only of rms with low residual media coverage, as described in detail in the text.
The rst column compares average event-time one-month pairs trading returns. The second column shows
ndings from regressing pairs returns on the distraction proxy decile rank. In all panels, statistical signicance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered by day of pair divergence.
Panel A: Impact of Investor Distraction on Pairs Consisting of Alternative Assets
Return computation Di.: Decile 10-Decile 1 Distraction Decile Rank
Top 100 pairs with stocks no waiting 0.0101*** 0.00089***
from dierent industries (N=103,386) (0.00151) (0.0000726)
Top 100 pairs with stocks 0.0094*** 0.00083***
from the same industry (N=100,726) (0.00156) (0.0001154)
Top 20 industry-level pairs 0.0047** 0.00036**
(N=14,180) (0.00190) (0.0001451 )
Panel B: Pairs With and Without Common Industry Segments (since 1977)
Return computation Di.: Decile 10-Decile 1 Distraction Decile Rank
No shared industry segment no waiting 0.0115*** 0.00096***
(0.0024) (0.00019)
Shared industry segment 0.0112*** 0.00043
(0.0039) (0.00030)
Dierence 0.00022 0.00053*
(0.0039) (0.00030)
Panel C: Pairs with High and Low Residual Media Coverage
Return computation Return: All Deciles Distraction Decile Rank
Low residual media coverage no waiting 0.0108*** 0.0011**
(0.0017) (0.0005)
High residual media coverage 0.0003 -0.0010
(0.0030) (0.0011)
Dierence 0.0106*** 0.0021*
(0.0035) (0.0012)
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6.3 Appendix to Chapter 4
This appendix provides information that supplements the analysis in chapter 4. Table
6.14 shows time-series statistics of weekly return deviations of twin stocks. Table 6.15
provides cross-sectional statistics of deviations from theoretical price parity. Table 6.16
shows the impact of investor distraction on the level of price deviations from theoretical
parity. Table 6.17 explores the impact of modied distraction proxies on return deviations
of twin stocks. Tables 6.18 and 6.19 show results from baseline regressions with a lagged
dependent variable on the right hand side.
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6.4 Appendix to Chapter 5
This appendix provides information that supplements the analysis in chapter 5. Table
6.20 reports factor loadings from a Carhart (1997) four factor model for every portfolio
strategy under consideration. Talbe 6.21 reports factor loading from a three factor market
model. Finally, this appendix provides detailed information about the calculation of size,
value, and momentum factors relied on.
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Table 6.20: Markowitz vs. Heuristics: International Stock Market Diversication Results for a Carhart
Four Factor Model
This table documents the results from regressing portfolio excess returns on the world factor returns ERM,
SMB, HML and WML. ERM is the excess return of the value-weighted global stock index. SMB is the return
dierence between small and large capitalization stocks, HML is the return dierence between stocks with high
and low book-to-market ratios and WML is the return dierence between stocks with high and low past stock
returns. This table reports alphas (4F ), betas and the adjusted R2 for the international equity portfolios
which are constructed using the various Markowitz-based optimization models and heuristic models. All values
are reported for the total sample period (1973-2009). T-statistics are reported in parentheses. We assume a
bid-ask spread of 40 basis points to calculate after-cost returns.
Portfolio Model 4F ERM SMB HML WML Adj. R2
Panel A: Markowitz-based Optimization Models
maxsr 0.24% 1.05 -0.02 0.09 -0.06 73.6%
(1.58) (33.30) (-0.30) (1.44) (-1.50)
minvarnb -0.03% 0.89 -0.02 0.14 0.02 84.3%
(-0.37) (47.11) (-0.73) (3.77) (0.96)
minvar 0.04% 0.93 0.01 0.11 0.02 91.4%
(0.57) (65.76) (0.58) (3.86) (0.89)
js 0.13% 0.95 -0.01 0.08 -0.07 79.1%
(1.11) (38.65) (-0.22) (1.67) (-2.21)
jsccm 0.15% 0.95 -0.03 0.07 -0.08 78.8%
(1.22) (38.11) (-0.59) (1.32) (-2.75)
ccmmaxsr 0.19% 1.02 -0.03 0.07 -0.07 75.0%
(1.33) (34.32) (-0.64) (1.15) (-2.01)
ccmminvar 0.05% 0.93 0.00 0.10 -0.01 91.1%
(0.65) (64.51) (0.14) (3.54) (-0.61)
nc1v -0.02% 0.90 -0.02 0.14 0.02 85.2%
(-0.21) (48.71) (-0.62) (3.70) (0.89)
nc1r 0.03% 0.93 -0.02 0.13 0.02 89.6%
(0.43) (59.69) (-0.76) (4.29) (1.18)
nc2v -0.02% 0.92 0.00 0.13 0.02 89.7%
(-0.24) (59.80) (0.14) (4.18) (1.03)
nc2r 0.02% 0.93 -0.01 0.13 0.02 90.8%
(0.26) (63.59) (-0.31) (4.26) (1.21)
Panel B: Heuristic Models
60-25-15; gdp 0.08% 0.99 0.07 0.05 -0.01 95.7%
(1.57) (94.05) (3.72) (2.42) (-0.44)
60-25-15; macap 0.00% 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.0%
(0.00) (97.23) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
60-25-15; naiv 0.08% 0.99 0.07 0.06 0.00 95.1%
(1.46) (88.42) (3.61) (2.87) (-0.04)
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Table 6.21: Markowitz vs. Heuristics: Asset Allocation Results from a Three Factor Model
This table documents the results from regressing portfolio excess returns on a three factor model comprising of
excess returns on the stock, bond and commodity market, respectively. This table reports alphas (3F ), betas
and the adjusted R2 for the asset allocation portfolios which are constructed using the various Markowitz-based
optimization models and heuristic models. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. All values are reported for
the subsample period from 1988-2009. We assume a bid-ask spread of 40 basis points to calculate after-cost
returns.
Portfolio Model 3F Stocks Bonds Commodities Adj. R2
Panel A: Markowitz-based Optimization Models
maxsr -0.09% 0.40 1.06 0.03 50.60%
(-0.64) (13.88) (7.60) (1.31)
minvar-nb -0.02% 0.00 0.92 0.04 82.40%
(-0.75) (0.63) (35.04) (9.59)
minvar 0.01% 0.03 0.92 0.03 92.80%
(-0.43) (10.00) (56.77) (12.54)
js -0.09% 0.15 0.86 0.14 44.60%
(-0.86) (7.16) (8.37) (7.92)
js-ccm -0.02% 0.26 0.89 0.15 49.20%
(-0.12) (10.32) (7.37) (7.17)
ccm-maxxsr -0.28% 0.41 0.91 0.09 54.80%
(-2.06) (14.77) (6.75) (3.86)
ccm-minvar 0.00% 0.06 0.95 0.02 97.20%
(0.44) (25.75) (91.51) (12.79)
nc1v -0.02% 0.00 0.91 0.04 82.70%
(-0.67) (0.79) (35.38) (9.66)
nc1r 0.01% 0.03 0.92 0.03 92.50%
(0.54) (9.75) (55.87) (12.34)
nc2v -0.02% 0.02 0.92 0.04 87.60%
(-0.83) (4.39) (42.75) (10.23)
nc2r 0.01% 0.03 0.92 0.03 92.80%
(0.43) (10.00) (56.77) (12.54)
Panel B: Heuristic Models
60-25-15; GDP 0.12% 0.60 0.21 0.18 96.40%
(2.86) (71.30) (5.09) (25.70)
60-25-15; macap 0.02% 0.59 0.26 0.16 99.60%
(1.18) (227.86) (20.82) (75.47)
60-25-15; naiv 0.10% 0.60 0.21 0.18 96.50%
(2.45) (71.57) (5.23) (26.03)
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Data selection for the stock universe Security data is extracted from Thomson
Reuters Datastream. For each stock market of interest, we create a constituent list based
on all securities which belong to that market and are coded as TYPE "Equity" or "Pref-
erence Share". Securities are included independent of their status ("Active", "Dead" or
"Suspended"). We construct constituent lists for the following Datastream markets: Aus-
tralia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Swe-
den, Switzerland, Turkey, and United Kingdom. These are all countries/markets that are
either used for the construction of the MSCI regional benchmark indices MSCI Europe,
MSCI Euro-Zone, MSCI North America, MSCI Pacic, or comprise the G-20 group of the
world's largest economies. Exceptions are Saudi Arabia, for which no data is available from
Datastream, and the United States, for which we can obtain factor returns from Kenneth
French's website.1 Our procedure results in a total sample of 47,130 unique securities. We
then make use of the Datastream security identier (DSCD) to download the following
data for our sample: International Securities Identication Number (ISIN), geographi-
cal status (GEOGN), total return index (RI), unadjusted price (UP), Datastream total
market value of equity (MV), Worldscope total market capitalization at scal year end
(WC08001), and Worldscope book value of equity at scal year end (WC03501). All nu-
merical values are converted in Euro. We use the variable GEOGN to identify and exclude
rms which are assigned to the wrong stock market. All rms having either no stock data
(no values for RI or UP) or no Worldscope data (no values for WC08001 or WC03501)
are dropped from the sample. Security returns are calculated using the total return index
(RI) which is adjusted for dividends (i.e. assumes that dividends are re-invested) and
stock splits. To clean the return data, we apply the following screens advocated by Ince
and Porter (2006). First, each month we identify rms that have been delisted previously.
Second, rm observations are classied as penny stocks whenever their unadjusted price
(UP) was in the lowest decile in more than 50% of the last twelve months. Third, we re-
move unrealistic returns from the data by setting any return above 300% that is reversed
within one month to missing.
1See http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html.
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Factor construction for individual stock markets Factors are constructed separately
for each stock market. We follow the methodology outlined on Kenneth French's website.
In particular, in order to construct the value and size factors, we form six value-weighted
portfolios based on rm size and equity book-to-market ratio each year at the end of
June. A rm's equity book-to-market ratio for June is dened as WC03501/WC08001
using values at the end of the rm's scal year ending anywhere in the previous calendar
year. Firm size for June is the total market value of equity (MV) at the end of June. To
be included in any of the portfolios, we impose the following requirements: 1) the rm's
stock must have valid price data at the end of June (i.e. no previous delisting and no
penny stock), and 2) neither WC03501 nor WC08001 nor MV must be negative. We use
the same breakpoints as Fama and French (1993) to sort stocks into the portfolios, i.e.
the breakpoints for the book-to-market ratio are the 30th and 70th percentiles and the
size breakpoint is the median market equity. Returns for the size factor (SMB) and value
factor (HML) are then calculated as follows:
SMB =
1
3
 (Small V alue+ Small Neutral + Small Growth)
 1
3
 (Big V alue+Big Neutral +Big Growth): (6.1)
HML =
1
2
 (Small V alue+Big V alue)  1
2
 (Small Growth+Big Growth): (6.2)
The momentum factor is computed based on six value-weighted portfolios formed on total
market equity (MV) at the end of the previous month and prior 1-year return (excluding
the return of the most recent month). In contrast to the value and size factor-mimicking
portfolios, the momentum portfolios are rebalanced monthly. Return breakpoints are the
30th and 70th percentiles and the size breakpoint is the median market equity. 1) Invalid
price data, 2) negative MV data, or 3) missing prior one-year return data results in exclu-
sion of the rm's stock for the particular month concerned. Returns for the momentum
factor (WML) are then calculated as follows:
WML =
1
2
 (Small High+Big High)  1
2
 (Small Low +Big Low): (6.3)
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Construction of regional stock market factors
In order to compute the world-wide factors and the factors for the dierent world regions
comprising of several markets/countries, we utilize the methodology of Grin (2002).
That is, world-wide respectively regional factors are market weighted averages of the
country-specic components. For example, the value factor for Europe in month t is cal-
culated as: HMLt;Eur =
PN
k=1 Ik;t;Eur  wk;t 1;Eur HMLk;t, where N is the total number
of countries, Ik;t;Eur is an indicator variable taking the value 1 (0) when country k is a
part of Europe, wk;t 1;Eur is the fraction of the total dollar-denominated European market
capitalization attributable to country k at the end of the previous month, and HMLk;t
is the factor-mimicking return for country k in month t. Data on the total dollar-market
capitalization of each country is extracted from Datastream (e.g., code TOTMKBD(MV)
for Germany). Our assignment of the countries to the regions Europe, European Monetary
Union, North America, and Pacic follows the index country membership denition used
by MSCI. To construct the world factors, we use a slightly dierent methodology: Each
month, we sort countries in descending order based on their total dollar-denominated
market capitalization and calculate the cumulative coverage of the world market capital-
ization at each country. After a total market coverage of 85% is achieved, we stop with
this procedure and exclude all other countries from the factor return calculations. Mar-
ket weights for the included countries are adjusted proportionally. With this approach,
we account for the fact that errors in the database are more likely for rms in smaller,
emerging economies, especially in the earlier parts of the sample period. Since our sample
period is from 1973 till 2009 in chapter 5, but Worldscope data is not available prior to
1980, we use the U.S. factor returns from Kenneth French's website for the earlier part
of our sample period (1973-1980) as an approximation for the world-wide factor returns.
The dollar-market capitalization weight of the United States was considerably larger in
the 1970's than in the later parts of the sample period. Hence, we do not expect this
methodology to have an fundamental impact on the estimated factor returns.
Data selection for the bond and commodity universe All of our bond and commod-
ity data are extracted from Thomson Reuters Datastream. Specically, our selection of
21 commodities comprises GSCI total return indices as well as spot prices for Aluminum,
Brent Crude, Cocoa, Coee, Copper, Corn, Cotton, Crude Oil, Gas Oil, Gold, Heating
Oil, Lead, Live Cattle, Lean Hogs, Natural Gas, Nickel, Silver, Soybeans, Sugar, Wheat,
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and Zinc. At any point in time during our sample period for this analysis (January 1988 to
December 2009), data on at least 14 commodities are available. Our bonds selection con-
stitutes of Merrill Lynch short-term government bond index returns as well as ve-year
government bond yields for the following nine countries: Australia, Canada, Denmark,
Germany, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. Asness
et al. (2009) rely on the same countries (plus Norway). At any point in time during our
sample period, at least seven bond series are available. Finally, we also obtain changes in
country-specic consumer price index changes for all of these countries.
Factor construction for the bond and commodity market Our methodology is
intended to result in simple value and momentum measures for bonds and commodities,
which are, to the extent possible, consistent with the basic ideas developed in the recent
literature. To this end, we closely follow the concept employed by Asness et al. (2009)
in deriving our value measures for commodities and bonds. Specically, for commodities,
the measure for month t is computed as the spot price ve years ago divided by the spot
price in month t-2. For bonds, the value measure is computed as the yield on the ve-year
government bond index minus the current change in the county-specic consumer price
index. The latter might be regarded as a proxy for rational ination expectations. For
momentum, we follow an approach commonly employed in studies on the stock market.
Specically, our momentum measure is the past cumulative (total) return on the asset
during months t-12 to t-2. For both bonds and commodities, we construct zero-cost,
long-short portfolios. To this end, we rst compute, for any point in time, the median
of the measures for value and momentum. Each component of the bond or commodity
universe with a value above or below this breakpoint is then assigned to either the long or
the short portfolio. Components are equal-weighted. This portfolio construction is redone
every month. The factor return for month t is then simply computed as the dierence
between the return of the long portfolio and the return of the short portfolio.
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